The Changed (and Changing?) Uniform Commercial Code by Garvin, Larry T.
Florida State University Law Review
Volume 26 | Issue 2 Article 4
1999
The Changed (and Changing?) Uniform
Commercial Code
Larry T. Garvin
1@1.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida State University Law
Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact bkaplan@law.fsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Larry T. Garvin, The Changed (and Changing?) Uniform Commercial Code, 26 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 285 (1999) .
http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol26/iss2/4
FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY 
LAW REVIEW 
 
 
 
THE CHANGED (AND CHANGING?) UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
 
Larry T. Garvin
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VOLUME 26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WINTER 1999 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NUMBER 2
 
Recommended citation: Larry T. Garvin, The Changed (and Changing?) Uniform 
Commercial Code, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 285 (1999).  
THE CHANGED (AND CHANGING?) UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE*
LARRY T. GARVIN**
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 286
II. ARTICLE 2A.............................................................................................................. 288
A. Background ...................................................................................................... 288
B. New Article 2A.................................................................................................. 290
1. Finance Leases........................................................................................... 291
2. Security Interests and Leaseholds ............................................................ 293
3. Lease Remedies.......................................................................................... 297
(a) Entitlement to Remedies..................................................................... 298
(b) Lessee’s Damages ................................................................................ 299
i. Restitution .................................................................................... 299
ii. Cover ............................................................................................. 300
(c) Lessor’s Damages................................................................................ 302
i. Re-Lease........................................................................................ 302
ii. Contract-Market Damages .......................................................... 303
iii. Lost-Volume Lessor ...................................................................... 304
iv. Action for the Rent ....................................................................... 305
v. Catch-All Damages ...................................................................... 306
4. Other Changes ........................................................................................... 307
(a) Subordination ..................................................................................... 307
(b) Right of Revocation............................................................................. 308
C. Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 309
III. ARTICLE 8 ................................................................................................................ 313
A. The Virtual Stock Certificate.......................................................................... 317
B. The Rise of Negotiability................................................................................. 320
C. Security Interests in . . . What? ...................................................................... 324
1. Securing Securities ................................................................................... 324
2. The Insecurity of Securities Accounts; Priorities Under the New
Article 8...................................................................................................... 329
(a) Priority Battles with a Customer as Debtor..................................... 330
(b) Priority Battles with the Securities Intermediary as Debtor.......... 332
(c) “WARNING: YOUR SECURITIES INTERMEDIARY MAY BE
DANGEROUS TO YOUR WEALTH” .............................................. 333
D. Conclusion........................................................................................................ 335
IV. THE GHOST OF U.C.C. YET TO COME .................................................................... 336
A. Article 5 ............................................................................................................ 336
B. Article 9 ............................................................................................................ 342
C. Articles 2 and 2B ............................................................................................. 345
V. A FEW WORDS ON UNIFORM LAW-MAKING........................................................... 351
                                                                                                                      
* Adapted, with apologies, from the excellent ALI-ABA series. See, e.g., THE
EMERGED AND EMERGING NEW UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 283 (ALI-ABA Course of
Study, Dec. 9-11, 1993).
** Associate Professor, Florida State University College of Law; Visiting Associate
Professor, Washington University School of Law. B.A., B.S., Michigan State University;
M.S., University of Michigan; J.D., Yale Law School. My thanks to the tireless librarians at
Florida State and Washington Universities, who unaccountably are still speaking to me. I
should note that I am an Observer to the Uniform Commercial Code Article 2 Drafting
Committee and a member of the Article 9 Study Committee of the Florida Bar, though
nothing here should be taken to reflect anyone’s views other than mine.
286 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:285
VI. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................... 358
I.   INTRODUCTION
The Uniform Commercial Code of today is not the Uniform Com-
mercial Code of our youth, or, in any event, of those halcyon days be-
fore law school. By now, almost every article has been revised at least
once, and the last holdouts—Articles 1 and 2—are even now being
changed, and will reach final form in a year or so.1 Indeed, we even
have two new articles, covering leases of personalty and electronic
funds transfers, and a new article on licensing may come forth in
2000.2
The last decade has proven especially active. Since 1990, most of
the Code has been revised or written anew, including those parts now
under change. State legislatures have been busy keeping up with the
onslaught of revised articles, new articles, and conforming amend-
ments; law professors have come out with many profitable new edi-
tions of casebooks; practitioners have attended countless slumbrous
CLE sessions in which the new rules were more or less explained. If
only through revision, commercial law is a growth industry.
Florida has taken part in this rather narcotic revolution, enacting,
sooner or later, the revisions that the indefatigable National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) fling forth.3
Still, Florida, whether a leader or a laggard, has retained its taste for
uniformity and eventually has always rejoined the parade, with only
occasional dirty glances from states that have marched along earlier.
The Florida Legislature’s most recent foray into the U.C.C. was last
session’s enactment of two revisions: those of Article 2A, governing
leases of personal property, and 8, governing the transfer of invest-
ment securities.4 This foray provides the excuse, such as it is, for this
                                                                                                                      
1. Article 7, on warehouse receipts and bills of lading, will not be revised in the short
run. An ABA task force recently examined Article 7, concluding that no substantial over-
haul was in order. In addition, the task force thought changes in the corresponding federal
statutes perhaps desirable, but also perhaps infeasible. Finally, there were uncertainties
as to the path electronic commerce might take and thus whether revision was yet appro-
priate. Accordingly, the Permanent Editorial Board of the U.C.C. decided not to recom-
mend revision of Article 7 at present. See Fred H. Miller, Et Sic Ulterius—V, UCC BULL.,
Feb. 1998, at 1, 7.
2. See infra Part IV.C.
3. Usually later. For the most recent set of revisions, for instance, Florida was the
next-to-last state to operate under the old version of Article 2A, and one of only six to oper-
ate under the old Article 8. See Miller, supra note 1, at 3-4.
4. See Act effective Oct. 1, 1999, ch. 98-11, 1998 Fla. Laws 105 (codified at FLA.
STAT. chs. 678, 680 (Supp. 1998)). Governor Chiles, presumably preferring not to take a
public stand on so fraught an issue, allowed the bill to become law without his signature.
See id. at 161.
In the enactment of revised Articles 2A and 8, the Legislature put in place one nonuni-
form amendment to Article 9. Section 9-105(1)(e) of the Official Text, defining deposit ac-
count, had excluded “an account evidenced by a certificate of deposit.” U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(e)
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Article (such as it is). Part II discusses Article 2A, while Part III dis-
cusses Article 8. These two parts explain how each revision changes
the law in its field, noting both the improvements and the possible pit-
falls of the revisions and, in an exercise of the usual professorial pre-
rogative, showing how much better each would have been if only
someone had asked me first.
In addition, Parts II and III will discuss briefly how each revision
came about. Each exemplifies a sort of statutory pathology, whether of
NCCUSL, the several states, or some other force. One wonders, I sup-
pose, about an Article that needed significant revision almost within
minutes of its proposal to the states, or of another which boldly
charted a course that the world blithely ignored. From these one may
draw morals about future attempts at statutory development.
Finally, Part IV will canvass briefly the work ahead. Despite its re-
cent spate of enactments, Florida still has not enacted revised Article
5, on letters of credit, which was proposed to the states in 1995 and
which has been adopted in thirty-two.5 In addition, three more articles
are on the way: revised Article 9, governing secured transactions,
which was approved by NCCUSL and the American Law Institute
(ALI) in 1998 and which has just been put in final form; revised Article
2, on sales of goods, which should be ready for approval in 1999 and
proposal in 2000; and new Article 2B on licenses, which may be ready
in 2000 or 2001. This last part will contain a few general assessments
                                                                                                                      
(1995). The Florida amendment revised the definition to exclude “an account evidenced by
a transferrable certificate of deposit that is an instrument within this article.” FLA. STAT. §
679.105(1)(e) (Supp. 1998). The effect of this is to place nontransferable certificates of de-
posit potentially within the scope of deposit accounts, which are not governed by Article 9.
See U.C.C. § 9-104(l) (1995). If a nontransferable certificate of deposit is not governed by
Article 9, then a security interest in it can be perfected only under the common law rule of
giving notice to the depository bank. See, e.g., Bank of Winter Park v. Resolution Trust
Corp., 633 So. 2d 53, 55 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994).
It is hard to see why this amendment was put in place. A certificate of deposit, even if
nontransferable, may still be an instrument, a security interest in which can be perfected
by possession under Article 9. See U.C.C. § 9-305 (1995). This conclusion was easier to
reach until the recent revision of Article 3, adopted in Florida, which narrowed the defini-
tion of negotiable instrument to exclude nontransferable certificates of deposit. See id. § 3-
102(a). Even under the revised version, though, a number of courts have held that non-
transferable certificates of deposit are instruments under the broader definition in Article
9. See, e.g., Craft Prods., Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 670 N.E.2d 959, 961 (Ind. Ct. App.
1996); Belke v. M&I First Nat’l Bank, 525 N.W.2d 737, 738 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994). Indeed,
an earlier decision of the Florida Supreme Court, made when Florida still had old Article 3,
held the very same thing. See Citizens Nat’l Bank v. Bornstein, 374 So. 2d 6, 9-10 (Fla.
1979). If the amendment was intended to remove nontransferable certificates of deposit
from Article 9, then it fails at the job; a better way to have done so would have been to re-
define “instrument” within Article 9 to exclude these as well. Still, the amendment seems
harmless, especially because a new Article 9 is on the way and will likely be enacted in
Florida in the next few years. See infra Part IV.B. If this amendment was the price of
gaining the support of certain parts of the banking industry for these U.C.C. revisions,
then it was well worth it.
5. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 1, at 4. Thirty-two states had enacted Revised Article
5 as of early 1998; others will likely have enacted it by the time this Article goes to press.
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and thoroughly unreliable predictions about the fate, deserved or not,
of each. In addition, Part V will suggest some changes in both Florida’s
treatment of uniform legislation and the treatment of uniform legisla-
tion generally. Now on with the festivities.
II.   ARTICLE 2A
A.   Background
The U.C.C., and uniform law generally, has had rather a troubled
relation with the law of personal property leasing. In the early days
B.L. (Before Llewellyn), the field was left almost entirely to the com-
mon law of the several states (and, before Erie,6 to the general federal
common law as well). Llewellyn, generally something of an imperialist
for his commercial code, left leasing alone. This is not to say that the
U.C.C. had no effect on lease law; a good many courts chose to apply
the principles of Article 2 by analogy.7 Still, others did not, and few
enough did that leasing law remained variant.8
This might not have been troubling if leasing of personalty had re-
mained either inconsequential or fundamentally local. If the former,
uniformity would hardly be worth the effort.9 If the latter, then codifi-
cation might be in order, but uniformity might not; a model statute,
rather than a uniform statute, might be as far as one would want to
go. Neither proved true. Personal property leasing has burgeoned over
the last couple of decades. By 1987, when Article 2A was first pro-
posed, almost 100 billion dollars in equipment was added through
leasing.10 The current estimates for 1998 are over 180 billion, in each
case around thirty percent of total business investment in equip-
                                                                                                                      
6. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
7. See, e.g., W.E. Johnson Equip. Co. v. United Airlines, Inc., 238 So. 2d 98, 99-100
(Fla. 1970); Redfern Meats, Inc. v. Hertz Corp., 215 S.E.2d 10, 15-17 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975);
Glenn Dick Equip. Co. v. Galey Constr., Inc., 541 P.2d 1184, 1188-89 (Idaho 1975); see also,
e.g., Amelia H. Boss, Panacea or Nightmare? Leases in Article 2, 64 B.U. L. REV. 39 (1984);
William D. Hawkland, The Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on Equipment Leas-
ing, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 446; Daniel E. Murray, Under the Spreading Analogy of Article 2 of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 39 FORDHAM L. REV. 447 (1971). This application was more
or less authorized in the comments to the statute, though rather coyly. See U.C.C. § 1-102
cmt. 1 (1995) (stating that courts “have recognized the policies embodied in an act as appli-
cable in reason to subject-matter which was not expressly included in the language of the
act . . . . Nothing in this Act stands in the way of the continuance of such action by the
courts.”).
8. See, e.g., DeKalb Agresearch, Inc. v. Abbott, 391 F. Supp. 152, 153-54 (N.D. Ala.
1974); Alpiser v. Eagle Pontiac-GMC-Isuzu, Inc., 389 S.E.2d 293, 294-95 (N.C. Ct. App.
1990); W.R. Weaver Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 580 S.W.2d 76, 81 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
9. This evidently is why leasing was not codified when the U.C.C. was first drafted.
See WILLIAM H. LAWRENCE & JOHN H. MINAN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY LEASING
¶ 1.01 (1993).
10. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S. INDUSTRIAL OUTLOOK 1992, at 52-1 (1992).
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ment.11 In addition, leasing is very much a multi-state affair, as a visit
to any airport will suggest. Codification was thus in order.
NCCUSL thus started drafting a Uniform Personal Property
Leasing Act in 1981.12 This model statute was approved by NCCUSL
in 1985; immediately after, though, it was suggested that the Act be
folded into the U.C.C, which took another two years.13 We thus saw
the first new article for the U.C.C. since its initial proposal: Article 2A
on personal property leasing. At least one symposium, and a good
many articles in a range of legal periodicals, heralded its advent.14 A
number of states quickly considered it, and a few adopted it posthaste.
Almost from the first, though, Article 2A proved troublesome, or
perhaps the states did. A State Bar of California study recommended a
good many nonuniform amendments to Article 2A.15 The California
Legislature passed Article 2A with quite a few of these and added
some of its own.16 Similarly, Massachusetts took many of the Califor-
nia changes, revised them, and added a few more.17 Other jurisdic-
tions, with or without encouragement from bar associations and law
review commissions, followed along.18 On the other hand, other juris-
dictions, starting with Oklahoma, enacted the 1987 Official Text as
is.19 Florida adopted the original version of 2A in 1990, following Cali-
fornia and Massachusetts in part and adding a few original variants.20
Even as Florida enacted the 1987 version, though, NCCUSL was
hard at work amending the 1987 text to take account of these criti-
cisms. NCCUSL was worried—and rightly so—that the Califor-
nia/Massachusetts approach would engulf the uniform version.21 Ac-
                                                                                                                      
11. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S. INDUSTRY & TRADE OUTLOOK 1998, at 47-17
(1998). These totals exclude short-term equipment leases and consumer leases. See id.
12. See, e.g., Amelia H. Boss, The New [1990] Article 2A: Leases, in THE EMERGED AND
EMERGING NEW UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 283, 283 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, Dec. 9-
11, 1993).
13. See id.
14. The symposium is Symposium, Article 2A of the Uniform Commercial Code, 39
ALA. L. REV. 559 (1988). Many of the pieces in this symposium are cited to in this Article.
15. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE COMMITTEE, STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, REPORT ON
PROPOSED CALIFORNIA COMMERCIAL CODE DIVISION 10 (ARTICLE 2A) (1987), reprinted in
Harry C. Sigman & Jeffrey S. Turner, Preface to the California Report on Article 2A (With
Some Thoughts About Participation in the Legislative Process), 39 ALA. L. REV. 975, 979-
1049 (1988) [hereinafter California Report].
16. CAL. COM. CODE §§ 10101-10532 (West 1990).
17. See, e.g., Daryl B. Robertson, Report of the Commercial Code Committee of the Sec-
tion of Business Law of the State Bar of Texas on UCC Article 2A, 43 BAYLOR L. REV. 235,
237 (1991).
18. See, e.g., Boss, supra note 12, at 283; Robertson, supra note 17, at 237-38.
19. See Act effective Nov. 1, 1988, ch. 86, 1988 Okla. Sess. Laws 1683 (current version
at OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, §§ 2A-101 to 2A-532 (West 1998)).
20. See Act effective Jan. 1, 1991, ch. 90-278, 1990 Fla. Laws 2114 (current version at
FLA. STAT. ch. 680 (1997)).
21. See, e.g., Fred H. Miller, The Uniform Article 2A Amendments and the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws After One Hundred Years, 45
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 193, 193 (1991).
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cordingly, the Standby Committee on Article 2A consulted with those
involved with the California and Massachusetts efforts, as well as oth-
ers, with an eye toward preserving uniformity and accommodating the
policy differences contained in the amendments.22 As a result,
NCCUSL put forth a set of amendments to some twenty-four sections
of Article 2A, taking into account many of the changes proposed else-
where and adding a few new ones. Had Florida waited one legislative
session, it could have put in place the now-uniform version.23 Still,
here we are. Better late, etc.
What follows in this Part is a look at the principal changes to Flor-
ida’s version of Article 2A made by the recent amendments. This is not
the same as a comparison of the 1987 and 1990 versions of Article 2A.
Florida’s old version and the 1990 amendments have a common ances-
tor in the California/Massachusetts version, so many of the amend-
ments did not change Florida law. Moreover, as will be discussed be-
low, the recent amendments to Florida’s Article 2A did not wipe out
Florida’s nonuniformity.24 Rather, Florida moved from one nonuniform
version to another, more uniform version. The comparison is the focus
of what follows.25
B.   New Article 2A
For the most part, the 1990 revisions to Article 2A left Article 2A
intact. There were, however, some important revisions, particularly in
the areas of finance leases, security interests in leasehold interests,
and lease remedies. These will be dealt with in turn.
                                                                                                                      
22. See id. NCCUSL creates a Standby Committee whenever it sets forth a new stat-
ute. The Standby Committee watches over the statute and can recommend changes if the
need arises. See id. at 193 & n.4.
23. To some extent, Florida already had. Insofar as the Florida adoption of the Cali-
fornia/Massachusetts version merely anticipated the 1990 amendments, Florida’s Article
2A has not changed in substance (though possibly in form). For example, the 1990 treat-
ment of finance leases drew heavily on the California version and thus does not materially
change Florida law. This Article will not discuss either unamended sections of Article 2A
or, with a few exceptions, sections where Florida’s nonuniform version agreed in substance
with the 1990 amendments. For more on Florida’s initial adoption of Article 2A, see James
E. Foster & David G. Shields, Personal Property Leasing in Florida: Moving 2A Uniform
Treatment, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 295 (1991).
24. See infra notes 151-159 and accompanying text.
25. This discussion has general application, though, because most of Florida’s Article
2A is the same as the official 1990 version, just as most of its earlier version was the same
as the official 1987 version.
One point of nomenclature and citation format. For ease in reference, this Article refers
to the Florida Statutes only when looking at a nonuniform variant of Article 2A. Other-
wise, references to the current version of Article 2A are to the 1995 Official Text, and ref-
erences to the older version are to the 1987 Official Text (and are so designated in each
footnote).
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1.   Finance Leases
Most leasing occurs when a lessor in possession of goods grants use
of the goods to a lessee for consideration. At times, though, the lessor
does not own the goods that the lessee wishes to rent. The lessee typi-
cally wishes to arrange for the goods directly with a supplier; the les-
sor essentially just finances the purchase of the goods, though it does
take title plus a residuary interest in the goods themselves. This
transaction is analogous to a purchase money security agreement: the
lessor here is in the same position as the bank or other third-party
creditor in the purchase money situation. Here, too, the lessor is usu-
ally a financial institution.
These transactions are finance leases. They involve three parties—
the supplier, the finance lessor, and the finance lessee—and two con-
tracts—the supply contract and the lease contract. Though Article 2A
usually follows Article 2 closely, here there are strong Article 9 over-
lays. Perhaps in part for this reason, Article 2A has a number of spe-
cial rules for finance leases that recognize the limited role of the fi-
nance lessor in the transaction. To be sure, as the Chief Reporter for
Article 2A observed, special provisions really were not necessary; if the
finance lessor wanted to limit its potential liability, it could do so using
conventional disclaimers.26 These consensual finance leases were
common before Article 2A and were in no way impeded by its enact-
ment.27 Still, finance leases are important enough, and the finance
leasing industry obdurate enough, that these provisions exist as safe
harbors.28
The original finance lease provisions garnered some criticism, for
the most part because their scope was, in the eyes of the finance leas-
ing industry, unduly narrow. The original definition required that the
finance lessee either receive a copy of the supply contract before sign-
ing the lease contract or approve the supply contract as a condition to
the effectiveness of the lease contract.29 Some finance lessors objected
because they did not want to reveal the full supply contracts to their
lessees. Accordingly, the definition was amended to allow more limited
information to be transmitted.30 Florida helped lead the way here; its
                                                                                                                      
26. See Edwin E. Huddleson, III, Old Wine in New Bottles: UCC Article 2A-Leases, 39
ALA. L. REV. 615, 661 & n.151 (1988). Huddleson thus characterized the finance lease pro-
visions of Article 2A as “a sop to industry.” Id. at 661.
27. See, e.g., 2 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 13-3(a) (4th ed. 1995).
28. As of 1995, leaving aside short-term rentals, finance leases governed 87% of the
cost of equipment subject to commercial leases. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S.
INDUSTRY AND TRADE OUTLOOK 1998, at 47-16 (1998).
29. See U.C.C. § 2A-103(g)(iii) (1987).
30. See U.C.C. § 2A-103(g)(iii) (1995); see also Miller, supra note 21, at 193-94.
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version of Article 2A has had substantially similar language since its
initial enactment.31 The change is thus purely stylistic.
There are other changes to finance lease provisions in the 1990 ver-
sion of Article 2A, most of which are either issues of style or, like the
definition of finance lease, are present already in Florida’s version of
Article 2A.32 Two fall into neither category, and merit brief attention.
First, the 1990 amendments clarified the treatment of “hell or high
water” clauses in finance leases. These picturesquely named clauses
provide that the lessee is obliged to perform under the lease, regard-
less of the lessor’s non-performance, once the lessee has accepted the
goods. These are standard in finance leases because the quality of the
leased goods is the responsibility of the supplier, whose warranties ex-
tend through the lessor to the finance lessee.33 If the finance lessee is
dissatisfied, it may go after the supplier; it must, however, continue to
pay the finance lessor. Hell or high water clauses were statutorily put
in place for nonconsumer finance lessees in the 1987 version of Article
2A.34 The 1990 amendment was intended to clarify that hell or high
water clauses in other sorts of lease agreements, most notably con-
sumer leases, might be attacked under other law (mainly unconscion-
ability).35 By its terms, though, the amendment applies to all lease
agreements, including contractual finance leases, which leaves open
an attack on their validity.36 Second, the finance lessee, if not also a
consumer lessee, may revoke its acceptance of the leased goods if the
lessor defaults under the lease contract and that default substantially
impairs the value of the goods to the lessee.37 Hitherto, the statute was
silent on whether the finance lessor’s failure to comply with its duties
under the lease agreement would allow the finance lessee to revoke.
As it stands, unless the lease agreement provides otherwise,38 the fi-
nance lessee may revoke only if the goods are nonconforming, the non-
conformity substantially impairs their value to the lessee, and the fi-
                                                                                                                      
31. Compare FLA. STAT. § 680.1031(1)(g)(3)(c)-(d) (1991) with FLA. STAT. §
680.1031(1)(g)(3)(c)-(d) (1997).
32. Another example of the latter is U.C.C. § 2A-209, the amendments to which made
clearer the extent to which the finance lessee retained rights it may have had under
agreements between it and the supplier. Florida already had in place a nonuniform
amendment that did this, so Florida law is not changed by the advent of uniformity. See
FLA. STAT. § 680.209 (1997).
33. See U.C.C. § 2A-209 (1995).
34. See U.C.C. § 2A-407(1) (1987). This reflected the main body of caselaw under the
common law of leases. See, e.g., West Virginia v. Hassett (In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs.,
Inc.), 21 B.R. 993, 1006 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); U.S. Roofing, Inc. v. Credit Alliance Corp.,
279 Cal. Rptr. 533, 544-46 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
35. See U.C.C. § 2A-407(3) & cmt. 6 (1995); see also id. § 2A-108 (1995).
36. The provision states, in pertinent part, that “[t]his section does not affect the va-
lidity under any other law of a [hell or high water clause] in any lease contract . . . .” Id. §
2A-407(3); see also, e.g., 2 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 27, at 504.
37. See U.C.C. § 2A-517(2) (1995).
38. See id. § 2A-517(3).
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nance lessee’s failure to detect the nonconformity was induced by the
lessor’s assurances.39
Because the adoption of the 1990 amendments swept away a Flor-
ida nonuniform amendment, one other section should be mentioned.
Under both the 1987 and 1990 texts, finance lessees could not revoke
their acceptances of leased goods if they knew of a nonconformity in
the goods at the time of acceptance.40 In contrast, Florida did not apply
this blanket prohibition to consumer finance lessees where the sup-
plier helped prepare the lease contract or helped the finance lessor ne-
gotiate the terms with the lessee.41 This twist was sensible, given the
greater rights elsewhere afforded the consumer finance lessee and the
limits placed on even the consumer finance lessee’s ability to revoke
for minor nonconformities. One can easily imagine that a finance les-
see might choose not to reject because, say, of an immediate need for
the goods, or because of a lack of time to go through the rejection ma-
chinery, or because the lessee acted through an agent with power to
accept, but no power to reject (as, for example, a spouse or older child).
In any event, the nonuniform amendment is gone; a victory for uni-
formity, if not for merit.
2.   Security Interests and Leaseholds
One might expect a commercial lessor to acquire its leased goods
using borrowed funds. If the funds were advanced in order to purchase
the goods, then the lender would take a purchase money security in-
terest in the goods. Alternatively, or in addition, the lessor might
pledge its assets, including leased goods, to a bank or other creditor as
security for a line of credit. In either case, one might envisage a con-
flict if the lessor defaults. The secured creditor doubtless will wish to
assert its rights under its security agreement, presumably including
repossession under Article 9. On the other hand, the lessee has a
leasehold interest, perhaps prepaid, but in any event contractual. Who
prevails?
Under both versions of Article 2A, large classes of lessees would
prevail. Like buyers in the ordinary course of business, lessees in the
ordinary course of business take their leasehold rights free of any prior
security interest, whatever the state of perfection or knowledge.42 Even
lessees not in the ordinary course would usually prevail under either
version. The general rule provides that “a creditor of a lessor takes
subject to the lease contract.”43
                                                                                                                      
39. See id. § 2A-517(1)(b).
40. See id. § 2A-516(2).
41. See FLA. STAT. § 680.516(2) (1997).
42. Of course, the lessor retains a residual interest in the leased goods, and can repos-
sess them and dispose of them at the end of the lease term.
43. U.C.C. § 2A-307(2).
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There are exceptions, though. The 1987 and 1990 texts share one: if
the creditor’s lien attached to the goods before the lease contract be-
came enforceable, then the lien creditor will prevail.44 This does not
help secured creditors, as the definition of “lien” excludes them,45 but
will help involuntary lien creditors—materialmen, mechanics, and the
like, as well as the garden-variety judgment lien creditor.46 In contrast,
the exceptions for secured creditors were revised significantly, and
bear attention.
Originally, secured creditors prevailed over lessees not in the ordi-
nary course only if the security interest would have priority over a
properly perfected security interest taking effect when the lease con-
tract was made.47 The lessee thus resembled the hypothetical lien
creditor of the Bankruptcy Code, which sets the trustee’s power to
avoid other claims on assets of the estate.48 This created some odd re-
sults. For example, as Professor Harris has pointed out, the 1987 text
did not state which type of hypothetical lien creditor the lessee would
be. If, for example, the lessee hypothetically held a purchase money
security interest, then it would have a superpriority over earlier se-
cured creditors.49 The Official Comment to section 2A-307 stated that
the lessee ought not be considered a purchase money secured creditor,
but its rationales were not wholly convincing.50 Apart from this statu-
tory omission, though, the rule was rather arbitrary. The lessee would,
by its operation, prevail against the holder of an unperfected security
interest, even though a buyer often would not.51 On the other hand, if
the secured creditor filed before the lease contract took effect, but cre-
                                                                                                                      
44. See id. § 2A-307(2)(a).
45. See id. § 2A-103(1)(r).
46. Statutory lien creditors also take solace from section 2A-306, which, like section 9-
310 for secured creditors, gives priority to liens taken by those who furnish services or ma-
terials for goods covered by a lease contract unless the law giving rise to the lien provides
otherwise. This section was not changed in the 1990 amendments.
47. See U.C.C. § 2A-307(2)(b) (1987). This leaves aside section 2A-308, which allows a
creditor, secured or otherwise, to treat a lease contract as void if either the lessor’s contin-
ued possession of the goods or the lease itself would be fraudulent under other law. An ex-
ception is carved out for sale-leaseback arrangements, under which the seller retains pos-
session under a lease contract between the buyer as lessor and the seller as lessee. As long
as the buyer gave value and bought in good faith, such a transaction is not fraudulent,
notwithstanding section 2-402.
48. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (1994); see also Steven L. Harris, The Rights of Creditors
Under Article 2A, 39 ALA. L. REV. 803, 819 (1988).
49. See U.C.C. § 9-312(3) (1995).
50. See Harris, supra note 48, at 819-20 & n.62. Perhaps the best reason is analogy;
the bankruptcy trustee is not considered a purchase money creditor either.
51. Holders of perfected security interests prevail over holders of unperfected security
interests, even if the unperfected security interests arose before the perfected security in-
terests. See U.C.C. §§ 9-301(1)(a), -312(5) (1995). On the other hand, buyers take free of
unperfected security interests only if they are in ordinary course, see id. § 9-307(1), or if the
buyer, though not in ordinary course, gave value and took delivery without knowledge of
the security interest and before perfection. See id. § 9-301(1)(c). See generally Harris, supra
note 48, at 820-21.
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ated the security interest after, the secured creditor would prevail be-
cause perfected security interests in goods ordinarily derive priority
from the time of filing or perfection, whichever is earlier.52
These results were, to a point, smoothed out by the 1990 amend-
ments.53 Now the lessor’s secured creditor takes subject to the lease
contract unless the lessee knew of the security interest when it gave
value and took delivery (or, a fortiori, if it did not give value or did not
take delivery), or if the creditor’s security interest was perfected before
the lease contract became enforceable.54 The first situation is probably
inconsequential, though it is analogous to the rights of the buyer not in
ordinary course under Article 9.55 Only the rare lessee will either give
no value56 or leave the leased goods with the lessor (apart from returns
of goods for temporary storage or repair). It is possible that a lessee
not in the ordinary course would know generally that the lessor’s
goods would probably be subject to a security interest, but the U.C.C.
defines knowledge strictly. Knowledge includes actual knowledge
only—not constructive knowledge, not possibility, and not standard
practice.57 Combining the relative infrequency of leases not in ordinary
course and the stringency of the knowledge provision, very few leases
should remain.
The second situation—perfection before the lease contract becomes
enforceable—is more likely. Purchase money secured creditors ordi-
narily will either prefile (so perfection will occur when the debtor ac-
quires rights in the goods) or file shortly after the debtor takes control
of the goods.58 The lessee would thus almost certainly enter into the
lease contract after the secured creditor had perfected its security in-
terest. This might not be true when an ordinary lender takes equip-
ment as collateral, as the equipment may already be subject to a
leasehold. It will, however, be true much of the time, given that com-
mercial leasing firms probably have lines of credit secured by floating
                                                                                                                      
52. See U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a) (1995).
53. These amendments derive largely from California’s nonuniform enactment. Com-
pare U.C.C. § 2A-307 (1995) with California Report, supra note 15, at 1016-24. Unfortu-
nately, Florida chose to leave this out when it enacted much of the California text. Flor-
ida’s adoption of the 1990 amendments thus changes Florida leasing law substantially.
54. See U.C.C. § 2A-307(2)(b), (c) (1995).
55. See id. § 9-301(1)(c).
56. Value includes promises of payment. See id. § 1-201(44). An executory lease con-
tract thus gives value. Presumably a gratuitous bailment would not, but one would not ex-
pect to see these very often, neighborly loans of lawnmowers aside.
57. See id.  § 1-201(25) (1995); see also, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Emerald Oil Co., 789
F.2d 1441, 1445-46 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding, in the analogous context of section 9-301(1)(c),
that there was no duty to make inquiries); Clark Oil & Ref. Co. v. Liddicoat, 223 N.W.2d
530, 535-36 (Wis. 1974) (same).
58. Most states have amended U.C.C. section 9-301(2) to allow 20 days to perfect pur-
chase money security interests, the perfection to take effect retroactively. See U.C.C. § 9-
301, 3A U.L.A. 14-15 (1992 & Supp. 1998) (listing 41 states that have adopted the 20-day
standard).
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liens in equipment. Still, this narrows the old rule because prefiled fi-
nancing statements will not by themselves yield priority; only if there
is actual perfection, which includes the taking of the security interest,
will the secured creditor win.
Another scenario in which the 1990 amendments might affect the
result arises when the lease contract antedates the lessor’s acquisition
of the goods. Even a prefiled financing statement will not give rise to a
perfected security interest until the secured creditor’s rights attach,
which may not occur until the debtor acquires rights in the goods.59 If
the lease contract took effect before then, the 1990 amendments would
hold that the lessee would prevail. In contrast, under the 1987 version,
the lessee was treated as a hypothetical lien creditor as of the date of
the lease contract. Since the secured creditor’s security interest would
derive its priority from the time of filing, the secured creditor would
have prevailed. To be sure, this fact pattern requires that the lease
contract become enforceable before the leased goods are even in the
hands of the lessor, much less delivered to the lessee. Still, one can an-
ticipatorily breach any contract, including a lease contract, so this may
not be chimerical.60
Which rule makes more sense? Probably the 1990 flavor. Lessees,
like buyers, acquire at least partial rights in the goods. Both buyers
and lessees might reasonably assume that their sellers or lessors
maintain their inventory subject to loans of various types. Neverthe-
less, financers not just expect, but desire, that the collateral be alien-
ated, in order that the debtor may pay off the loans. In order to ease
these transactions, ordinary course lessors and buyers receive formi-
dable rights.
Buyers and lessees who take out of the ordinary course, however,
more properly suspect that the goods may carry encumbrances. Fur-
thermore, the financers are less likely to want the debtors to dispose of
the goods. By definition, a disposition not in the ordinary course of
business is not part of the seller’s or lessor’s normal business.61 Typi-
cally, a seller may sell off some fixtures or equipment, or may lease
equipment that was purchased for the lessor’s own use. If so, the pro-
ceeds of the disposition will likely not be as high as might be true of
ordinary course transactions. This is not to say that secured parties
would always object; better to dispose of unneeded equipment or the
like at low prices if it would otherwise become valueless. Still, such
transactions are often associated with failing businesses, and failing
businesses often will take desperate steps in order to avoid bank-
                                                                                                                      
59. See U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(c) (1995).
60. See id. § 2A-402 (anticipatory repudiation); cf. U.C.C. § 2-610 (1995) (same; sales
of goods); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 250 (1981) (same; common law).
61. See U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (1995) (buyers); id. § 2A-103(1)(o) (lessors).
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ruptcy, even steps that their secured creditors would frown upon.62
This may justify the harsher treatment of lessees and buyers out of the
ordinary course.
But does this justify disparate treatment? The old rule subordi-
nated lessees out of the ordinary course when the secured party had
prefiled, presumably on the basis that the lessee had constructive no-
tice of a security interest. Though a financing statement does not nec-
essarily betoken a security agreement, it often does, and the lessee
might thus be alerted of its need to search further. But why would a
lessee, even out of the ordinary course, expect to search? The tran-
sience of leaseholds further undercuts the apparent need to search.
Finally, the 1987 version’s analogy to bankruptcy is peculiar, to say
the least. Creditors may not, among other things, take or perfect secu-
rity interests after the filing of a bankruptcy petition.63 But no such
rule prevents a creditor from taking a security interest in goods after a
lease contract is signed.
Perhaps, in the end, the real virtue of the amendment is uniform-
ity. Now buyers and lessees are treated in the same way. True, one
can concoct odd hypotheticals in which a crafty creditor hoodwinks les-
sees into renting from the debtor/lessor, and then contrives to get su-
perior rights. For the most part, these might best be left to professors
in desperate search of exam questions. The 1990 amendments reject
the false analogy to bankruptcy and adopt instead a truer analogy to
Article 2. That should suffice.
3.   Lease Remedies
Article 2A’s remedial provisions were quite controversial when Ar-
ticle 2A was first put forth, drawing fire from, among others, the Cali-
fornia Bar64 and academic commentators.65 They were thus redrafted
extensively; though they remain imperfect, they have received at least
the moderate endorsement of many.66 Both the 1987 and 1990 versions
                                                                                                                      
62. After all, failing firms present a classic moral hazard problem. Secured creditors
of failing firms logically wish to maximize the value of their collateral, which probably
means avoiding desperate and risky maneuvers. Equity holders, on the other hand, will
lose all in case of bankruptcy, so they have an incentive to take risks with the funds they
have received through secured credit. See, e.g., Larry T. Garvin, Credit, Information, and
Trust in the Law of Sales: The Credit Seller’s Right of Reclamation, 44 UCLA L. REV. 247,
285-86, 309-11 (1996).
63. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3)-(5) (1994).
64. See California Report, supra note 15, at 1030-46.
65. See, e.g., Marion W. Benfield, Jr., Lessor’s Damages Under Article 2A After Default
by the Lessee as to Accepted Goods, 39 ALA. L. REV. 915 (1988); Michael J. Herbert, A Draft
Too Soon: Article 2A of the Uniform Commercial Code, 93 COM. L.J. 413 (1988); Donald J.
Rapson, Deficiencies and Ambiguities in Lessors’ Remedies Under Article 2A: Using Official
Comments to Cure Problems in the Statute, 39 ALA. L. REV. 875 (1988).
66. For example, Professor Herbert, who had excoriated the 1987 version. Compare
Michael J. Herbert, Getting Better All the Time: The Official (Revised) Remedy Provisions
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draw heavily on Article 2 concepts, and often language, which at times
may yield obscure and odd results. But now for the changes.
(a)   Entitlement to Remedies
An important area that underwent some change is default. This is
dealt with in sections 2A-508 to 2A-517. One change reverses what
looked like a departure from the Article 2 analogue. Section 2A-508(4),
dealing with the lessee’s remedies, states in both versions that the les-
see may recover damages if the lessor breached a warranty. This
hardly needed saying, given that section 2A-508(1) grants the lessee a
right to a remedy if the lessor fails to comply with the lease agree-
ment.
The comment, though, shifts interestingly. Originally, it provided
that a lessor’s breach of warranty might not result in default “unless
the breach is material.”67 This appears to put in place the material
breach rule familiar in the common law.68 Article 2, in contrast, uses a
perfect tender rule for rejection, though one subject to a good many ex-
ceptions.69 The drafters stated no reason for this change. Perhaps they
felt that an ongoing relation like a lease should not be subject to re-
scission for a minor defect, even if subject to a right of cure.70 This may
well be a valid point for long-term leases, but it deprives the lessee of a
powerful bargaining tool in forcing the lessor to provide the promised
goods. In any event, the 1990 comment states that a breach of war-
ranty “may not rise to the level of a default by the lessor justifying
revocation of acceptance.”71 This changes nothing; it merely adverts to
the revocation rules of section 2A-517, based closely on Article 2, which
limit the lessee’s rights to revoke its acceptance of nonconforming
goods unless, among other things, the value of the good is substan-
tially impaired.72
Beyond this, the statute was amended to make clearer that the par-
ties may define default as they like and may thus create their own
rules about when they might claim remedies.73
                                                                                                                      
of the Uniform Commercial Code’s Article 2A, 96 COM. L.J. 1 (1991) (favoring adoption),
with Herbert, supra note 65 (favoring rejection or significant amendment before adoption).
67. U.C.C. § 2A-508 cmt. (1987).
68. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241 (1981); see also, e.g., Jacob
& Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 890-91 (N.Y. 1921) (Cardozo, J.).
69. See U.C.C. § 2-601 (1995). For interesting discussions of the perfect tender and
material breach rules, see William H. Lawrence, The Prematurely Reported Demise of the
Perfect Tender Rule, 35 U. KAN. L. REV. 557 (1987); George L. Priest, Breach and Remedy
for the Tender of Nonconforming Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code: An Economic
Approach, 91 HARV. L. REV. 960 (1978).
70. See U.C.C. § 2A-513 (1995).
71. Id. § 2A-508 cmt. 6.
72. See id. § 2A-517(1); cf. id. § 2-608(1) (sales of goods; analogous provision requiring
substantial impairment for revocation).
73. See id. §§ 2A-508(1)(d), -523(1)(f), -523(3).
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(b)   Lessee’s Damages
Assuming that the lessor has in some way defaulted on its obliga-
tions, then the lessee will likely be entitled to damages. How these are
measured has proven vexing, whether under the 1987 version of Arti-
cle 2A, Florida’s old nonuniform version, or the recent amendments.
Two sets of changes seem material: those to the lessee’s restitutionary
remedy, and those to the cover remedy.
i.   Restitution
In the catalog of remedies available to the lessee, Article 2A once
provided that the lessee could “recover so much of the rent and secu-
rity as has been paid, but in the case of an installment lease contract
the recovery is that which is just under the circumstances.”74 This ap-
parently would allow the lessee to recover its full stream of payments,
even if it had derived most of the value of the lease agreement. If, for
example, the lessor under a five-year lease defaulted on its mainte-
nance obligations under the lease in year three, the lessee probably
could revoke its acceptance75 and, under this section, recover its lease
payments for the two or more years in which it had used the leased
goods. Except for installment lease contracts,76 the payments, if one
takes the section literally, would not be offset by the value of the
leased goods for the time of use. To be sure, the general rule of the
U.C.C. limits damages to those necessary to put the breached-against
party in the position it would have been in had the contract been per-
formed in full.77 Still, the narrow limitation of this principle to install-
ment leases in this section might suggest that the lessee could gain
through the lessor’s breach.
This notion, though foreign to expectation, is not unknown at com-
mon law; restitution, as a good many famous cases have told us, is not
limited by expectation.78 The 1990 amendments, however, changed the
text and comments to subordinate restitution more fully to expecta-
tion. The text now limits the lessee’s recovery of its rent and security
in all cases to that which is just.79 Moreover, the comment clarifies the
point by noting that the return of the lease payments may be reduced
if the goods have been used while the lease payments were made.80 As
                                                                                                                      
74. U.C.C. § 2A-508(1)(b) (1987).
75. See U.C.C. § 2A-517(2) (1995).
76. Lease contracts under which separate lots of goods would be delivered and ac-
cepted separately. See id. § 2A-103(1)(i).
77. See id. § 1-106(1).
78. See, e.g., United States v. Algernon Blair, Inc., 479 F.2d 638, 641 (4th Cir. 1973);
Scaduto v. Orlando, 381 F.2d 587, 595-96 (2d Cir. 1967); see also, e.g., RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 373 cmt. d (1981).
79. See U.C.C. § 2A-508(1)(b) (1995).
80. See id. § 2A-508 cmt. 2.
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has often been true over the last century: Expectation 1, Restitution
0.81
ii.   Cover
Should the lessor breach, the lessee may wish to secure replace-
ment goods and sue the lessor for the added cost, if any. Cover has
long been a remedy available under Article 2, and Article 2A follows to
some extent this statutory analogue.82 This section was revised exten-
sively in 1990, though, as we shall see, Florida had anticipated one of
the amendments.
Cover is available when, on the lessor’s breach, the lessee makes a
substantially similar lease agreement for replacement goods in good
faith and in a commercially reasonable manner.83 Leaving aside for the
moment just how one determines whether two leases are substantially
similar,84 what is the remedy? Besides the usual incidental and conse-
quential damages, the lessee gets, put in the most general way, the
difference between the cover price and the contract price, as in Article
2. How this difference is measured has changed with the drafts.
Originally, the lessee would receive the present value, as of the
date of default, of the difference between the rent for the lease term of
the new agreement and the total rent for the balance of the lease term
under the old lease.85 If a cover lease was longer than the original
                                                                                                                      
81. Restitution may be coming back, though. The ALI has started work on a Restate-
ment (Third) of Restitution (though, oddly, there is no Restatement (Second) of Restitution).
See Herbert P. Wilkins, Foreward, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 567, 570-71 (1998). The literature
also shows a boom—well, a boomlet—of restitutionary scholarship. See, e.g., HANOCH
DAGAN, UNJUST ENRICHMENT (1997); LORD GOFF OF CHIEVELEY & GARETH JONES, THE
LAW OF RESTITUTION (4th ed. 1993); Andrew Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, 83 CAL. L.
REV. 1191 (1995). Stay tuned for late-breaking developments.
82. See U.C.C. § 2A-518 (1995); cf. id. § 2-712.
83. See id. § 2A-518(2). If the lessee purchases goods as cover, it must proceed under
the contract-market measure of § 2A-519. See id. § 2A-518 cmt. 2. This may be too narrow
an approach. By definition, a lease may not encompass the whole economic life of the
leased goods, so ordinarily purchase will give the lessee more than it had under the lease.
See id. § 1-201(37)(1st a). If, however, the leased goods were new, and the lessee covered by
buying used goods, the lessee might purchase goods with a useful life no greater than that
under the breached lease agreement. The lessee might alternatively purchase new goods
and then sell the goods as used at the end of the period of the breached lease. Finally, the
lessee could simply retain the goods, with the remaining value deducted from the damages
award. Under any of these scenarios, purchase would plausibly cover for a breached lease;
Article 2A’s failure to recognize this remains a problem, even after the 1990 amendments.
84. The term “substantially similar” goes largely undefined in the comments. See
Herbert, supra note 65, at 445-48 (attacking comments as “verbose” and a “tautological
mess”). In fairness, the comments were later revised, and now are somewhat clearer,
though still a trifle vague.
85. See U.C.C. § 2A-518(2) (1987). This is not quite Florida’s old text. Leaving aside
differences of style, Florida measured present value from the commencement of the term of
the cover lease, rather than from the date of default. See FLA. STAT. § 680.518(2) (1997).
This change was adopted in the 1990 amendments—and a good thing, too, because using
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lease, the whole of the cover period would be used to calculate dam-
ages.86 The lessee might thus have received gratis the benefit of the
goods for the additional period.87 Now, however, damages are calcu-
lated using the rent under the cover lease for the period comparable to
the unexpired term of the old lease.88 This does not mean that the old
and new leases must be identical; the new lease might begin and end
earlier or later without thereby becoming incomparable.89 It does,
however, avoid giving the lessee a longer lease term than the lessee
had originally bargained for.
Another change is a bit obscure, but helpful. The method of calcula-
tion has changed from the present value of the difference between the
cover price and the contract price90 to the difference between the pres-
ent values of the cover price and the contract price.91 This change
makes no difference if the old and new leases have identical payment
schedules. The 1990 amendments, however, opened up the possibility
that the terms might not coincide exactly. If they did not, it is hard to
see how one would calculate the present value of the difference. One
cannot use simple subtraction, because the payments would occur at
different times. One would, I suppose, have to discount the later pay-
ment to the earlier time, and then subtract—and then do another pre-
sent value calculation. Rather than add this possibility for error, the
test was sensibly reframed.92
One final question is whether section 2A-518 is mandatory for les-
sees who cover with an appropriate lease.93 Florida originally enacted
a nonuniform amendment that gave the lessee a choice of remedy; if it
covered, it could choose either the cover remedy or the remedy for re-
tained goods.94 By adopting the 1990 amendments, Florida moved from
freedom to constraint. Now, if the lessee covers with an appropriate
lease, section 2A-518 provides the sole measure of damages.95
                                                                                                                      
the date of default left the lessee uncompensated for the value of money between the date
of default and the date it had to pay for the leased goods.
86. If the cover lease term differed too greatly from the term of the breached lease,
though, the two leases might not be substantially similar; the lessee would then resort to
damages under section 2A-519 (a contract-market measure, which would take no account
of cover prices or extended durations).
87. One assumes, though, that the usual duty to mitigate, as well as the general rule
of section 1-106, would cause set-off to the extent that the lessee derived benefit from the
extended lease term.
88. See U.C.C. § 2A-518(2) (1995).
89. See id. § 2A-518 cmt. 7. There is, however, a strong suggestion in the comment
that the comparable periods, whenever they begin or end, must be the same length. See id.
90. See U.C.C. § 2A-518(2) (1987).
91. See U.C.C. § 2A-518(2) (1995).
92. The same change was made to all the other damages measures, whether for les-
sees or lessors. See id. §§ 2A-519(1), -527(2), -528(1).
93. A lessee may cover by purchase; if so, the cover falls outside section 2A-518, and
the remedy must be set by section 2A-519. See id. § 2A-518(1), (3).
94. See FLA. STAT. §§ 680.518(3), .519(1) (1997).
95. See U.C.C. § 2A-518(3) & cmt. 2 (1995).
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(c)   Lessor’s Damages
These sections may have drawn the most fire of any in old Article
2A. Two articles, often critical, in the leading symposium on Article 2A
were devoted to these sections,96 and other commentary was almost
uniformly negative.97 Moreover, these sections are among the most Ja-
nus-faced in Article 2A. The damages measures, and many of the pro-
cedures involved in declaring a default, look to Article 2. On the other
hand (face?), the lessor’s permitted actions in retaking its rights in the
goods resemble those allowed under Article 9. The union of these dif-
ferent approaches is inherent in the law of leases, but can lead to some
tensions—tensions not always resolved in the 1990 amendments. The
major changes are discussed below.
i.   Re-Lease
After the lessee breaches, the lessor may dispose of the goods. As-
suming, for the moment, that the lessor is able to re-lease the goods, it
may choose between this section and the next—or perhaps not, de-
pending on how one reads the fruits of a careless legislative error. Free
election between these remedies is not found in the official text of Arti-
cle 2A under either the 1987 or 1990 versions. In these, if the lessor
sells the goods, or leases them in a manner not substantially similar to
the breached lease, then the lessor must use contract-market dam-
ages.98 If, on the other hand, the lessor re-leases the goods under a
lease agreement that is substantially similar to the one breached, then
the lessor is entitled to damages based on the difference between the
rent under the old contract and the rent under the new contract, as
well as any unpaid rent under the old contract and any incidental
damages.99
Florida, however, allowed election of remedies when it enacted its
variation of the 1987 text.100 When it amended Article 2A, the Legisla-
ture changed only those subsections of the statute that were altered
from one official version to the other. Because the election of remedies
language in section 2A-527, providing damages for re-lease, was not
changed in the 1990 official amendments, it was left untouched here,
so election of remedies appears to persist.101 But the corresponding
                                                                                                                      
96. See Benfield, supra note 65, at 915; Rapson, supra note 65, at 875.
97. See, e.g., California Report, supra note 15, at 1036-46; Herbert, supra note 65, at
450-58; Homer Kripke, Some Dissonant Notes About Article 2A, 39 ALA. L. REV. 791, 795-
97 (1988).
98. See U.C.C. § 2A-527(3) (1995). These damages must be reduced by the amount
gained through the disposition. See id. § 2A-523 cmt. 11; LAWRENCE & MINAN, supra note
9, ¶ 15.03[6][b].
99. See U.C.C. § 2A-527(2) (1995).
100. See FLA. STAT. §§ 680.527(3), .528(1) (1997).
101. See Act effective Apr. 14, 1998, ch. 98-11, § 43, 1998 Fla. Laws 105, 158 (amending
FLA STAT. § 680.527(1),(2) (1997)).
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language in the section governing contract-market damages was de-
leted because it was placed in a section that the 1990 amendments
changed.102 There, it would seem that there is no election. So whether
there is election of remedies depends on whether one starts one’s
analysis with section 2A-527 or section 2A-528. One hopes that this
sloppiness will be mended shortly, perhaps when Florida comes back
to the U.C.C.103
Three substantial changes were made here by the 1990 amend-
ments, all of which mirror changes made elsewhere. First, the unpaid
rent is now measured as of the date of the new lease agreement,
rather than the date of default—a change from the 1987 official text,
but not from Florida’s formerly nonuniform variation of it.104 Second,
the measure no longer compares the total rent remaining under the
old and new agreements, but looks only at the total rent for the com-
parable periods of the old and new leases.105 Third, the measure is no
longer based on the present value of the difference between the two
rents, but the difference of the present value of the two rents, a change
which makes easier the calculation of damages when the two lease
terms do not match up perfectly.106
ii.   Contract-Market Damages
This measure, perhaps applying when the conditions for re-lease
damages are not met,107 was changed in what are by now familiar
ways. The unpaid rent is measured from the date of the new lease,
rather than the date of default, and the measure is based on the dif-
ference of the present values of the contract rent and the market rent,
rather than the present value of the difference between the contract
rent and the market rent.108 There is, however, one change of some
modest interest. In the original Article 2A, the hypothetical market
rent was measured at the place for tender.109 The new version meas-
ures this rent at the place where the goods are located.110
                                                                                                                      
102. See id. § 44, 1998 Fla. Laws at 159 (amending  FLA. STAT. § 680.525(2), (3) (1997)).
103. There are other nonuniform amendments that survived the recent legislation,
many both substantive and regrettable. See infra notes 151-158 and accompanying text.
104. See U.C.C. § 2A-527(2) (1995); see also supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
105. See id.; see also supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
106. See id.; see also supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
107. Or, then again, perhaps not. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
108. See U.C.C. § 2A-528(1) (1995). The latter change seems immaterial, because the
hypothetical lease period would appear to be identical to the actual lease period. One as-
sumes it was put in place in case it is impossible to use the actual lease term to measure
the hypothetical rent; in that case, the court may use a reasonable substitute, which might
produce the sort of problem this change in formula addresses. See id. § 2A-507(2).
109. See U.C.C. § 2A-528(1)(b) (1987).
110. See U.C.C. § 2A-528(1)(ii) (1995).
304 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:285
iii.   Lost-Volume Lessor
This remedy is the counterpart to that favorite from first-year Con-
tracts, U.C.C. section 2-708(2). It gives the lessor the profit it would
have made if the lessee had fully performed.111 The one change in this
section—rather an important one—changes the remedy from the full
profit112 to the profit reduced to present value.113 Regrettably, the sec-
tion was otherwise left as muddy as its Article 2 counterpart. For in-
stance, the final clause of section 2-708(2), giving “due credit for pay-
ment or proceeds of resale,” has almost universally been considered a
drafting disaster.114 Courts have come to realize that it applies only to
components sellers—sellers whose buyers breach when the goods are
incomplete, and who salvage something through sale or use of the in-
complete goods.115 Did the Article 2A drafters learn from this and craft
a properly limited equivalent? No. It reads “due credit for payments or
proceeds of disposition”—using the language of leases, but otherwise
preserving the horrors of the old language.116 This fidelity to Llewellyn
is touching, but he can do without this sort of homage.117
Even more fundamentally, the section leaves entirely unclear just
when it should be used. As in the original, we are told that the lost
profit measure should be used when the contract-market measure will
not put the lessor in as good a position as would performance.118 The
comment merely repeats the original, with some minor embellish-
ment.119 One imagines that the classic article by Professor Harris will
be adapted for use here, but some statutory guidance would have been
helpful.120 And, as Professor Herbert has pointed out, the section is in
                                                                                                                      
111. See id. § 2A-528(2).
112. See U.C.C. § 2A-528(2) (1987).
113. See U.C.C. § 2A-528(2) (1995). The original comment, though not the statute it-
self, said that “the concept of present value should be given effect.” U.C.C. § 2A-528 cmt.
(1987). The diffident should is now a bossy must, and, in any case, is now statutory. See
U.C.C. § 2A-528 cmt. 5 (1995). This change comes from the California version. See Herbert,
supra note 65, at 455 n.231.
114. See, e.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Measuring Sellers’ Damages: The
Lost-Profits Puzzle, 31 STAN. L. REV. 323, 326 (1979); Robert J. Harris, A Radical Restate-
ment of the Law of Seller’s Damages: Sales Act and Commercial Code Results Compared,
18 STAN. L. REV. 66, 83-87 (1965).
115. This appears to have been the intent of the drafters. Section 2-708(2) was
amended in 1954 to add the critical phrase. The drafting committee explained that the new
phrase was “to clarify the privilege of the seller to realize junk value when it is manifestly
useless to complete the operation of manufacture.” EDITORIAL BOARD OF THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE, DECEMBER 1954 RECOMMENDATIONS 14 (1955).
116. See U.C.C. § 2A-528(2) (1995).
117. And no one can say that the drafters were not warned. Both Professor Herbert
and the California Bar committee pointed out this problem. See Herbert, supra note 65, at
454-55; California Report, supra note 15, at 1040-41.
118. See U.C.C. § 2A-528(2) (1995); cf. id. § 2-708(2).
119. See id. § 2A-528 cmts. 4 & 5.
120. The Harris article outlined the classes of sellers that might take advantage of
U.C.C. section 2-708(2): (1) lost volume sellers, who now have unsold units because of the
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the wrong place. The lessor who will want to take advantage of it is
one who has re-leased the goods; consequently, the lost-volume remedy
should be in section 2A-527, not in section 2A-528.121 Fortunately,
courts construing Article 2 have managed to find section 2-708(2),
which is similarly misplaced, so one assumes that they will find sec-
tion 2A-528(2) as well.
iv.   Action for the Rent
Section 2A-529, granting the lessor an action for unpaid rent, un-
derwent a great deal of revision in the 1990 amendments. Fortunately
for Florida, most of the major changes were already in its statute book,
thanks to its adoption of California’s nonuniform version. Perhaps the
most important change in this section is one of these. The 1987 Urtext
violated the usual rules of mitigation, because it did not provide that,
if the lessor was able to dispose of the goods after a judgment, it could
not keep both the full rent (as damages from the lessee) and the pro-
ceeds of the disposition.122 This arose because the action for the rent
was originally available whenever the lessee had accepted goods, at
least according to the statute.123 Presumably, a lessor that had repos-
sessed the goods, but had not decided whether to dispose of them,
would choose an action for the rent (with no apparent duty to mitigate)
over a contract-market action (with a duty to mitigate).124 The pre-
Code cases suggested a need to mitigate before seeking an action for
the rent, but these cases were not referred to in the comment, much
less in the statute.125 Quite a mess.
The 1990 amendments fixed the statute with two changes (and cor-
responding changes to the comments). First, the action for the rent
                                                                                                                      
breach and resulting resale; (2) jobbers, who maintain no inventory and thus have no op-
portunity for resale; and (3) components sellers, who do not complete the goods and conse-
quently cannot resell them. See Harris, supra note 114, at 98. This leaves aside the large
literature asking whether, in an efficient market, there is such a thing as a lost volume
seller, or whether this measure of damages is appropriate if there is such a creature. See,
e.g., Goetz & Scott, supra note 114, at 326-27; Victor P. Goldberg, An Economic Analysis of
the Lost-Volume Retail Seller, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 283, 283-84 (1984).
121. See Herbert, supra note 65, at 454.
122. See U.C.C. § 2A-529(3) (1987). The original comment sought to prevent double re-
covery, by pointing out that, according to the statute, the lessor was obliged to hold the
goods for the lessee. See U.C.C. § 2A-529 cmt. 3 (1995); see also id. § 2A-529(2) (providing
this right). However, this obligation was subject to a critical limit: the lessor was entitled
to dispose of the goods at any time until the damages were collected, though its damages
would be limited to re-lease or contract-market if it did so during the remaining lease term.
See U.C.C. § 2A-529(3) (1987). Thus, if the lessor did collect damages from the lessee, the
lessor could not then re-lease the goods, but the lessor could, if it chose, do so after judg-
ment (and the expiration of the lease term) and before the damages were collected and still
claim the full damages.
123. See U.C.C. § 2A-529(1)(a) (1987).
124. See Rapson, supra note 65, at 902-04.
125. See, e.g., United Chemicals, Inc. v. Welch, 460 So. 2d 540, 541-42 (Fla. 1st DCA
1984); see generally Benfield, supra note 65, at 940 & n.78.
306 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:285
under section 2A-529(1)(a) could be brought only when the lessee had
accepted the goods and the lessor had not repossessed them or had
them tendered back (or when the goods were damaged when the lessee
bore the risk of loss).126 This eliminated the free choice between the ac-
tion for rent and the action for contract-market damages or re-lease
damages. Second, the section permitting re-lease or other disposition
now provided an express right of set-off to the extent that the damages
available under section 2A-529 exceed those available under the other
section.127 Both of these helpful changes were found in the California
version of the statute, and both were carried forward into Florida’s
original enactment.128
Similarly, the 1990 amendments codify another nonuniform change
carried from California to Florida: the use of the date of entry of the
judgment, rather than the date of default, to set the time until which
unpaid rent could be recovered.129 The remaining changes were mainly
cosmetic.
v.   Catch-All Damages
It is possible that none of these remedies would prove entirely satis-
factory to the lessor. For the most part, they contemplate that the les-
sor will repossess all of the goods, which may be infeasible. Reposses-
sion might also be undesirable, should the dispute not go to the core of
the lease agreement; the lessor may prefer to keep the lease alive and
litigate the dispute. Furthermore, some of these remedies may com-
pensate the lessor only in part. Finally, Article 2A does not make every
default a basis for seeking remedies. The parties may, as has been
noted, define default as they please, and may provide that the lessor is
entitled to remedies for even trivial defaults.130 If they do not, though,
defaults not listed in the general section on the lessor’s remedies, and
not substantially impairing the value of the lease contract to the les-
sor, will not entitle the lessor to the remedies noted above.131
For each of these scenarios, the 1990 amendments to Article 2A
provide a catch-all remedy. This entitles the lessor to “recover the loss
resulting in the ordinary course of events from the lessee’s default as
determined in any reasonable manner, together with incidental dam-
ages, less expenses saved in consequence of the lessee’s default.”132
                                                                                                                      
126. See U.C.C. § 2A-529(1)(a) & cmt. 1 (1995).
127. See id. § 2A-529(3).
128. See FLA. STAT. § 680.529(1)(a) (1997).
129. See U.C.C. §§ 2A-529(1)(a)(i), -529(1)(b)(i) (1995); cf. FLA. STAT. §§
680.529(1)(a)(1), .529(1)(b)(1) (1997).
130. See U.C.C. § 2A-523(3) (1995).
131. See id. § 2A-523(3)(a), (b).
132. Id. § 2A-523(2).
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This remedy is obviously rather fluid, giving great deference to the
ability of the courts to frame a remedy consistent with expectation.133
This section adds usefully to Article 2A. It makes clear that the les-
sor need not elect remedies, an approach otherwise disfavored in the
U.C.C.134 The section also provides a clear remedy for minor defaults;
though these would not ordinarily be litigated by themselves, they
might be litigated as part of a larger action based on more fundamen-
tal breaches of the lease agreement. It should be noted that this sec-
tion does not allow the lessor to drive up its damages. If, for example,
the lessee tenders back the leased goods and the lessor refuses to ac-
cept them, the lessor may not then seek under this section any dam-
ages that could have been avoided had the lessor accepted the goods
and re-leased them.135 This is implicit in the general need to mitigate,
but bears repetition all the same.136
4.   Other Changes
Of the remaining amendments, a good many were purely stylistic
or formal, and need not be discussed here. Two, however, though not
fitting into the categories above, are sufficiently weighty to warrant
brief attention.
(a)   Subordination
The parties to a lease may have various types of priority created by
Article 2A. For instance, mechanic’s liens and materialman’s liens
generally have priority over the interests of the lessor and lessee, un-
                                                                                                                      
133. Which is the general damages measure under the U.C.C. See id. § 1-106(1).
134. See, e.g., id. §§ 2-703 cmt. 1, 9-501(1); see also id. § 2A-523 cmt. 1 (rejecting elec-
tion of remedies).
135. See U.C.C. § 2A-523 drafting note (1990). These damages would be precluded un-
der section 2A-529(1)(a) of the U.C.C., assuming that the lessor would have been able to re-
lease the goods. See U.C.C. § 2A-529 cmt. 1 (1995).
136. The 1990 amendments added a section on the lessor’s residual interest in goods,
simply providing that the lessor might, in addition to the remedies mentioned above, re-
cover damages if the lessee’s default caused damage to the lessor’s residual interest in the
goods. See U.C.C. § 2A-532 (1995). This section merely codified what has long been under-
stood: the lessor, by definition, has some lingering property right in the leased goods,
which the lessee may not impair (beyond whatever wear and tear is contemplated under
the lease agreement, and any damage consistent with the lessee’s duty of ordinary care
under the bailment for hire). See, e.g., Davis v. M.L.G. Corp., 712 P.2d 985, 987-88 (Colo.
1986); Stephens v. Thompson, 339 S.E.2d 784, 785 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986). The section con-
forms almost exactly to a Florida nonuniform amendment, drawn from the California Bar
report, and thus does not change Florida law. See FLA. STAT. § 680.532 (1997); see also
California Report, supra note 15, at 1045-46. Professors White and Summers find this sec-
tion mysterious, perhaps because they have assumed that this right was so obvious that it
could be taken for granted. See 2 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 27, § 14-3, at 42. Two
grizzled veterans of Code wars probably should know better than to assume that anything
in the Code is so obvious that it cannot be mucked up by the naive, foolish, or willful. In
any event, here it is.
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less the law creating the lien provides otherwise.137 On the other hand,
creditors of the lessee always, and of the lessor usually, take subject to
the lease contract.138 And, as in Article 9, the rights of lessors and les-
sees in fixtures depend in large part on the presence of fixture fil-
ings.139 In Article 9, rights of these types may be subordinated.140 As
the comment to section 9-316 hints, the section may not itself have
been necessary.141 Given the ready alienability of claims outside of the
U.C.C., it is logical to suppose that one can agree to take junior status,
whether gratuitously or for a consideration. Certainly pre-U.C.C. law
held as much.142
The first try at Article 2A omitted this right. Possibly it was omit-
ted out of simple economy, if all concerned thought subordination suf-
ficiently obvious. Still, most of the rights in Article 2A subject to sub-
ordination derive from Article 9. A court with too much time on its
hands might thus apply expressio unius est exclusio alterius and con-
clude, one assumes wrongly, that no such right of subordination ex-
isted under old Article 2A. Happily, the 1990 amendments contain a
section copied word for word from Article 9, with almost exactly the
same comment.143 Parties to a lease, as well as other parties with
rights in a lease, may thus blithely subordinate away, secure in the
knowledge that their transactions will not be invalidated.
(b)   Right of Revocation
Under both Article 2 and Article 2A, the right of revocation is nar-
rower than the right of rejection, in large part to avoid the strategic
behavior that could result were the recipient of the goods able to re-
voke its acceptance well after it took delivery.144 Under the 1987 text,
the lessee’s right to revoke was rather narrow, stemming entirely from
the nonconformity of the goods leased.145 This left out the possibility
that the lessor might default under the lease contract, even though it
supplied conforming goods. For example, a lessor might have a con-
tinuing service obligation. Its failure to comply might render the goods
valueless as they break down, though they might have performed per-
                                                                                                                      
137. See U.C.C. § 2A-306 (1995). In Florida, the statutes creating these liens are gen-
erally found in chapter 713 of the Florida Statutes.
138. See id. § 2A-307.
139. See id. § 2A-309; cf. id. § 9-313 (fixtures).
140. See id. § 9-316.
141. See id. § 9-316 cmt. (“This section is inserted to make it entirely clear that a per-
son entitled to priority may effectively agree to subordinate his claim.”).
142. See, e.g., 2 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 37.1
(1965).
143. See U.C.C. § 2A-311 & cmt. (1995). The only change in the comment renders it
gender-neutral.
144. See, e.g., Avery Katz, The Strategic Structure of Offer and Acceptance: Game The-
ory and the Law of Contract Formation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 215 (1990).
145. See U.C.C. § 2A-517(1) (1987).
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fectly when they were first delivered. The 1990 amendments corrected
this oversight by providing that breach of the lease contract, like sup-
plying non-conforming goods, can justify the lessee’s revocation if the
breach substantially impairs the value of the goods to the lessee.146
Another, perhaps less necessary subsection was added, which provides
that the lessee may revoke for other reasons if the lease contract so
provides.147 This may not have been necessary; default is left to the
parties to define, so one would think, a fortiori, that they could define
a lesser right than default. Still, the clarity does no harm, and may re-
duce lingering or contrived uncertainty.
C.   Conclusion
Article 2A has improved. The 1990 amendments did much to re-
move the earlier uncertainties and perversities in remedies, in par-
ticular, and in other areas as well. Florida, of course, had taken a step
toward the current version when it enacted its nonuniform version of
Article 2A back in 1990. Now it has brought itself more or less into line
with other states, and has at the same time gained the other im-
provements that the 1990 amendments brought. Uniformity and cer-
tainty are perhaps self-evident virtues in commercial law.148 Unpre-
dictable results and free-form standards can lead to risk-averse be-
havior and, as a result, inefficient operations.149 Firms may decline op-
portunities to make money or take excessive precautions to reduce risk
(or, in the case of damages, to prove the amount).150 Uniformity pro-
motes certainty, at least in the middle- to short-run, by promoting
convergence on legal standards. Florida has, at little cost, bought its
lessors and lessees certainty.
But not complete certainty. Yes, of course no statute can provide
that. But there is a larger reason to make the comment about uncer-
tainty: Florida still has a nonuniform version of Article 2A. The Leg-
islature enacted NCCUSL’s 1990 amendments, which covered about
half of Article 2A’s sections. For these, Florida has purely the uniform
version. The other sections, though, remain as they were before this
legislative session. In the main, Florida had enacted the uniform ver-
sion here as well. In several sections, though, Florida had enacted
                                                                                                                      
146. See U.C.C. § 2A-517(2) (1995).
147. See id. § 2A-517(3).
148. Cf. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (“Considerations in favor of stare
decisis are at their acme in cases involving property and contract rights, where reliance in-
terests are involved . . . .”) (citations omitted).
149. See, e.g., Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal
Standards, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 279, 279-80 (1986); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Accu-
racy in the Assessment of Damages, 39 J.L. & ECON. 191, 194 (1996).
150. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 149, at 192.
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nonuniform versions, untouched by the recent amendments. For these
sections, then, Florida remains out of step with most of the nation.151
Many of these differences are immaterial. A few, though, are not.
Almost all of these pertain to consumers, and often weaken the rights
of consumers under Article 2A.152 For example, the uniform provision
on unconscionability provides in part that consumer leases induced by
unconscionable conduct or as to which unconscionable collection prac-
                                                                                                                      
151. Florida’s leasing law has one provision not contained within Article 2A, but af-
fecting it greatly. When Article 2A was put in place, Florida added to its motor vehicle laws
a provision stating that for motor vehicles and trailers, “a transaction does not create a se-
curity interest merely because it provides that the rental price is permitted or required to
be adjusted under the agreement either upward or downward by reference to the amount
realized upon sale or other disposition of the motor vehicle or trailer.” FLA. STAT. § 319.271
(1997). This sort of statute has been enacted in a good many states, and a version of it ap-
pears in the Internal Revenue Code. See 26 U.S.C. § 7701(h) (1994); see also, e.g., Corinne
Cooper, Identifying a True Lease Under UCC § 1-201(37), in 1 EQUIPMENT LEASING § 4.08,
at 4-81 n.89 (Jeffrey J. Wong ed., 1998) [hereinafter Cooper, Lease]. Its effect is to validate
so-called terminal rent adjustment clauses (TRACs) as leases, thus excusing those who use
them from complying with the filing requirements and procedural restrictions of Article 9.
TRACs are used when the parties anticipate that the lessor will sell the leased goods at
the end of the lease term. The parties set a value for the residual interest in the goods. If
the goods are sold or appraised for more than this value at the end of the lease, then the
lessee gets the gain; if the goods are worth less, the lessee is liable for the difference. The
question, then, is how much of the risk associated with this sale is retained by the lessor.
At times, a clause of this sort merely protects the lessor against excessive mileage or wear
and tear. It may be defensible as a true lease. Most of these clauses, though, effectively di-
vest the lessors of any real residual interest in the leased goods. If the lessee insures the
lessor against any downside market risk, and retains any upside gain, then the lessee ef-
fectively has taken the full risk of any market change. This sounds like a classic security
interest, because the lessor has handed off its real residual right in the goods. It is guaran-
teed a certain amount—the lease payments, plus a lump-sum payment at sale. The lessee
is thus, in essence, the economic owner of the goods. See, e.g., Cooper, Lease, supra, §
4.08[1]; see also, e.g., In re Zerkle Trucking Co., 132 B.R. 316 (Bankr. S.D. W. Va. 1991)
(holding TRAC lease a disguised security interest).
Article 2A avoided this issue, in large part to prevent conflict with the TRAC leasing in-
dustry. See Corinne Cooper, The Madonnas Play Tug of War with the Whores or Who is
Saving the UCC?, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 563, 574-76 (1993) [hereinafter Cooper, Madonnas].
We thus see legislation, as in Florida, that validates them. It is hard to justify these stat-
utes as a matter of principle, and especially hard to justify placing them apart from the
rest of the relevant statutory scheme. See Cooper, Madonnas, supra, at 574-76 (noting that
the location “despicably hides the ball”). One hopes that the legislature will clear out this
anomaly, to use a polite term, when it next revises Article 2A.
152. One nonconsumer change is to the risk of loss section. The change shifts the risk
of loss to the lessee when the loss resulted from the lessee’s negligence. See FLA. STAT. §
680.219(1) (1997); cf. U.C.C. § 2A-219(1) (1995). This seems inconsequential. Though Arti-
cle 2A does not say so in as many words, the Official Comment states that the parallel pro-
visions in Article 2 that expressly allow the parties to allocate risk of loss contractually
“are not incorporated as they are not necessary.” Id. § 2A-219 cmt. One may infer from this
that the parties are free to allocate risk by contract, the apparently firm rule of section 2A-
219(1) notwithstanding. See, e.g., LAWRENCE & MINAN, supra note 9, ¶ 13.02[5]; 2 WHITE &
SUMMERS, supra note 27, at 462. If so, the lessor is likely to shift the risk to the lessee in
its form contract. In any event, this provision may appropriately place the risk on the party
better able to avoid it, which is not inconsistent with the conventional economic analysis of
tort. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in
Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1057 (1972).
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tices have been used may give rise to relief, and that a court finding
unconscionability shall grant reasonable attorney’s fees to the con-
sumer lessee.153 These provisions were, and are, omitted from Florida’s
Article 2A.154 Similarly, the permissible choice of law provisions in
leasing contracts have been expanded from those in the uniform ver-
sion.155 Another is section 2A-406(1)(b), which controls when delay or
allocation by a lessor enables a lessee to modify the lease contract by
accepting what is supplied, with an appropriate allowance for the defi-
ciency. In the uniform version, this right extends to all lessees except
nonconsumer finance lessees, who presumably look to the supplier for
recourse.156 Florida’s version, as in a few other states,157 bars all fi-
nance lessees from exercising the right to modify.158
If only in the interests of consistency, the Legislature should tidy
up Article 2A to render it wholly uniform. Beyond the appeal of uni-
formity, though, most of the substantive amendments disrupt the care-
                                                                                                                      
153. See U.C.C. § 2A-108(2), (4) (1995). Subsection 4 also provides that the party
against whom a claim of unconscionability is made may collect its fees if the lessee’s claim
proves groundless. This has been attacked as creating excessive uncertainty for consumer
lessees, thus perhaps chilling unconscionability litigation. See Donald B. King, Major Prob-
lems with Article 2A: Unfairness, “Cutting Off” Consumer Defenses, Unfiled Interests, and
Uneven Adoption, 43 MERCER L. REV. 869, 873-77 (1992). One could solve this problem, if
problem it be, by enacting only section 2A-108(4)(a) without the reverse fee shifting. See
also infra notes 343-352 and accompanying text (fee shifting in revised Article 5).
154. See FLA. STAT. § 680.1081 (1997).
155. The uniform version of Article 2A allows the parties to a consumer lease to choose
only the law of the jurisdiction in which the lessee resides at the time the lease agreement
becomes enforceable or within thirty days after, or that in which the leased goods are to be
used. See U.C.C. § 2A-106(1) (1995). Florida’s version also allows the parties to choose the
law of the jurisdiction where the goods will be used. See FLA. STAT. § 680.1061(1) (1997).
While this is convenient for the lessor, the lessee, often a tourist, may find the law unfa-
miliar and irksome (especially in light of the attenuated consumer protections granted by
Florida’s Article 2A).
156. See U.C.C. § 2A-406 cmt. (1995).
157. Seven, as of 1997. See U.C.C. § 2A-406(1)(b), 1B U.L.A. 227 (Supp. 1998).
158. See FLA. STAT. § 680.406(1) (1997). A similar change was made in the section
dealing with casualty to leased goods. See id. § 680.221(b); cf. U.C.C. § 2A-221(b) (1995).
It should be noted that not all of the changes that affect consumers do so for the worse.
One, to a provision on rejection and revocation, excepts most consumer finance lessees
from a bar on revocation when the lessee knows of a nonconformity when it accepts the
goods. See FLA. STAT. § 680.516(2) (1997); cf. U.C.C. § 2A-516(2) (1995) (barring all finance
lessees from revocation under those circumstances). Florida did not, however, make a cor-
responding amendment to the parallel provision in section 2A-517(1)(a), which creates
some internal inconsistency. One assumes that the nonuniform enactment trumps the uni-
form language, thus giving consumer finance lessors an expanded revocation right. In the
same vein, Florida removed the requirement of timely notice of default in the case of revo-
cation for all consumer leases, which clears away one procedural hurdle otherwise faced by
consumers. See FLA. STAT. § 680.516(6) (1997); cf. U.C.C. § 2A-516(3)(a) (1995) (requiring
timely notice). Other states have chosen this nonuniform path. See U.C.C. § 2A-516, 1B
U.L.A. 243-44 (Supp. 1998) (Alabama, Maryland, South Dakota). Finally, the Article 2A
Statute of Frauds has been amended in Florida to require all consumer leases to be in
writing, subject to a limited list of exceptions; the uniform version excuses leases with total
payments of less than $1,000. Compare FLA. STAT. § 680.201(1)(a) (1997) with U.C.C. § 2A-
201(1)(a) (1995).
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ful balance of consumer and lessor rights contained in Article 2A.
NCCUSL is even now revising Article 2A yet again, this time to take
account of changes in draft Article 2 and new Article 9, as well as
other criticisms that have been made over time. When these changes
come forward, the Legislature should take the opportunity to clear out
the remaining idiosyncrasies in Florida’s Article 2A.159
One might also ask whether Article 2A is a whole loaf. There is
much to be said to the contrary. One critique of Article 2A has been its
limited treatment of consumer leases.160 This is not a surprise; much of
the force behind Article 2A’s drafting came from commercial lessors,
and most of the leasing industry engages in commercial leases, Hertz,
Avis, and the like notwithstanding. Article 2A does contain some con-
sumer protection provisions, though not many of overpowering conse-
quence.161 True, there are other statutes, state and federal, that give
consumers additional rights.162 The statutes do not, however, provide a
systematic and coherent body of consumer protection law governing
leases.
To remedy this, a NCCUSL drafting committee is hard at work on a
Uniform Consumer Leasing Act. The first draft appeared in 1996, and
the sixth appeared in October of 1998.163 It is too early to comment on
this project, but at present it seems to be providing a sensible body of
consumer leasing law. Whether it will be widely enacted is a trickier
question. If consumer protections had been worked into a more general
uniform act, the leasing industry might be relatively willing to take
the bitter with the sweet and swallow the whole act. As it is, the in-
dustry has the benefits of uniformity, and, should the statute be over-
solicitous to consumers, can snipe at this consumer statute. One may
thus wonder whether it will be enacted generally. This may well de-
pend on the extent to which leasing industry concerns can be ad-
dressed—and to this extent, consumer advocates may be less en-
chanted with the statute. Floridians, along with the rest of the nation,
will just have to wait.
                                                                                                                      
159. It could do so earlier, of course, perhaps either in a glitch bill or as part of the next
U.C.C. amendments (presumably Articles 5 and 9). See infra Parts IV.A.-B.
160. See, e.g., King, supra note 153, at 877-80.
161. For a somewhat jaundiced view of these provisions, see 2 WHITE & SUMMERS, su-
pra note 27, § 13-4; for a more optimistic view, see Fred H. Miller, Consumer Leases Under
Uniform Commercial Code Article 2A, 39 ALA. L. REV. 957, 959-64 (1988).
162. Perhaps the most important is the Consumer Leasing Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1667-
1667e (1994), and the corresponding regulation, Regulation M, 12 C.F.R. § 213 (1998). The
Uniform Consumer Credit Code also gives consumer lessees special rights, though it is not
in force in most states.
163. The drafts are available at the NCCUSL Website, located at
<http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/ulc.htm> (visited Jan. 28, 1999).
1999]                  THE CHANGED (AND CHANGING?) U.C.C. 313
III.   ARTICLE 8
Article 8 of the U.C.C. deals with investment securities—not the
more glamorous bits of securities regulation of the sort that have
made certain shady operators guests of the federal government from
time to time, but the bits that control how we own and transfer secu-
rities.164 One can understand that a statute originally written in the
1940s and 1950s might need some revision, given the radical changes
in financial markets since that time. Indeed, some of the revisions to
Article 8 deal precisely with the advent of new technology, and will
be dealt with below.165 But Article 8 has already been revised since
the Age of Llewellyn, as recently as 1977. Why the need for a new
Article 8?
The reason requires a bit of history; but, as Holmes didn’t quite
say, a page of history is worth a volume of illogic. Once upon a time,
when Karl Llewellyn bestrode the earth, stockbrokers moved stock
certificates from place to place when they sold shares for their cus-
tomers. This meant a good deal of paperwork and some careful rec-
ord-keeping, but share volume was none too high. In 1964, at the
height of enactment of the U.C.C., daily volume on the New York
Stock Exchange averaged 4.89 million shares.166 Then came a boom
in stock trading, as conglomerates sprouted and the economy,
stimulated by the guns-and-butter policies of the Johnson admini-
stration, took off. By 1968 share volume had almost tripled from that
of only a few years before.167 The increased trading volume might
have gratified the brokers in the front office, but wrought havoc on
the increasingly desperate clerks in the back office. Brokerage
houses, unwilling to devote more resources to mundane tasks like
processing trades, fell further and further behind—so much so that,
despite midnight shifts of workers and seven-day workweeks, stock
exchanges shortened trading days in late 1967 and early 1968, and
even closed on Wednesdays in much of 1968.168 Something had to be
done.
Perhaps obviously, some firms bought the relatively newfangled
computers to help out; others failed to keep up and shut their
                                                                                                                      
164. Indeed, the new Article 8 no longer covers those bits of contract law on the sale of
securities which old Article 8 had covered. Thus, for instance, the old provisions on per-
formance and remedies have been deleted on the theory that a statute should either regu-
late contracts comprehensively or not at all. See U.C.C. art. 8 pref. note IV.B.8. (1995); cf.
U.C.C. § 8-107 (1977) (remedies); id. § 8-314 (breach).
165. See infra Part III.A.
166. See VI LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 2899 (1989).
167. See id.
168. See id. at 2899-900.
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doors.169 More systematic solutions took shape, prodded by legislative
and regulatory action that promoted such things as uncertificated or
book-entry stocks and centralized clearing corporations.170 As these
took shape, NCCUSL started work on a revision of Article 8 that
would, it was hoped, provide a legal structure for a more efficient
system of transferring securities.
The process begat the 1977 version of Article 8. After surveying
the changing world of securities transfers, the drafting committee
concluded that uncertificated stocks would shortly predominate.171
Issuers would no longer send out nicely engraved certificates; rather,
they would simply record ownership and transfer electronically or
otherwise, as they were told to do so by their shareholders or the
shareholders’ agents. The committee, however, was aware that ac-
tual stock certificates would continue to exist and even continue to be
created. Accordingly, the 1977 version of Article 8 provided parallel
rules for both certificated and uncertificated securities.172 All told, it
was a sensible resolution of a knotty and potentially disastrous
problem, and one much heralded in the literature.173 Except for one
little detail—it didn’t work.
The problem with the 1977 version of Article 8 became obvious
quickly, and, using the perfect hindsight vouchsafed law professors,
was evident even as that version came forth and was enacted. That
problem? Uncertificated securities never really arose, save for mu-
tual funds and United States Government securities.174 Why is hard
                                                                                                                      
169. See id. at 2902-07; see also Emily I. Osiecki, Comment, Alabama By-Products
Corp. v. Cede & Co.: Shareholder Protection Through Strict Statutory Construction, 22
DEL. J. CORP. L. 221, 225 (1997).
170. See Osiecki, supra note 169, at 224-25.
171. The literature of the time was rife with calls for uncertificated securities. See, e.g.,
Egon Guttman, Toward the Uncertificated Security: A Congressional Lead for the States to
Follow, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 717 (1980); Thomas H. Jolls, Can We Do Without Stock
Certificates? A Look at the Future, 23 BUS. LAW. 909 (1968); Richard B. Smith, A Piece of
Paper, 25 BUS. LAW. 923 (1970); Richard B. Smith, “A Piece of Paper Revisited,” 26 BUS.
LAW. 1769 (1971).
172. For proper analyses of this version of Article 8, see, EGON GUTTMAN, MODERN
SECURITIES TRANSFERS (3d ed. 1987); 7 WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND ET AL., UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES, ARTICLE 8: INVESTMENT SECURITIES (1986).
173. Including in this esteemed periodical. See Paul B. Rasor, A Critical Look at Se-
cured Transactions Under Revised UCC Article 8, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 859, 865-67
(1987); see also, e.g., Martin J. Aronstein et al., Article 8 Is Ready, 93 HARV. L. REV. 889
(1980).
174. See James Steven Rogers, Policy Perspectives on Revised U.C.C. Article 8, 43
UCLA L. REV. 1431, 1443 (1996). Indeed, a good many states continued to require that
share certificates be issued by their corporations, including New Jersey and, for quite a
while, Pennsylvania, both corporate havens. See GUTTMAN, supra note 172, ¶ 1.04[2]. Even
many of the states that allowed their corporations to issue uncertificated securities still
allowed shareholders to demand stock certificates. See id.
The principal exception for publicly-held corporations is the dividend reinvestment plan,
under which the issuer automatically uses dividends to purchase more shares, often frac-
tional, of the issuer’s stock. If a broker holds the shares in street name—that is, the bro-
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to explain. Possibly the issuers decided that they would not want to
invalidate existing stock certificates or convert the old records into
new. Possibly all concerned were a little uneasy about a brand-new
set of rules, preferring to adhere as closely as possible to rules fa-
miliar from certificated days. Possibly the immediate solution to the
paperwork crunch of the late 1960s was successful enough that bro-
kers and issuers alike decided to stay with it, whether because of in-
ertia or because of the preference for certainty.175 In any event, the
world of securities developed a very different model, one in which
certificates were still issued but never moved.176
The key to this system is the use of a common depository for
shares. The Depository Trust Company (DTC), a New York company,
holds about three-quarters of shares in publicly traded companies,
with its nominee, Cede & Co., as the nominal shareholder of record.
Brokerages and banks created DTC to allow them to deposit certifi-
cates centrally (so-called “jumbo certificates,” often representing tens
or hundreds of thousands of shares) and leave them at rest. When a
customer of one of DTC’s participants buys or sells shares, appropri-
ate changes are made on the books of the participants.177 At the end
of each day, the transactions are netted out,178 so that only the net
changes for each participant need be recorded by DTC. Each broker
makes similar book entries. Thus, if one customer of a broker buys
one hundred shares of a certain stock, and another sells one hundred
shares, the brokerage need not report anything to NSCC. The clear-
                                                                                                                      
ker’s name—this is no different from any other indirect system of holding. If, however, the
shares are held in the customer’s name, but the issuer has its own reinvestment plan, then
the issuer will usually reinvest the dividends and hold the shares as a book entry rather
than issue new certificates with each reinvestment. See Martin J. Aronstein, Security In-
terests in Securities: How Code Revision Reflects Modern Security-Holding Practices, 10
UCC L.J. 289, 292-93 (1978).
175. In contrast, mutual funds, though dating back a good many years (at least as
closed-end funds), did not become very important until the 1960s. Accordingly, there was
less accumulated practice to dislodge, and the industry could adopt more readily a new
method of dealing with securities. The government’s move toward uncertificated securities
may be explained, at least in part, by its unitary structure. Though a single corporation
might choose not to rely on uncertificated securities, given dominant industry practice to
the contrary, the federal government need not worry about losing out to rival governments
or to any resulting reluctance on the part of investors to purchase its securities. For more
on federal uncertificated securities, see Guttman, supra note 171.
176. The description that follows is drawn from a number of sources. See, e.g., U.C.C.
art. 8 intro. (1995); JOHN F. DOLAN, COMMERCIAL LAW: ESSENTIAL TERMS AND
TRANSACTIONS § 14.4 (2d ed. 1997); Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Property, Credit, and Regula-
tion Meet Information Technology: Clearance and Settlement in the Securities Markets,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1992, at 131, 136-38.
177. Some small brokerages and financial intermediaries may not be members of DTC.
In that case, they generally contract with members to handle their clearance tasks. See
Jeanne L. Schroeder, Is Article 8 Really Ready This Time? The Radical Reform of Secured
Lending on Wall Street, 1994 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 291, 327-28.
178. The transactions are netted out by the National Securities Clearing Corporation
(NSCC), another creation of brokerages and banks.
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ing agent and DTC’s books will show no change. Only the brokerage’s
own books will reflect the sale and purchase.
Revised Article 8 made some acknowledgment of this indirect
holding system, but very little.179 For the most part, it treated all
dealings in certificated securities alike, which proved increasingly
troublesome as this method of share disposition took hold. The great-
est problems, at least conceptually, arose because of the 1977 revi-
sion’s use of property models when dealing with securities held by an
intermediary. Much has been written about the confusion this
yielded, particularly in such areas as tracing rules and the creation
of security interests.180 Moreover, the 1977 revision of Article 8 made
no great changes in the substance or scope of the statute. For the
most part, it merely accommodated the new and, it was hoped, soon
predominant method of share transfer. New tools of trafficking in se-
curities arose, which fit imperfectly within the old rules. Finally, the
stock market difficulties of October 1987 brought about studies that
suggested that legal uncertainties about clearance and settlement
might contribute to fears that institutions might not be able to meet
their obligations, and thus to increased market volatility.181
By 1988, an American Bar Association committee was hard at
work proposing alterations to Article 8 and encouraging NCCUSL to
form a drafting committee.182 NCCUSL responded by assembling a
drafting committee in 1991; this committee—one of NCCUSL’s
stronger assemblages, with Professor James Steven Rogers as re-
porter and Professor Curtis R. Reitz as chair—completed its work in
1994. Its fruits are now the law of almost every state, including, at
last, Florida.
To do justice to new Article 8 would exceed the patience of even
those few readers who have made it this far, not to mention the page
budget that this periodical could allow.183 A few issues, though, bear
                                                                                                                      
179. See U.C.C. § 8-313 (1995).
180. See, e.g., Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Beyond Negotiability: A New Model for Transfer
and Pledge of Interests in Securities Controlled by Intermediaries, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 305
(1990); James Steven Rogers, Negotiability, Property, and Identity, 12 CARDOZO L. REV.
471 (1990); Schroeder, supra note 177.
181. See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 174, at 1437-38, 1445-46.
182. See Charles W. Mooney, Jr., et al., An Introduction to the Revised U.C.C. Article 8
and Review of Other Recent Developments with Investment Securities, 49 BUS. LAW. 1891,
1892 & n.3 (1994).
183. I take solace that two leading scholarly commentators on Article 8 have recently
made similar laments—and then gone on to write very lengthy articles that did not cover
the whole terrain. See Rogers, supra note 174, at 1433 n.2 (disclaiming comprehensive cov-
erage in an article of 113 pages); Schroeder, supra note 177, at 301 (same disclaimer in an
article of 212 pages). The best overviews of new Article 8 are EGON GUTTMAN, MODERN
SECURITIES TRANSFERS (3d ed. Supp. 1998), 7A WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND & JAMES S.
ROGERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES, REVISED ARTICLE 8: INVESTMENT
SECURITIES (1996), and Bryn R. Vaaler, Revised Article 8 of the Mississippi UCC: Dealing
Directly with Indirect Holding, 66 MISS. L.J. 249 (1996).
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attention, whether because they are potentially important to a wide
range of practitioners or because they are at the core of the new stat-
ute. This Article will thus touch on virtual commerce, risks of wrong-
doing by intermediaries, and security interests in investment securi-
ties.184
A.   The Virtual Stock Certificate
Electronic commerce has become ever more important, as every-
thing from funds transfers to airline tickets and antiques are han-
dled over the wires. The U.C.C. adjusted to this to some degree when
Article 4A, on electronic funds transfers, was added in 1989.185 The
current U.C.C. revisions also take electronic commerce into account,
at least to some extent.186 Indeed, there is a larger NCCUSL project
to draft a Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, which would regulate
the manner in which electronic contracts might be formed.187
Revised Article 8 takes these developments into account in a
range of sections. One of obvious interest is its deletion of the Statute
of Frauds, on the theory that electronic transactions rendered the
                                                                                                                      
184. This is not to say that new Article 8 makes no other significant changes. For ex-
ample, until these revisions, the issuer would have been liable to a former owner of securi-
ties for wrongful registration if the issuer had received written notice of an adverse claim
far enough ahead of the presentation of the security for registration that it could act ap-
propriately. See U.C.C. § 8-403(1) (1977). Once the issuer had received notice, it would
have been under a duty to inquire about the merits of the claim, an inquiry potentially
satisfied by notice to the adverse claimant that registration would proceed in 30 days un-
less the issuer received either an appropriate court order or a bond. See id. § 8-403(2). This
honored a long line of American cases but imposed significant burdens on transfers by fi-
duciaries. See, e.g., Lowry v. Commercial & Farmers’ Bank, 15 F. Cas. 1040 (C.C.D. Md.
1848) (No. 8581). Various fiduciary statutes, consistent with this principle, excused issuers
from liability, save in the presence of notice. See, e.g., Vaaler, supra note 183, at 292-93.
Revised Article 8, following in its tendency to increase the negotiability of interests in se-
curities, entirely eliminated issuer liability, whether or not notice had been given of ad-
verse claims, unless the issuer had been served with an injunction or similar order or the
issuer colluded with the wrongdoer. See U.C.C. § 8-404(a) (1995).
185. Federal law had adjusted somewhat earlier, with the enactment of the Electronic
Funds Transfer Act (EFTA), covering consumer transactions, in 1978. See 15 U.S.C. §§
1693, 1693a-1693r (1994). Transactions governed in part by the EFTA do not fall within
Article 4A. See U.C.C. § 4A-108 (1995). In addition, a number of Federal Reserve regula-
tions and operating circulars of Federal Reserve Banks regulate electronic funds transfers;
perhaps obviously, these prevail over Article 4A. See id. § 4A-107. Article 4A has been part
of Florida law since 1991. See Act effective Jan. 1, 1992, ch. 91-70, 1991 Fla. Laws 515
(current version at FLA. STAT. §§ 670.101-.507 (1997)).
186. Thus, for example, the current draft of Article 2 no longer refers to “writings,” but,
rather, uses “records,” a term that includes both traditional writings and information
stored in an electronic medium. See U.C.C. § 2-102(26) (Draft Mar. 1, 1999) (defining “rec-
ord”); see also U.C.C. § 2-201 (Draft Mar. 1, 1999) (Statute of Frauds; refers to “record,”
rather than “writing”).
187. See UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT (Draft Jan. 29, 1999). At least at present, the
statute would defer to other bodies of law, including the U.C.C., should they have their
own rules about electronic contracting. See id. § 103(c).
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provision dated and even obstructionist.188 A good deal of litigation
had arisen under the old Statute of Frauds—more, perhaps, than
under any other section of Article 8. This litigation typically involved
informal transactions in securities of small firms, and often also in-
volved an alleged promise that an employee would receive shares in
the firm.189 It may be too much to think, though, as one optimistic
author did, that this heralded the virtual demise of the Statute of
Frauds.190 Article 2’s revisers, after flirting with the deletion of the
Statute of Frauds, have since restored it, albeit in weakened form.191
The Statute is, perhaps, on a life support system, but its heart beats
(feebly) on.192
More fundamentally, revised Article 8 recognizes—at last!—the
indirect holding system and allows it to flourish without resort to
general and variant principles of agency law. Until the 1994 revi-
sions, only one section of Article 8 dealt with the depositary system
described above, and that section was messy and complex.193 Under
the new rules, we have a new vocabulary—not merely the old and
general use of “financial intermediary.”194 Consider the following sce-
nario. Suppose that Moe has a brokerage account with Dewey,
Cheatham & Howe, a securities firm that is a member of DTC and
NSCC. Moe places an order to buy one hundred shares of Stooge Pic-
tures with Shemp, his broker. Once the order is executed and the
shares paid for, what do we have? To begin, Moe is not a purchaser;
Moe does not own any specific shares, and Moe’s name appears no-
where on the books of Stooge. Moe is, instead, an “entitlement
                                                                                                                      
188. See U.C.C. § 8-113 & cmt. (1995); see also U.C.C. art. 8 pref. note IV.B.7. (1995)
(explaining reasons further); cf. U.C.C. § 8-319 (1977) (old Statute of Frauds).
189. See U.C.C. art. 8 pref. note B.7. (1995); see also, e.g., Goldfinger v. Brown, 564
N.Y.S.2d 459, 460-61 (App. Div. 1991); Davenport v. Island Ford, Lincoln, Mercury, Inc.,
465 S.E.2d 737, 738-39 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995); Beta Drilling, Inc. v. Durkee, 821 S.W.2d 739,
740 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992); GUTTMAN, supra note 172, ¶ 5.03[1][b].
190. See Douglas R. Heidenreich, Article 8—Article 8?, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 985,
991-92 (1996).
191. See U.C.C. § 2-201 (Draft Mar. 1, 1999).
192. Perhaps appropriately. With no Statute of Frauds, it is true that, say, a buyer
could bring in oral evidence of a sales agreement that the seller sought to deny. It is just as
true, though, that a seller could do the same with a buyer, which might reopen the door to
the sort of fraud which the Statute of Frauds was designed to discourage. For the sale of
goods, then, there might be something to be said for an asymmetric Statute of Frauds,
which would bar only the seller to a consumer from asserting the existence of an oral con-
tract over a certain amount. In contrast, many of the Statute of Frauds cases under Article
8 may well have involved statute-induced fraud, if, say, an employer sought to avoid an
oral contract to sell stock to an employee. In the reverse set of circumstances—an employee
either making up an offer to sell, or, more charitably, misinterpreting vague suggestions as
firm contracts—presumably the plaintiff’s burden of proof, along with the threat of suits in
tort (and even criminal sanctions) will sufficiently prevent fraud. Hence Professor Gutt-
man’s comment that “[t]he continuation of such a formalistic anachronism is difficult to
justify.” GUTTMAN, supra note 172, ¶ 5.03[1][b], at 5-22.
193. See U.C.C. § 8-313 (1977).
194. Id. § 8-313(4).
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holder.”195 Moe’s agreement with Dewey is a “securities account,”196
and the rights created under that account in the Stooge stock is a
“security entitlement.” Dewey, which maintains the securities ac-
count, is a “securities intermediary.”197 NSCC is a “clearing corpora-
tion.”198 The Stooge stock held by DTC in the name of Cede & Co. is a
“security” (and, for that matter, a “financial asset,” which includes
the definition of “security”). The jumbo certificate held by DTC on
behalf of Dewey and others is a “security certificate.”
The vocabulary recognizes, as the 1977 flavor of Article 8 did not,
that Moe does not own stock in Stooge Pictures. He instead has con-
tractual rights created under his securities account. These give him a
security entitlement that corresponds to one hundred shares of
Stooge Pictures, because Dewey has indicated in its books that the
one hundred shares—a financial asset—have been credited to Moe’s
account.199 This security entitlement carries with it a good many
rights and duties. For instance, Dewey must collect dividends or the
like made by Stooge and must pay anything received to Moe (or hold
it for him, as their securities account may provide).200 If Moe wants to
vote in shareholders’ meetings, then Dewey must vote as Moe wishes,
though Moe can allow Dewey to cast ballots for him.201 Should Moe
wish to sell his shares or place some other sort of order (for instance,
a stop-loss order), then Dewey must comply.202 Possibly Moe will de-
cide that he prefers direct holding to indirect; if so, Dewey must,
should the agreement creating the securities account provide as
much, procure a stock certificate for Moe and have one hundred
shares of Stooge placed directly in Moe’s name, or in any other name
that Moe may direct.203
Perhaps the most important rights go directly to what rests be-
hind the security entitlement. Dewey must obtain and maintain fi-
nancial assets that correspond to the aggregate claims of its entitle-
ment holders.204 Dewey, the securities intermediary, does not have a
property interest in the financial assets held for its entitlement hold-
ers; rather, the entitlement holders have pro rata shares in the fi-
                                                                                                                      
195. U.C.C. § 8-102 (1995) contains this definition and the others in this illustration,
except where noted.
196. Id. § 8-501(a).
197. If Dewey were not a member of DTC, but instead contracted with a DTC member
to handle its dealings, both firms would be securities intermediaries. See id. § 8-
102(a)(14)(ii) & cmt. 14. In addition, NSCC, which clears accounts for all DTC members, is
itself a securities intermediary. See id.
198. But not DTC, which is merely a depositary. See id. § 8-102(a)(5) & cmt. 14.
199. See id. § 8-501(b)(1).
200. See id. § 8-505.
201. See id. § 8-506.
202. See id. § 8-507.
203. See id. § 8-508.
204. See id. § 8-504(a).
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nancial assets held for them.205 So far, so good for Moe; though Moe
lacks the security of clutching the stock certificate to his bosom as he
slumbers, or of knowing that his name is emblazoned upon the rec-
ords of Stooge Pictures, he does have a property interest of some
sort.206 The question that Moe might think about, but probably does
not, is just how far these rights will get him in case of a dispute. In
particular, what if the shares underlying Moe’s security entitlement
are sold or given away without Moe’s consent? This is the subject of
the next Part.
B.   The Rise of Negotiability
Before exploring the modest rights of the entitlement holder, we
should look at the changed analogies that animated the change. Un-
til the recent revision of Article 8, the law looked at rights in securi-
ties essentially as tangible property. Sitting behind each share, after
all, is a collection of assets, usually tangible. The stock certificate,
though itself only evidence of an ownership share in the underlying
business, is also tangible. One may entertain a picture of certificates
changing hands for money on the floor of the New York Stock Ex-
change, much in the way that goods change hands for money at the
local five-and-dime.
If this is our image, then all sorts of rules spring forth. One in
particular is of interest: the old property rule of nemo dat.207 One may
transfer all the rights one has, but no more. This shelter principle
appears all over the U.C.C.208 Thus, for instance, under Article 2 “[a]
purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor had or had
power to transfer.”209 As a corollary, a buyer of goods from a thief
may never take good title, however honest the purchase may have
seemed, and no purchaser down the chain of title may do any bet-
ter.210
This principle seems to have influenced the drafters and initial
revisers of Article 8. Consider the case of Moe. Let us say that
Shemp, in desperate need of cash, forges Moe’s name, sells the shares
                                                                                                                      
205. See id. § 8-503(a), (b).
206. This property interest becomes important if Dewey becomes insolvent, and
Dewey’s general creditors seek to seize the financial assets Dewey holds for its entitlement
holders. Ordinarily, entitlement holders prevail over any creditors of the securities inter-
mediary. See id. § 8-503(a). Ordinarily? Yes, but there is an important exception. One
hates to hold the reader in suspense, but . . . . See infra notes 283-309 and accompanying
text.
207. More fully, nemo dat quod non habet (one cannot give what one does not have).
208. See John F. Dolan, The U.C.C. Framework: Conveyancing Principles and Property
Interests, 59 B.U. L. REV. 811, 812-13 (1979).
209. U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (1995).
210. See, e.g., Alamo Rent-a-Car, Inc. v. Williamson Cadillac Co., 613 So. 2d 517, 518-
19 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); Candela v. Port Motors Inc., 617 N.Y.S.2d 49, 50 (App. Div. 1994);
Butler v. Buick Motor Co., 813 S.W.2d 454, 458 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).
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credited to his account, and pockets the proceeds. Moe obviously has
a claim against Shemp in tort, though this may not mean much if
Shemp is insolvent. Can Moe get his stock back? Here we run into
another concept familiar from personal property—tracing. Pursuing
the analogy further, Moe’s shares have disappeared into a blizzard of
exchanges. It would be very difficult indeed to figure out where Moe’s
shares went. Under the 1977 version of Article 8, Moe would have
owned a share in a “fungible bulk,” the term of art applied to jumbo
certificates and the like.211 This recognizes, to a degree, that Moe has
no certificate with his name on it nestled in some large vault. It also
creates potential claims if Dewey has not been forthright. If, for in-
stance, Dewey has not purchased all the shares that its customers
have paid for, then Dewey’s customers share pro rata in whatever
bulk Dewey did acquire.212
Moe’s immediate difficulty, then, may stem from an inability to
trace the sale of the shares. Let us say, though, that he did own
shares, and that we can trace them—improbable, true, but perhaps
not impossible for thinly-traded shares. Under nemo dat, one would
expect that Moe would win; after all, if Shemp acquired the shares
through theft, then he could not pass good title to anyone.213 Indeed,
the hapless buyer—Larry—may well lose to Moe. The old rule
started regrettably; Moe will lose to any bona fide purchaser.214 If
Larry bought through an indirect holding system, however, he would
not be a bona fide purchaser unless the fungible bulk were held by a
clearing corporation.215 The distinction between fungible bulks held
by clearing corporations and those held by other financial intermedi-
                                                                                                                      
211. See U.C.C. § 8-313(1)(d)(iii) (1977). The term is rooted in commodities. See, e.g.,
U.C.C. § 2-501 cmt. 5 (1995).
212. See id. § 8-313(2). This avoids the use of especially messy tracing rules, which
might depend on coordinating the actual and ostensible balances of shares. For more on
tracing, see LIONEL D. SMITH, THE LAW OF TRACING (1997); LAUNDERING AND TRACING (Pe-
ter Birks ed., 1995).
The problem with stockbrokers (or, to use the new term for indirect holding, securities
intermediaries) who might hold too little for their entitlement holders is not as great as it
may have been. Federal statutes and regulations, most notably the Securities Investor Pro-
tection Act (SIPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa to lll (1994), now protect customers against most
shortfalls. See Michael E. Don & Josephine Wang, Stockbroker Liquidations Under the Se-
curities Investor Protection Act and Their Impact on Securities Transfers, 12 CARDOZO L.
REV. 509 (1990). This system of protection is not infallible, though, and might be strained
or broken in a market crash; in addition, the changes in Article 8 may require some
strengthening of this backup system. See, e.g., David A. Kessler, Note, Investor Casualties
in the War for Market Efficiency, 9 ADMIN. L. REV. 1307 (1996).
213. Shemp probably committed fraud, which nowadays is not thought to yield void ti-
tle. The Article will deal with this shortly.
214. See U.C.C. § 8-302(1) (1977).
215. Section 8-302(1)(c) allows for bona fide purchase only when the purchaser’s rights
come through section 8-313(1)(c), -313 (d)(i), or -313(g). Section 8-313(1)(g), in turn, refers
to entries made to the account of the purchaser or its designee on the books of a clearing
corporation. We may assume that Larry’s broker would serve as his designee.
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aries probably was not deliberate, but remains puzzling and even
mischievous.216 Still, there it is; Moe may prevail over a downstream
purchaser.
But nemo dat is not our only conveyancing principle, and this is
not our only model. Indeed, this sort of property rule has long been
hemmed in by another, more potent rule, even for tangible property:
the good faith purchase rule. In brief, this rule provides that a good
faith purchaser, typically for value, receives greater rights than the
seller had.217 Thus, for example, one who acquires goods by fraud has
voidable title, rather than the void title acquired by a thief; though
the defrauded party may replevy the goods from the defrauder, a
good faith purchaser for value from the defrauder will take clear ti-
tle, free from any claims of the victim of fraud.218 This rule has a long
and somewhat bumpy history. In general, though, with a few dips in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the trend, for bet-
ter or worse, has been toward increasing the rights of the good faith
purchaser for value.219 This is also true outside of voidable title is-
sues. Most of Article 3, governing negotiable instruments, is based on
the premise that instruments of this sort must flow freely, giving
their takers little reason to question the bona fides of each check; ac-
cordingly, we see that a holder in due course of a negotiable instru-
ment is immune to almost every form of attack.220 Coming a little
closer to home, Article 2 allows a merchant to whom goods are en-
trusted to give clear title to a buyer in the ordinary course of busi-
ness, as long as the merchant deals in goods of that kind.221 If one
thinks of the brokerage house as the entrustee and the customer as
the entruster, then one can see rather a stern rule in the offing.222
                                                                                                                      
216. See Mooney, supra note 180, at 333-34 & n.95.
217. See Dolan, supra note 208, at 813-16.
218. See U.C.C § 2-403(1) (1995); see also, e.g., Interstate Cigar Co. v. United States,
928 F.2d 221, 224 (7th Cir. 1991); Southeast Foods, Inc. v. Penguin Frozen Foods, 203 So.
2d 39, 43 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967); Jernigan v. Ham, 691 S.W.2d 553, 556 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).
219. See, e.g., Grant Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63
YALE L.J. 1057 (1954). Professor Gilmore later regretted somewhat his enthusiasm for ne-
gotiability and the rights of the good faith purchaser, enthusiasm rendered tangible not
merely in his article but in Article 9 of the U.C.C., for which he was the main drafter. See
generally Grant Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase Idea and the Uniform Commercial
Code: Confessions of a Repentant Draftsman, 15 GA. L. REV. 605 (1981) [hereinafter Gil-
more, Good Faith].
220. See U.C.C. § 3-305(a)(1) (1995).
221. See id. § 2-403(2); see also, e.g., Touch of Class Leasing v. Mercedes-Benz Credit of
Canada, Inc., 591 A.2d 661, 667-71 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991); Thorn v. Adams, 865
P.2d 417, 420 (Or. App. Ct. 1993).
222. The entrustment analogy has been made by Schroeder, supra note 177, at 496.
Indeed, one can go further. Perhaps, as Professor Rogers has suggested, negotiability is
not a very good analogy because it is based on the assumption that one owns a thing that is
then negotiated. Investment securities are abstract rights—rights that may be represented
by stock certificates, but rights all the same—and thus may not really be said to exist in
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That is what we have in new Article 8. As before, the entitlement
holder takes a pro rata share in all interests in that financial asset.223
What if that asset is sold to one who acquires a security entitlement
for value and without notice of any adverse claim? Then Moe would
lose, even if he could somehow manage the job of tracing.224 The rule
applies no matter who the securities intermediary might be; whether
clearing corporation or brokerage house no longer matters.225 Nor is
there any distinction between transfers of actual stock certificates or
transfers through an indirect holding system.226
But we should go a little further. Suppose that the sale occurred,
not because of fraud or theft by Shemp or by some outsider, but be-
cause of defalcation by Dewey itself. What then? Though at first
blush it seems harsh, new Article 8 yields the same result; however
the security or security entitlement was placed on the market, a pur-
chaser with no notice of an adverse claim takes free of the entitle-
ment holder’s rights. This may cause the securities intermediary’s
entitlement holders to bump into each other. Another illustration
may help. Let us say that Moe has a security entitlement for one
hundred shares of Stooge Pictures, and that Dewey has faithfully en-
tered this entitlement on its books and holds one hundred shares on
the NSCC records. Now Curly comes along and enters an order for
fifty shares of Stooge Pictures. Dewey takes his money and credits
Curly’s account with the position but purchases no more shares of
Stooge. Then Dewey fails. One could use some tracing rule or other to
figure out who owns what.227 Rather than that, new Article 8 contin-
ues the policies of the old and allows the entitlement holders to share
pro rata—here, giving Moe rights in just under sixty-seven shares
and Curly rights in just over thirty-three.228 Of course, there remains
a claim against Dewey, for all the good that does.229
New Article 8 has thus embraced negotiability, giving purchasers
of securities or securities entitlements even broader rights than they
had under old Article 8. We have, however, one more class of transac-
                                                                                                                      
any sense that makes analogies drawn from the transfer of goods directly helpful. See
Rogers, supra note 180, at 507-08.
223. See U.C.C. § 8-503(b) (1995).
224. See id. § 8-502 & cmt. 2.
225. See id.; see also, e.g., Rogers, supra note 174, at 1469.
226. See U.C.C. § 8-303 (1995).
227. Such as first-in-time, last-in-time, or the like. See supra note 212.
228. See U.C.C. §§ 8-502 cmt. 4, 8-503(b) (1995).
229. Incidentally, what if Dewey never buys any shares? Technically, Moe may well
have a security entitlement; though no financial asset actually existed, the presence of a
financial asset is not essential if the other steps required to create a security entitlement
took place. See id. § 8-501(c) & cmt. 3. Moe would then have a claim against Dewey for the
value of this entitlement, as well as possible actions under state and federal law. This may,
as before, be a hollow claim if Dewey lacks unencumbered assets, though some resources
may be available under SIPA. See Schroeder, supra note 177, at 472-73.
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tions to consider: security interests in securities or security entitle-
ments. These transactions push negotiability to its edges—and be-
yond? We shall see.
C.   Security Interests in . . . What?
Securities and security entitlements are potentially just the sort
of assets in which a lender would want to stake a claim. Unlike, say,
machine tools or kumquats, they do not wear out or decay; though
they do fluctuate in value, whatever value they have may be readily
realized. Two questions arise. First, how does revised Article 8
change the rules governing how one takes and perfects a security in-
terest in securities or security entitlements? Second, what priority
rules govern these security interests? In particular, do the claims of a
security intermediary’s secured creditors trump the securities enti-
tlements of the intermediary’s customers?
1.   Securing Securities
Under the first iteration of Article 8, one went to Article 9 to de-
termine whether a security interest in stock230 existed and whether it
was perfected. In general, just as with other security interests, the
secured party would either have to take possession of the collateral
or have the debtor sign a security agreement and give value in order
to have a security interest in the stock.231 Either filing or possession
could perfect this security interest.232 This was simple enough, but
did not clearly deal with the indirect holding problem. The 1977 revi-
sion of Article 8 sought to solve the problem by pulling security in-
terests in certificated securities back within Article 8, mainly in sec-
tion 8-313—a section not unjustly called “the most opaque provision
in the entire UCC.”233 To parse this closely would be both tedious and
pointless.234 In brief, a secured party could take a security interest in
stock held in bulk by an intermediary only if the security were trans-
ferred to the secured party or its designee.235 This security interest
simultaneously attached and perfected the security interest; no addi-
                                                                                                                      
230. Though stock is a narrower term than securities, I shall use it here to avoid over-
repetition of the word security.
231. See U.C.C. § 9-203(1) (1972).
232. See id. §§ 9-302(1), -305. Though certificated securities are not named in section 9-
305, the definition of instrument includes them. See U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(i) (1995).
233. BARKLEY CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE ¶ 7.17[4] (rev. ed. 1993).
234. Particularly because it has been parsed lucidly by others. See, e.g., CLARK, supra
note 233, ¶ 7.17[2][a]; Peter F. Coogan, Security Interests in Investment Securities Under
Revised Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1013 (1979); Mooney,
supra note 180; Jeanne L. Schroeder & David Gray Carlson, Security Interests Under Arti-
cle 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 557 (1990).
235. See U.C.C. § 8-321(1) (1977).
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tional filing was needed.236 In turn, transfer of an indirectly held se-
curity could be effected through any of four ways.237 First, the finan-
cial intermediary could send the secured party a confirmation that
the security interest existed and make a book entry to that effect.238
Second, if the shares were held by a clearing corporation, the trans-
fer would be effected if the clearing corporation made appropriate
book entries.239 Third, if the debtor had signed a security agreement
describing the stock, transfer occurred when the intermediary re-
ceived a notice of the security agreement signed by the debtor.240
Fourth, and last, if the secured party was itself a financial interme-
diary in possession of the stock, the security interest was transferred
when the debtor signed a security agreement.241
These rules—the third, in particular—have allowed secured par-
ties to claim rights in stocks. Yet there were many difficulties. The
use of transfer as the key concept was a bit odd, continuing as it did
the idea of a thing to be transferred.242 It may, however, have been
inevitable, if one bears in mind that 1977’s section 8-313 was in-
tended to cover not just the taking of security interests, but also the
means by which purchasers would take clear title, whether to certifi-
cated or uncertificated securities.243 Still, it makes for an unwieldy
bit of drafting—and one that has yielded error in a range of con-
texts.244 Moreover, infelicitous drafting meant that a broker with
rights in more than one fungible bulk might make no transfer at all
to any secured parties of her customers, meaning that there would be
no security interests extant in a very common set of circumstances.245
                                                                                                                      
236. See id. § 8-321(3)(a).
237. The intermediary could perfect as the secured party’s intermediary, as long as the
certificate was either indorsed to the secured party or had been issued to it. See id. § 8-
313(1)(c). This is not holding in bulk, though, and more properly falls under the general
head of agency law.
In addition, the security interest would be perfected for 21 days if the security interest
were taken under a security agreement and transfer had not yet been effected. See id. § 8-
321(2). This is analogous to the rights under Article 9 for the holder of a security interest
in instruments, certificated securities, or negotiable documents. See U.C.C. § 9-304(4)
(1995).
238. See U.C.C. § 8-313(1)(d)(ii) (1977).
239. See id. § 8-313(1)(g).
240. See id. § 8-313(1)(h).
241. See id. § 8-313(1)(i).
242. On the other hand, it beats “delivery,” for there is no delivery in the indirect
holding system. See Aronstein, supra note 174, at 301-02.
243. See U.C.C. art. 8 pref. note IV.B.2. (1995).
244. See, e.g., Schroeder & Carlson, supra note 234, at 588-98.
245. See Mooney, supra note 180, at 334-36; Schroeder & Carlson, supra note 234, at
602-04. Happily, the matter seems never to have been litigated to a reported judgment,
though one cannot be sure whether this provision might have had some subterranean ef-
fect.
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New Article 8 has come to the rescue, in part by selflessly re-
turning security interests in investment securities to Article 9.246 The
new key is not transfer, but control. A secured party with control has
both attached247 and perfected248 its security interest in the invest-
ment property, and thus has exalted rights. Indeed, control can even
prevail over the Article 9 equivalent of the Statute of Frauds; one
need not have a written security agreement to have a security inter-
est if one has control of the investment property.249 How one gains
control, and what rights one acquires, are thus at the core of what
follows.
Put generally, control entails taking whatever steps are necessary
for the secured party to have the investment property sold without
any further action by the owner.250 The relevant actions will vary
with the type of investment property. For example, taking control of
certificated securities requires taking delivery of the certificates, ei-
ther properly indorsed or registered in the secured party’s name.251 In
turn, delivery is either to the secured party itself or to its agent, or to
a securities intermediary who acts on behalf of the secured party (if
the certificate is properly indorsed to the secured party).252 The se-
cured party thus need not have physical possession of the certificate,
as long as the secured party is the registered holder of the security
on the issuer’s books and the holder is not a securities intermediary.
Revised Article 8 thus includes the classic forms of pledges available
even before the U.C.C., as well as a means involving a shift in regis-
tration.
More significant are the control provisions for securities entitle-
ments. Here a secured party gains control either if it becomes the en-
titlement holder or if the securities intermediary agrees that it will
obey entitlement orders from the secured party without gaining the
assent of the entitlement holder.253 The first system is straightfor-
ward, if perhaps not usual; if the secured party becomes the “owner,”
bearing in mind the difficulties with using conventional language of
ownership, then it will have control.254 More consistent with physical
analogies to securities entitlements is the other method, which envi-
                                                                                                                      
246. See U.C.C. art. 8 pref. note IV.B.2. (1995).
247. See id. § 9-203(1)(a).
248. See id. § 9-115(4).
249. See id. § 9-203(1).
250. See id. § 8-106 cmt. 1; see also id. § 9-115(1)(e) & cmt. 2 (showing relation of con-
trol to taking of security interest).
251. See id. § 8-106(b).
252. See id. § 8-301(a).
253. See id. § 8-106(d). Much the same system applies for security interests in uncerti-
ficated securities. See id. § 8-106(c) & cmt. 4.
254. These rules cover all forms of control, including purchase, so the scenario is not
very outré, except perhaps for secured credit. Even then, one may see sales, as the common
“repo” transaction suggests. See infra notes 265-269 and accompanying text.
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sions a contract among the entitlement holder, the securities inter-
mediary, and the secured party. The entitlement holder need not give
up its own right to dispose of the entitlement; as long as the secured
party is able to do so, the definition is satisfied.255 For that matter,
granting control rights to one secured party is perfectly consistent
with granting control rights to other secured parties.256 Finally, for
the sake of completeness, one may grant and take a security interest
in a securities account by taking control over all securities entitle-
ments in that account or by taking control under a three-party
agreement.257
One or two more rules on attachment and perfection under re-
vised Article 8 may be helpful before we turn to priorities. One may,
as noted, perfect a security interest in investment property by taking
control. One may also do so in the more conventional manner of filing
a financing statement in the appropriate office; conventional, that is,
for most other types of security, but remarkable for investment secu-
rities.258 How one perfects, however, may affect one’s priority against
other secured creditors.259 The new rules also codify the old common
law broker’s lien. If a customer of a financial intermediary buys a fi-
nancial asset, but has not yet paid for it when the asset is credited to
the customer’s account, the securities intermediary retains an auto-
matically perfected security interest in the resulting securities enti-
tlement securing the customer’s obligation to pay.260
Finally, two special methods of securities transactions are han-
dled specially under revised Article 8. First, those who lend to stock-
brokers and the like secure their loans principally by taking security
interests in the security entitlements of their debtors. These can be
handled through a so-called “hard pledge,” under which the securi-
ties are actually transferred on the clearing corporation’s books;
these can be disposed of only with the lender’s approval.261 Less radi-
cally, the secured lender may be willing to leave the securities or se-
curity entitlements in the name of the debtor, subject to an agree-
ment that the securities or entitlements will be transferred to the se-
                                                                                                                      
255. See U.C.C. § 8-106(f) & cmts. 4 & 7 (1995). Indeed, example 3 to comment 4 does
exactly that.
256. See id. Creating junior security interests or disposing of the entitlement may
cause a default under the security agreement, but that is not the concern of the law that
allows the security interests to be created and perfected.
257. See id. § 9-115(1)(e) & cmt. 4.  To be truly complete, I should mention that com-
modities contracts and accounts are also covered by these sections, even though they are
not securities for the purposes of Article 8. See, e.g., Vaaler, supra note 183, at 314-15.
258. See U.C.C. § 9-115(4)(b) (1995). If, however, the debtor is a securities intermedi-
ary, the financing statement is irrelevant; the security interest is perfected when it at-
taches. See id. § 9-115(4)(c).
259. See infra notes 290-294 and accompanying text.
260. See U.C.C. § 9-116(1) & cmt. 2 (1995).
261. Id. § 9-115 cmt. 6.
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cured creditor on demand—an “agreement to pledge.”262 The hard
pledge gives the lender control, and thus a perfected security inter-
est, with no need to file. The agreement to pledge, on the other hand,
gives a security interest, but no control; the lender may not sell the
securities or security entitlements without the broker/debtor’s ap-
proval. Under the 1977 version of Article 8, the lender under an
agreement to pledge could gain only temporary perfection and thus
had to roll over the loans every twenty-one days (not a real problem,
because the loans seldom last that long).263 Revised Article 8 is
kinder to this sort of lender; it falls under the automatic perfection
rule, and thus does not have to roll over the loan.264
One more type of lending before we go on to the new priorities
rules: repo lending. This type of transaction became notorious in
1994 when Orange County, California, was forced into bankruptcy by
incautious trading in repos, and many major corporations showed
great and surprising losses.265 What is this financing method? Briefly,
a firm simultaneously sells securities and agrees to buy equivalent
securities back at some specified time and price.266 The price differ-
ence is, in effect, the interest rate charged by the repo lender for the
use of the purchase price.
Repo agreements caused a great deal of dispute during the draft-
ing of revised Article 8, in part because it was far from clear whether
they were security interests or simple sales. The characterization is
complicated in part by the different types of repos. Some allow the
repo seller to retain the underlying securities (“hold-in-custody” re-
pos), while others require that the repo seller give control of the se-
curities to the repo buyer (“delivered-out” repos).267 These correspond
roughly to agreements to pledge and hard-pledge loans, discussed
above, and very possibly would receive the same overall treatment.268
For our purposes, it is enough to note the problem and point out that
                                                                                                                      
262. Id.; see also Howard M. Darmstadter, Revised Article 8 and the Agreement to
Pledge, 28 UCC L.J. 202, 205-06 (1995).
263. See Darmstadter, supra note 262, at 203-04.
264. See U.C.C. § 9-115(4)(c) & cmt. 6 (1995); see also Darmstadter, supra note 262, at
206-07. This kindness may be more apparent than real, though, because the lender under
an agreement to pledge has lost some of its old priority. See infra notes 290-294 and ac-
companying text.
265. See Jeanne L. Schroeder, Repo Madness: The Characterization of Repurchase
Agreements Under the Bankruptcy Code and the U.C.C., 46 SYRACUSE L. REV. 999, 1000
(1996).
266. See Jeanne L. Schroeder, Repo Redux: Repurchase Agreements Under the 1994 Re-
visions to the UCC, 29 UCC L.J. 3, 4 (1996); see also generally MARCIA STIGUM, THE REPO
AND REVERSE MARKETS (1989).
267. See U.C.C. art. 8 pref. note III.C.10 (1995).
268. The courts and commentators seem divided on the issue. See, e.g., Schroeder, su-
pra note 265; Schroeder, supra note 266; William F. Hegarty, IV, Note, Lifting the Cloud of
Uncertainty Over the Repo Market: Characterization of Repos as Separate Purchases and
Sales of Securities, 37 VAND. L. REV. 401 (1984).
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revised Article 8 generally does not require that one characterize a
transaction as one or the other.269
In sum, revised Article 8 cleans up the baroque world of attach-
ment and perfection for all classes of security interests in investment
securities, and particularly for security interests in security entitle-
ments. As others have suggested, this removes earlier impediments
to secured lending and very likely improves the availability of credit
to a wide range of potential borrowers.270 Before one can opine boldly
about the benefits to credit markets and the like, though, one must
look closely at the priority rules under revised Article 8, for changes
in priorities will affect greatly the willingness of a lender to lend and
the ability of a borrower to borrow.
2.   The Insecurity of Securities Accounts; Priorities Under the New
Article 8
Security interests have value because they can give priority to
their holders over other creditors, should the debtor default, and be-
cause, relatedly, the creditors typically have easier, faster, and
cheaper means of getting to their collateral as a result. We need not
enter the murky debate about the efficiency of secured credit here, or
this Article would never end.271 For the moment, it is sufficient to
suggest that there are at least some cases where secured credit may
be efficient, even if they are at times overrated. The real question
then becomes who takes priority over whom.
Under the 1977 version of Article 8, these questions were left to
conventional Article 9 law.272 Then and now, the general rule under
Article 9 resolves disputes among holders of perfected security inter-
                                                                                                                      
269. This is unlike, say, the distinction between a sale and a lease, which has poten-
tially huge consequences in a wide range of instances. See U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1995); 4
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 27, § 30-3.
270. See George T. Morrison & John J. Donlon, Pending Revisions to Articles 8 and 9 of
the Florida UCC: An Opportunity for Florida to Merge onto the Information Superhighway,
FLA. B.J., Jan. 1998, at 45, 46.
271. For those inclined to take the plunge, here are some of the leading sources pro and
contra: Symposium, The Priority of Secured Debt, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1279 (1997); Lucian
Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in
Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857 (1996); Garvin, supra note 62; Steven L. Harris & Charles
W. Mooney, Jr., A Property-Based Theory of Security Interests: Taking Debtors’ Choices Se-
riously, 80 VA. L. REV. 2021 (1994); Lynn LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor’s Bargain, 80
VA. L. REV. 1887 (1994); Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the Pattern of Secured Credit, 110
HARV. L. REV. 625 (1997); Steven L. Schwarcz, The Easy Case for the Priority of Secured
Claims in Bankruptcy, 47 DUKE L.J. 425 (1997); Alan Schwartz, Security Interests and
Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of Current Theories, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1981); Paul M.
Shupack, Solving the Puzzle of Secured Transactions, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 1067 (1989);
Elizabeth Warren, An Article 9 Set-Aside for Unsecured Creditors, 51 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q.
REP. 323 (1997); James J. White, Efficiency Justifications for Personal Property Security,
37 VAND. L. REV. 473 (1984).
272. See U.C.C. § 8-321(3) & cmt. 3 (1977).
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ests by giving priority to the first to file or perfect.273 There are a good
many twists on this rule, particularly for holders of purchase money
security interests—security interests that exist to enable the debtor
to purchase the collateral—who generally receive superpriority over
earlier holders of liens in after-acquired property (“floating liens”).274
In any event, security interests continue in the proceeds of the collat-
eral, to the extent the proceeds were traceable.275 Secured parties,
however, did lose to buyers in the ordinary course of business,276 and
even to many non-ordinary-course buyers.277 These rules had uncer-
tain application under the 1977 version of Article 8, in large part be-
cause the methods of transfer under section 8-313 fit poorly with the
main Article 9 approaches to the creation of security interests, even
for conventionally certificated securities.278
(a)   Priority Battles with a Customer as Debtor
The attendant uncertainty did little to encourage the use of in-
vestment securities as collateral, whether held directly or indirectly.
Revised Article 8 sought to reduce confusion here, in part by setting
up some special priority rules in Article 9. To get at these, it may be
useful to go back to hypotheticals. We shall retain the Dewey firm,
but this time use as our entitlement holder Laverne, who holds a se-
curity entitlement in one hundred shares of Shotz Brewing.
Laverne’s security entitlement is, as noted earlier, a property inter-
est in the underlying financial assets.279 A few uncontroversial re-
sults may be dealt with first, starting with priorities involving only
one secured creditor. If Laverne seeks to borrow, using her security
entitlement as collateral, the lender’s perfected security interest will
have all the attributes of an ordinary security interest. Thus, it will
be safe against the claims of the trustee in bankruptcy as hypotheti-
cal lien creditor.280 It will also give the secured creditor rights over all
unsecured creditors who may wish to levy Laverne’s assets.281 None
of this changed prior law.
If we add another secured creditor, we start to see changes. If two
secured creditors, perhaps Lenny and Squiggy, take control of
                                                                                                                      
273. See U.C.C. § 9-312(5) (1995).
274. See id. §§ 9-109, -312(3), (4).
275. See id. § 9-306. This statement, like most of the others in this synopsis, is over-
simplified, but may be useful to set up the new provisions on security interests in invest-
ment securities.
276. See id. § 9-307(1).
277. See id. § 9-307(2), (3).
278. See, e.g., Coogan, supra note 234; Schroeder & Carlson, supra note 234, at 618-40.
279. See supra notes 196-206 and accompanying text.
280. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (1994).
281. See U.C.C. § 9-301 cmt. 2 (1995).
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Laverne’s security entitlement,282 then we would ordinarily expect
the first to take control to prevail, following the general Article 9
analogy. Under the revised rule, however, Lenny and Squiggy will
usually rank equally, presumably sharing the collateral pro rata.283
This result seems odd, in that it undercuts the apparent primacy of
the initial security interest. Furthermore, if both Lenny and Squiggy
had filed financing statements to perfect their security interests,
then the first to file would prevail.284 One assumes that the first to
take control will define default in the security agreement to include
the granting of control to any other secured party, though this may
do little good if Laverne becomes insolvent. But what if Lenny per-
fects by filing, and Squiggy then perfects by taking control? Under a
first-to-file-or-perfect rule, Lenny would prevail (if we analogize
taking control of a security entitlement to taking possession of
goods). But under the new rule Squiggy would win: one who perfects
by taking control prevails over one who perfects by filing.285
This needs some explanation, given that we ordinarily assume
that later creditors with notice of a security interest can protect
themselves. What about a later creditor here? The control agreement
will not be found in the public records, so an untruthful borrower can
do some mischief. The rationale rests on the fact only in the revision
was filing made a proper means of perfecting a security interest in
securities.286 Accordingly, lenders may not yet have grown accus-
tomed to searching the public records. As standard practice had been
to perfect by other means, it seemed appropriate to the framers of re-
vised Article 8 to give precedence to established practice. Further-
more, this approach is consistent both with practice and law for ne-
gotiable instruments and even for certain transactions within Article
9 for which there is a preferred means of perfection.287 One may still
ask whether this approach may prove a trap for the unwary. An in-
experienced lender may be seduced by the general Article 9 method
and assume that filing first will grant priority. Still, perhaps these
battles among secured creditors—probably relatively sophisticated
examples of this breed, given the type of security they are taking—
should not evoke our sympathy; if they can’t learn the rules of their
trade, they should pick a new line of work.
                                                                                                                      
282. Recall that control need not be limited to one secured party. See supra note 256
and accompanying text.
283. See U.C.C. § 9-115(5)(b) (1995).
284. See id. §§ 9-115(5)(f), -312(5)(a). The purchase money superpriority rule does not
apply here. See id. § 9-115(5)(f).
285. See id. § 9-115(5)(a) & cmt. 5. Examples one through three in the comment con-
tain variations on this theme.
286. See id. § 9-115 cmt. 5.
287. See Rogers, supra note 174, at 1477-83.
332 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:285
These battles among secured creditors produce different results
when one secured creditor is the debtor’s financial intermediary. In
these cases, the financial intermediary will always prevail, even if
the other secured creditor takes control.288 Once again, the first-in-
time approach is not followed, though perhaps this result is not so
odd. After all, the security entitlement exists on the broker’s books,
which might be analogized to perfection by possession.
(b)   Priority Battles with the Securities Intermediary as Debtor
If the debtor is, say, a brokerage house, most of the rules dis-
cussed above will apply. This is true both for the routine rules about
control and for other rules that apply to the debtor’s financial inter-
mediary, for a financial intermediary may itself have a financial in-
termediary. For example, a stockbroker not itself a member of DTC
may contract with another broker to handle its accounts; that broker,
in turn, has DTC as its intermediary. It should be noted, though,
that if the debtor is a financial intermediary, filing a financing
statement will neither perfect a security interest in its investment
property nor affect the priority of the security interest, because such
a security interest perfects automatically on attachment.289
These rules change the priorities for some of the specialized
transactions discussed above. Consider, for starters, the hard pledge
and the agreement to pledge.290 The former is unexceptionable be-
cause the lender has control and thus has a perfected security inter-
est with priority over a noncontrol security interest.291 The trickier
case is the agreement to pledge. Here there is no control; the lender
under such an agreement thus will take equally with other non-
control lenders with perfected security interests, but will lose to all
holders of control security interests.292 The advantages of lasting per-
fection for the lender under an agreement to pledge are thus coun-
tered by this somewhat pale priority.293 Repo lenders have very
similar problems under revised Article 8. If they actually require
that the security entitlements be transferred, then they have control
with all the resulting advantages; if not, then not.294
These rules may not be too surprising, given that we have recov-
ered from whatever shock the basic rules induced when we went
through them with Laverne as debtor. Nor should we worry much, if
                                                                                                                      
288. See U.C.C. § 9-115(5)(c) (1995).
289. See id. § 9-115(4)(c).
290. See supra notes 261-264 and accompanying text.
291. See U.C.C. § 9-115 cmt. 6 (1995).
292. See id.
293. But the real problem is up ahead. See infra notes 301-09 and accompanying text.
294. There is much more to this analysis, but not for present purposes. See, e.g.,
Schroeder, supra note 177.
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at all, about any of the assumptions made about standard practice or
appropriate analogies; these rules seem to comport with what sophis-
ticated parties, who are pretty much the only ones who will care, will
want, and so they are probably efficient. But what if one of the par-
ties to a priority battle probably is not sophisticated? This may hap-
pen—indeed, probably will—if the battle is between an entitlement
holder and a secured creditor of the securities intermediary, and it is
here that we will end up.
(c)   “WARNING: YOUR SECURITIES INTERMEDIARY MAY BE
DANGEROUS TO YOUR WEALTH”295
Under the 1977 version of Article 8, the priority rules appeared to
give the entitlement holder, as we would now put it, the rights of a
purchaser, but perhaps not a bona fide purchaser.296 This posed
problems when the broker’s secured creditor held rights in the bro-
ker’s assets. Though the cases were unsettled, a parsing of the stat-
ute leads one to conclude that a secured creditor could prevail over a
customer with an interest in a fungible bulk, depending on the tim-
ing of the secured loan and the transfer to the customer.297 This em-
phasis on timing was thought peculiar; the customer would have no
way to know about any transactions with a secured lender (who at
that time could not perfect by filing) or another intermediary,
whether before the customer acquired its interest or after.298 A
clearer rule would, if nothing else, give the customer certainty and
allow her to plan.
Revised Article 8 does provide certainty—but, for the most part,
the certainty of the grave. We can, however, start with some good
news for the entitlement holder. If Shirley, the holder of a security
interest in Dewey’s securities and security entitlements, challenges
Laverne, our entitlement holder, and Shirley’s security interest is an
agreement to pledge, then Laverne will win. Under section 8-511, an
entitlement holder will prevail over a creditor of the securities in-
termediary when the creditor does not have control over the financial
asset.299 This changed then-current law in the entitlement holder’s
favor.300 Otherwise, though, the news is not very good. If Shirley in-
stead took control of the securities and security entitlements, then
                                                                                                                      
295. Mooney et al., supra note 182, at 1895 (quoting Martin J. Aronstein).
296. See supra notes 272-278 and accompanying text.
297. See, e.g., Mooney, supra note 180, at 366-79.
298. See id. at 377.
299. See U.C.C. § 8-511(a), (b) (1995); see also Darmstadter, supra note 262, at 207-08.
300. See Darmstadter, supra note 262, at 208; Rogers, supra note 174, at 1523-26.
Whether there will be any lasting benefit is less clear. If lenders under agreements to
pledge respond by taking control, then the entitlement holder will lose anyway, and will
have succeeded only in forcing the securities intermediary to pay more for its loan. See
Mooney et al., supra note 182, at 1901.
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she would prevail over Laverne, the customer.301 Hence the title of
this section: allowing a securities intermediary to act on one’s behalf
exposes one to the risk that the intermediary will become insolvent.
As Professor Rogers has observed, this provision has engendered a
good deal of comment, much at least initially adverse.302 Indeed, Pro-
fessor Rogers, the Reporter for revised Article 8, was among those in-
clined at first to favor the rights of the customers.303 His conversion,
and perhaps that of others, stemmed in part from the apparent con-
servatism of the provision; though the customers would lose, they
would very likely have lost under old Article 8. Perhaps more to the
point, the rule is consistent with other provisions, such as section 8-
503, which favors the transferee over the entitlement-holder wrong-
fully deprived of her entitlement.304 Nor may the securities interme-
diary routinely grant these security interests. Indeed, revised Article
8 makes clear the implicit idea that one cannot pledge what one does
not own.305 In addition, a rule which protected entitlement holders
over secured creditors or, for that matter, transferees, would greatly
complicate repo financing, for it is far from clear even now whether
repos are true sales or security interests.306 One last point of the
many that could be made: very often customers are perfectly willing
to allow their brokers to borrow on their security entitlements. If, for
instance, a customer buys on margin, the broker in effect lends the
customer the added money needed to establish the entitlement,
money that the broker will have to get somewhere. The broker is
likely to borrow it, using its assets, including the security entitle-
ment, as collateral. To draw a distinction between these transactions,
which presumably are acceptable, and others would increase the cost
of lending, and very possibly discourage the use of margin ac-
counts.307 The arguments are many and can only be touched on
here.308 It should be borne in mind that the major threat to an enti-
tlement holder—that its security intermediary may wrongfully
pledge its entitlement and then become insolvent—is dealt with by
other law. SIPA should often provide the customer with the remedy
she cannot get under revised Article 8.309
                                                                                                                      
301. See U.C.C. § 8-511(b) & cmt. 1 (1995).
302. See Rogers, supra note 174, at 1511-12.
303. See id.
304. See supra notes 223-226 and accompanying text.
305. See U.C.C. § 8-504(b) (1995).
306. See Rogers, supra note 174, at 1527-28.
307. See Rogers, supra note 174, at 1533-34. Much the same result may obtain when a
customer sells short. See id. at 1528-29.
308. The curious may wish to consult U.C.C. § 8-511 cmts. 1 & 2 (1995); see also
Rogers, supra note 174, at 1511-40; Schroeder, supra note 177, at 486-502.
309. Rights under SIPA are, however, limited, and could in extreme cases run out en-
tirely. See, e.g., Egon Guttman, Mediating Industry and Investor Needs in the Redrafting of
UCC Article 8, 28 UCC L.J. 3, 13-18 (1996); Kessler, supra note 212.
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D.   Conclusion
Revised Article 8 is certainly a success, if adoptions and scholarly
commentary are any guide. The commentary, strewn throughout the
preceding footnotes, has almost all been laudatory, and the adoptions
have been rapid and plentiful. Indeed, revised Article 8 has even
been adopted as the federal law governing the perfection and priority
of security interests in Treasury securities.310 Even if the statute
were at best an indifferent success, Florida would have been justified
in adopting it for the sake of uniformity and the commercial advan-
tages that attach to it. As it is, the statute clarifies much that was
murky, especially with respect to the indirect holding system.
One may still ask whether the rules that place a good deal of the
risk of intermediary failure on the customer had to be structured
thus. Granting the considerable force of Professor Rogers’ arguments
in their favor, the rules could still have had, in essence, a consumer
exception. It would not have to protect repo financers, margin cus-
tomers, or the like, and it would not have to affect the rules that pro-
tect buyers of entitlements. Rather, revised Article 8 could have
given individual entitlement holders priority over secured creditors
of their intermediaries as to any entitlements pledged to the secured
creditors. After all, the intermediary is not supposed to borrow on the
basis of the entitlements held by others, and one may fairly assume
that most of an intermediary’s financial assets are held on behalf of
its customers. Under these circumstances, why should a lender, pre-
sumably knowing these facts, be given priority in assets which it
should know the intermediary may not pledge?311 This problem is es-
pecially acute in light of the tendency of most people to undervalue
remote risk and thus the probability that an intermediary might de-
fault.312 Properly crafted, it would have been possible to avoid the
                                                                                                                      
310. See 31 C.F.R. § 357.10(c) (1997). For a vigorous critique of the earlier proposals
and the earlier law, see Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Good Faith Transferees of U.S. Treasury
Securities and Other Weird Ideas: Making Federal Commercial Law, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
715 (1993). On the appropriate means of complying with revised Article 8, see CLARK, su-
pra note 233, ¶ 7.17[3] (Supp. 1998).
311. The lender could, of course, lend on the basis of any securities held by the inter-
mediary on its own account, and separate arrangements could be effected to deal with
margin accounts—which, in any case, have proved problematic enough in our history that
very modest discouragement may not be amiss.
312. This may be caused by a good many factors, including excessive discounting of fu-
ture events, over-optimism, cognitive dissonance, and the infrequency, and resulting un-
derassessment, of this sort of risk. In the securities context, see Donald C. Langevoort,
Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law from Behavioral Economics About Stock-
brokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 627 (1996); Robert B. Thompson, Se-
curities Regulation in an Electronic Age: The Impact of Cognitive Psychology, 75 WASH.
U.L.Q. 779 (1997). On cognitive error more generally, see Larry T. Garvin, Disproportion-
ality and the Law of Consequential Damages: Default Theory and Cognitive Reality, 59
OHIO ST. L.J. 339 (1998); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Eco-
nomics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998).
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harms to which Professor Rogers and others allude, and give some
added protection to those against whom the intermediary acted
wrongfully.313
But here we are, and Article 8 will not be revised again any time
soon. Perhaps, as has been observed, the great clarity of revised Arti-
cle 8 will bring home to investors their relative vulnerability and
lead to strengthening of consumer protections in other legislation.314
Even as it is, though, revised Article 8 vastly improves the law of in-
vestment securities; any regrets are about missed opportunities, of
which there are very few, rather than errors made. Taken as a whole,
the statute is a great success; NCCUSL should be proud of fostering
it, and Florida should be proud to have enacted it.
IV.   THE GHOST OF U.C.C. YET TO COME
Thanks to the last legislative session, Florida’s U.C.C. is almost
current. The Legislature has adopted revisions that, though not per-
fect, both improve the law and increase uniformity. It is thus time to
blow the dust off of the crystal ball and look at impending U.C.C. re-
visions, both for already-approved changes to the Code and for
changes that are in the works. These follow, in the likely order of
submission.
A.   Article 5
This section of the U.C.C. governs letters of credit. It had gone un-
revised since its initial enactment, a few conforming amendments oc-
casioned by changes in other articles aside. Since the 1950s and
1960s, though, letter of credit practice has changed greatly. This is
due in large part to shifts in international letter of credit law. To il-
lustrate, the International Chamber of Commerce has adopted the
Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP), a
codification of trade practice that, by contract, governs most interna-
tional letters of credit. The UCP has changed over the years, with the
most recent iteration in 1993.315 In addition, the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) has prepared
the United Nations Convention on International Guarantees and
Stand-by Letters of Credit, which has been adopted by the General
Assembly of the United Nations and which awaits ratification.316
Given the large percentage of letters of credit that occur internation-
                                                                                                                      
313. As others have suggested. See, e.g., Francis J. Facciolo, Proposed Article 8: Why it
Should Not Be Adopted in Its Current Form, UCC BULL., Apr. 1997, at 1, 5.
314. See Mooney et al., supra note 182, at 1895.
315. See INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ICC PUBLICATION NO. 500 (1993).
316. See JOHN F. DOLAN, THE LAW OF LETTERS OF CREDIT ¶ 4.01[4] (rev. ed. 1996 &
Supp. 1998).
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ally, banks issuing letters of credit would much prefer international
and domestic law to coincide.  To an extent, they did before; the area
has evolved over many centuries, and modern changes have tended
not to depart far from this historic base. Furthermore, several states,
most notably New York, put in place a nonuniform amendment to
Article 5 that expressly allowed parties to contract out of Article 5
and into the UCP, or to apply the UCP through trade usage or the
like.317 Still, divergence in practice could create traps for the unwary
or incautious, and thus might be avoided.
Ordinary domestic practice has also changed. One significant
change is the increasing use of electronic payment systems, including
letters of credit, which were not even contemplated some forty years
ago when Article 5 was first drafted. Some specialized types of letters
of credit, most notably standby letters of credit, have been developed
as well, and fit imperfectly in the old statutory regime.318 Finally, Ar-
ticle 5 was the first attempt to codify this old and often idiosyncratic
field. Excellent as the original project was, some drafting anomalies
and oversights cropped up over the years, and were dealt with in
varying ways and with varying degrees of success by courts and leg-
islatures.
Accordingly, an American Bar Association Task Force on Article 5
studied the matter and recommended substantial revision.319 A
Drafting Committee, with Professor James White (of the classic
White and Summers treatise) as reporter, began work in 1990, and a
final draft was approved in 1995. This has been adopted, with very
few nonuniform amendments, by thirty-two states.320
It would be hard to do justice to the revision in the limited space
one can justify, especially in light of the technical challenges of the
field.321 In brief, the revision seeks both to align letter of credit law
more closely with good commercial practice and modernize letter of
                                                                                                                      
317. The states were Alabama, Arizona, Missouri, and New York. See id. ¶ 4.05. Since
then, all save New York have enacted revised Article 5. See U.C.C. art. 5, 2B U.L.A. 127-29
(Supp. 1998).
318. In part to bring order to this important area, the International Chamber of Com-
merce recently codified international standby practices. See Robert S. Rendell, Stand By
for New Set of Rules on Letters of Credit, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 2, 1998, at B8. These obviously
are not referred to in new Article 5, but presumably will be treated in much the same
manner as the UCP. See infra notes 322-323 and accompanying text.
319. See generally An Examination of U.C.C. Article 5, 45 BUS. LAW. 1521 (1990).
320. See U.C.C. art. 5, 2B U.L.A. 127-29 (Supp. 1998).
321. For more thorough summaries of the Article 5 revisions, see James G. Barnes &
James E. Byrne, Revision of U.C.C. Article 5, 50 BUS. LAW. 1449 (1995); Dellas W. Lee, Let-
ters of Credit: What Does Revised Article 5 Have to Offer to Issuers, Applicants, and Benefi-
ciaries?, 30 UCC L.J. 234 (1996); Milton R. Schroeder, The 1995 Revisions to UCC Article
5, Letters of Credit, 29 UCC L.J. 331 (1997); B. Lynn Kremers, Note, Letters of Credit:
Should Revised Article 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code be Adopted in Missouri, 65
UMKC L. REV. 567 (1997); James J. White, Trade Without Tears, or Around Letters of
Credit in 17 Sections, UCC BULL., Dec. 1995, at 1.
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credit law. The former is accomplished in part by section 5-116(c),
which provides that the parties may incorporate the UCP or other
rules of custom or practice by reference, save where Article 5 declares
itself nonvariable.322 Parties to letter of credit transactions, generally
a sophisticated lot, can thus use whatever rules are common to a con-
tracting community, without fear that Article 5 will interfere.323 To
bring about modernity, revised Article 5 makes a good many
changes. Some resolve splits in the cases; some bring U.S. law into
line with general commercial norms; some change law, typically in a
manner that increases commercial efficiency.324 Perhaps an example
of each is in order.
One important split resolved by revised Article 5 deals with the
burden placed on beneficiaries to comply with the terms of the credit
when they present the letter of credit to the issuer for honor. Prob-
lems here arise when a beneficiary provides documents that do not
quite comply. For example, a beneficiary might be obliged to submit a
draft that, among other things, gave the number of the credit and
stated that it was drawn under the credit. What if the draft did not
do so? If the issuer could refuse payment, then the beneficiary would
be unpaid. This might not be a problem if the applicant were still
solvent, but it might leave the beneficiary without recourse if the ap-
plicant were no longer solvent. On the other hand, one may ask
whether it is appropriate to require issuers to decide whether to
honor a letter in other than a relatively clear, mechanical way. To do
so would likely drive up the cost of letters of credit and impair their
primary use as an efficient means of ensuring prompt and certain
payment.325 Old Article 5 was vague on this issue, leading to a meas-
                                                                                                                      
322. See U.C.C. § 5-116(c) (1995). The nonvariable provisions, listed in section 5-103(c),
go to the expiration of letters of credit, the assignability of proceeds of letters of credit, and
certain definitions. In addition, the ability of the parties to vary the subrogation right is
somewhat limited under section 5-117(d), and Article 5 is generally subject to section 1-
102(3), which provides a good-faith limit on variation. On variability, see, e.g., Clark A.
Remington, Llewellyn, Antiformalism and the Fear of Transcendental Nonsense: Codifying
the Variability Rule in the Law of Sales, 44 WAYNE L. REV. 29, 60-100 (1998).
323. Article 5 thus recognizes the importance of extralegal norms in commercial be-
havior and gives legal force to these norms generated outside of law. Put positively, Article
5 thereby gives effect to relational contract; though the rules that govern actual behavior
may have developed outside of commercial law, the law will nevertheless recognize these
rules. See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s
Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996). Less positively,
perhaps, Article 5 provides little basis for attacking standard commercial practice as un-
fair, inefficient, or misguided. This may not matter much in the law of letters of credit,
though the same cannot be said of, say, the law of sales.
324. Some also codify nonuniform Florida law. For example, at present Article 5 is si-
lent about whether letters of credit are irrevocable. Florida’s version of Article 5 contains a
nonuniform amendment that creates a default rule of irrevocability. See FLA. STAT. §
675.103(a) (1997). This concept is found in revised Article 5. See U.C.C. § 5-106(a) (1995).
325. On the functions of letters of credit, see, e.g., DOLAN, supra note 316, ¶ 3.07 (rev.
ed. 1996).
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ure of disagreement in the cases.326 Most courts, including Florida’s,
have chosen the latter virtue over the former and employed a rule of
strict compliance.327 Though immaterial variations would not allow
an issuer to refuse payment, anything else—even substantial com-
pliance—would. A few jurisdictions, including that faced with the
facts above, have instead chosen a substantial compliance rule,
which deals more loosely with inaccuracies at the cost of certainty.328
Revised Article 5 has chosen the strict compliance rule, putting it
squarely in the blackletter.329 This does not, as the comments make
clear, require “slavish conformity to the terms of the letter of
credit.”330 Beyond typographical errors and the like, more substantial
mistakes may also be excused under something very much like es-
toppel, though waiver seems no longer a valid basis for a claim.331
The rule, though firm, is thus not quite as harsh as it could be. It
also should be remembered that the parties involved are typically
rather sophisticated, so the ameliorations more appropriate in other
contexts may not be needed, or wanted, here.
A modest example of a change that conforms American law to
general commercial practice is section 5-108(i)(1) on the issuer’s right
to reimbursement.332 Under old Article 5, the issuer was entitled to
immediate reimbursement in “effectively available funds” not later
than the day before the acceptance under the letter matured.333 As
the ABA Study Committee pointed out, this contradicted normal
business practice, which is to reimburse immediately as of the day
the acceptance matured.334 Indeed, it would be odd for the agreement
giving rise to the letter of credit to provide otherwise.335 Accordingly,
revised Article 5 provides that reimbursement must be in “immedi-
ately available funds not later than the date of its payment of
                                                                                                                      
326. The relevant provision says merely that “[a]n issuer must honor a draft . . . which
complies with the terms of the relevant credit . . . .” U.C.C. § 5-114(1) (1968).
327. See, e.g., American Nat’l Bank v. Cashman Bros. Marine Contracting, 550 So. 2d
98, 100-02 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Fidelity Nat’l Bank v. Dade County, 371 So. 2d 545, 546-47
(Fla. 3d DCA 1979). On the general rule, see DOLAN, supra note 316, ¶ 6.04.
328. See First Nat’l Bank v. Wynne, 256 S.E.2d 383, 385-86 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979); see
also, e.g., Banco Espanol de Credito v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 385 F.2d 230, 234-37
(1st Cir. 1967).
329. See U.C.C. § 5-108(a) (1995).
330. Id. § 5-108 cmt. 1.
331. See id. § 5-108(c) & cmt. 3. Waiver is addressed most clearly in section 5-108 cmt.
7.
332. See id. § 5-108(i). As noted earlier, the revision’s general deference to commercial
practice, especially as found within the UCP, is an important move toward uniformity. See
supra notes 322-323 and accompanying text.
333. U.C.C. § 5-114(3) (1968).
334. See An Examination of U.C.C. Article 5, supra note 319, at 1625.
335. See 3 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 26-
7, at 160 (4th ed. 1995).
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funds.”336 The U.C.C. thus has put in place a majoritarian default
rule, obviating the need to contract around its predecessor.337
The final example, demonstrating a change that furthers freedom
of contract, is the changed treatment of the duty of care owed by an
issuer to an applicant. Old Article 5 provides that an issuer has a
duty to an applicant to examine documents with care.338 This duty
may be defined by the parties, but may not be waived.339 In revised
Article 5, the duty of care is gone.340 Though this section requires
nonpayment if the documents do not comply, this requirement is
subject to the agreement of the parties.341 The only limit to the elimi-
nation of this potential liability is procedural: section 5-103(c) does
not allow sweeping disclaimers in boilerplate, but rather requires
more narrowly tailored, explicit disclaimers.342
In general, the revision has been accepted. However, new Article 5
has been criticized on the grounds that its fee-shifting provision may
dissuade small firms from bringing suit against large banks.343 In-
deed, Alabama and New Jersey have enacted nonuniform versions of
the relevant section to avoid mandatory fee-shifting.344 This section,
5-111(e), in essence adopts the English approach to attorney’s fees by
granting reasonable fees and costs to the prevailing party.345 Perhaps
ironically, the provision was intended to improve the position of
beneficiaries of letters of credit, who might otherwise be unable to
bring suits alleging wrongful dishonor.346 The New Jersey Law Revi-
                                                                                                                      
336. U.C.C. § 5-108(i)(1) (1995).
337. A majoritarian default rule is a rule that supplies what most contracting parties
would choose if they could negotiate costlessly and with perfect information. Such a rule
can be efficient because it lowers transaction costs: fewer contracts will have to provide al-
ternative terms. In addition, a majoritarian default rule can provide a sensible result
where the costs of contracting around the default would exceed the benefit derived from
the departure. In those cases, the parties will not depart from the default rule; making the
default rule anything other than their preferred result would thus yield an unwanted con-
tract term. See Ian Ayres, Preliminary Thoughts on Optimal Tailoring of Contractual
Rules, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 12 (1993); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in
Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 93 (1989);
Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV.
608, 613-17 (1998).
338. See U.C.C. § 5-109(2) (1962).
339. See U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1995).
340. See id. § 5-108.
341. See id.
342. See id. § 5-103(c) & cmt. 2.
343. See Margaret L. Moses, The Impact of Revised Article 5 on Small and Mid-Sized
Exporters, 29 UCC L.J. 390, 407 (1997). The provision, U.C.C. § 5-111(e) (1995), states that
“[r]easonable attorney’s fees and other expenses of litigation must be awarded to the pre-
vailing party in an action in which a remedy is sought under this article.” (emphasis
added).
344. See ALA. CODE § 7-5-111(e) (1997) (making fee-shifting discretionary); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 12A:5-111(e) (Supp. 1998) (same).
345. See U.C.C. § 5-111(e) (1995).
346. See id. § 5-111 cmt. 1; see also Fred H. Miller, Realism Not Idealism in Uniform
Laws: Observations from the Revision of the UCC, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 707, 723 (1998).
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sion Commission, despite the entreaties of Professor Fred Miller,
NCCUSL’s Executive Director, and Carlyle Ring, Chair of the Article
5 Drafting Committee, concluded instead that attorney’s fees should
be made available, but not required, necessitating a change from
“must” to “may” in the statute.347
The point is a good one, though not perhaps this amendment.
Symmetric two-way fee-shifting statutes are very rare in American
law, and with good reason; though they reduce the number of frivo-
lous suits, they also reduce the number of meritorious suits. The lat-
ter effect is probably greater than the former, given the relative risk-
aversion of plaintiffs and defendants.348 In any event, genuinely
frivolous litigation can be dealt with by existing powers of the courts.
True, under the fee-shifting rule rejected by New Jersey, beneficiar-
ies of letters of credit may more easily sue issuers for wrongful dis-
honor—a claim especially important given the unavailability of con-
sequential damages.349 The problem of unavoidable consequential
damages is attenuated, though, by the lack of duty to mitigate on the
part of the beneficiary.350 Little harm to uniformity would be done
were section 5-111(e) either omitted, made optional (as in New Jer-
sey), or, preferably, remodeled in the manner of Article 2A.351 Much,
however, would be done to bring revised Article 5 within the broader
scope of American commercial law.352
With that exception—altering the fee-shifting provision to model
that in Article 2A—Florida should enact revised Article 5.353 Most let-
                                                                                                                      
347. NEW JERSEY LAW REVISION COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT: UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE REVISED ARTICLE 5—LETTERS OF CREDIT 7-8, 10 (1996) [hereinafter NEW JERSEY
REPORT], available at <http://www.lawrev.state.nj.us> (visited Jan. 9, 1999).
348. See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settle-
ment Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319, 368-73, 379
(1991).
349. See U.C.C. § 5-111(a) (1995).
350. See id. § 5-111 cmt. 1. One imagines that the beneficiary will still tend to mitigate.
First, its action against the issuer may be combined with other actions for breach, for
which a duty to mitigate would still apply. Second, it may seek to limit its (unrecoverable)
consequential damages and, in so doing, may also mitigate its direct damages.  By implica-
tion, the applicant still has a duty to mitigate.
351. Article 2A’s unconscionability provision grants consumer lessees reasonable at-
torney’s fees if the court finds unconscionability but gives the lessor reasonable attorney’s
fees only if the lessee knew the action to be groundless. See id. § 2A-108(4). This provision
is modeled on the corresponding provision in the Uniform Consumer Credit Code. See
UNIF. CONS. CRED. CODE § 5.108(6) (1974). It also resembles greatly the asymmetric fee-
shifting system used under some federal civil rights statutes, including 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
See, e.g., Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978); see generally 1
ROBERT L. ROSSI, ATTORNEYS’ FEES §§ 10:17 to 10:22 (1995) (collecting authority).
352. It should be added that Professor Miller, though understandably against this
nonuniform amendment, does not see it as a major threat to uniformity. See Miller, supra
note 346, at 723.
353. New Jersey has enacted another nonuniform amendment to revised Article 5,
which specifies that whether the issuer observes the standard practice of financial institu-
tions regularly issuing letters of credit is a question for the court, rather than the jury.
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ters of credit that Florida firms receive domestically are now issued
under revised Article 5; so Florida lawyers must of necessity become
at least noddingly familiar with it. This is not a statute with massive
consumer effects, in which one properly looks at the costs that
change will have on various classes of those affected. Letters of credit
exist to facilitate commerce; the more uniform the rules governing
them, the lower the cost of commerce, and the greater the ease with
which commerce can occur. Revised Article 5, in its deference to UCP
and other sources of letter of credit practice, is sufficiently flexible to
effect the efficient use of letters of credit for quite a long time.
B.   Article 9
In 1998 both the ALI and NCCUSL approved the final text of re-
vised Article 9, governing secured transactions. The reporters have
just completed the comments, and the whole package has already
been introduced in some legislatures. This will be the third version of
Article 9. After the original enactment, Article 9 was revised in 1978.
Since then, a few relatively minor changes have come about. In es-
sence, though, Article 9 has remained static for some twenty years,
and largely so since the framing of the U.C.C.
New Article 9 has not yet been enacted—not surprising, given its
recency. Its recency and scope also preclude any thorough treatment
of its many nuances. Analysis of these will cause the death of many
trees—no, forests—for years to come. Still, a few comments and pre-
dictions may be appropriate. I predict that in relatively short order it
will replace the current version of Article 9 everywhere. The growth
of interstate banking and multistate firms has made all the more
important a uniform law on the taking of security interests. Once a
handful of states adopt the new Article 9, there will be a strong push
for all the others to do so.
But will the first handful enact the new statute? Will Florida? If
history repeats itself, Florida will not pioneer in the enactment of Ar-
                                                                                                                      
Compare U.C.C. § 5-108(e) (1995) with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:5-108(e) (Supp. 1998). The
problem raised here is whether the provision leaves an issue of fact for the judge, which
might limit unconstitutionally the right to a jury trial. See Moses, supra note 343, at 391-
407. But see generally James E. Byrne, Revised UCC Section 5-108(e): A Constitutional
Nudge to Courts, 29 UCC L.J. 419 (1997) (suggesting that section 5-108(e) is constitu-
tional). The difficulty here is the sweeping language of the statute. As Professor Miller has
noted, the intent was merely to leave to the court the determination of what standard
practice is, not to take from the finder of fact any disputed fact questions as to whether the
issuer complied with that standard. See NEW JERSEY REPORT, supra note 347, at 6. New
Jersey’s amendment clarifies this meaning, though at some cost to uniformity. This
amendment may not be too consequential; presumably a constitutional challenge would re-
sult at most in a limiting interpretation of this section, and the amendment seems only to
carry out what Professor Miller has suggested was the drafters’ intent. It is hard to say, as
has been suggested, that this is a fundamental departure from nonuniformity. See Miller,
supra note 346, at 723.
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ticle 9, but will happily follow others. One may confidently expect
other states to lead the way. Naturally, there is some pressure placed
on legislatures to enact revised versions of uniform statutes. Those
states with law reform commissions have a built-in lobby, and very
often the organized bar will act vigorously to push for uniform legis-
lation. In addition, the commissioners themselves often lead the way
in the legislatures. Though NCCUSL puts out more uniform legisla-
tion than a commissioner can handle at one time, a statute as impor-
tant as the U.C.C. will naturally tend to take priority. These suggest
a certain tendency to move revised Article 9 ahead, though perhaps
not enough to overcome legislative inertia.
The critical force probably will come from the interest groups most
favored by the revision. As with revised Article 5, larger banks are
likely to push for the enactment of new Article 9. In part, this stems
from the added clarity that the revision provides (though at times at
the cost of pithiness; the text and the comments of proposed Article 9
are much longer than its predecessor).354 Certainty, like uniformity,
has great value to repeat actors in a market. The costs of moving to a
new statute are not, however, borne equally by those who use it. This
problem stems both from the fact of change and from the increased
detail and precision of the new statute—in many ways, a move from
rules to standards. As Louis Kaplow has observed, rules impose costs
ex ante, while standards impose costs ex post.355 Most of the costs ex
ante ordinarily stem from the promulgation of the rules. Sometimes,
however, the costs ex ante may be of the sort here—the costs of re-
working one’s way of doing business. Large banks and frequent
credit users may find the added certainty of the new Article 9 attrac-
tive, as their transition costs can be spread over a good many trans-
actions. Small banks and relatively infrequent credit users may,
however, find the changes less pleasing. Just like their more active
competitors, they will have to change their forms and, in a good
many instances, their methods of doing business, but they will have
fewer transactions over which to spread their costs.356 At least in the
short run, the change to new Article 9 may thus make smaller credi-
tors less competitive.
                                                                                                                      
354. To illustrate, compare the provisions on the priorities of purchase money security
interests. Compare U.C.C. § 9-324 (1998) with U.C.C. § 9-312(3), (4) (1995).
355. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J.
557, 585-86 (1992).
356. Alternatively, they may choose a sort of rational ignorance; if they conclude that
the costs of revising their business practices exceed the likely value of the revisions, they
may choose to remain ignorant. See id. at 571-77, 596-99. Apart from the direct costs of le-
gal nonconformity, though, knowing that one may be afoul of the law may lead to excessive
risk-aversion and thus a loss of potential gain. See Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, De-
terrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 279, 299 (1986).
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Even more important, though, is the tendency of revised Arti-
cle 9 to favor secured lenders over trade creditors and other unse-
cured creditors. The original U.C.C. moved far in that direction, in
part by unifying a messy and complex field of law, in part by abro-
gating the pre-Code rights of unsecured creditors, and in part by
making possible the ready use of floating liens and blanket liens.357
The new Article 9 pushes further that way. It expands the possible
scope of security interests to include, among other things, deposit ac-
counts, payment intangibles, commercial tort claims, health care re-
ceivables, and most consignments.358 It eases perfection rules.359 It
lowers filing costs by doing away with most occasions for multiple
filings.360 It clarifies the rules about filing locations, thus reducing
the number of multistate filings.361
Just as important are the things it does not do. It makes only
modest improvements in the lot of the consumer-debtor, rolling back
some helpful changes in earlier drafts.362 Though a good many com-
mentators of a wide range of political stances have urged that invol-
untary tort claimants be given enhanced priority, this was not
done.363 The Article 9 committee also lobbied for the reversal of a
                                                                                                                      
357. The main drafter of Article 9, Grant Gilmore, later regretted that change. See
Gilmore, Good Faith, supra note 219, at 627. For an example of the loss in standing of un-
secured creditors, see, e.g., Garvin, supra note 62.
358. See U.C.C. § 9-109 (1998).
359. For instance, by allowing perfection by filing for instruments. Compare id. § 9-
312(a) (perfection may be by filing) with U.C.C. § 9-304(1) (1995) (perfection only by taking
possession). Perfection by possession will still give greater security to the creditor, though.
See U.C.C. § 9-330(d) (1998) (perfection by possession has priority over other forms of per-
fection).
360. Compare U.C.C. § 9-501 (1998) with U.C.C. § 9-401(1) (1995). This is likely to
yield a measure of nonuniformity as states that have elected a dual filing system choose to
retain part or all of it beyond the remnant left in the revision. Local filing officers, typically
the clerks of the county courts, may well bemoan the lost revenue and urge such a change.
361. This may well be the greatest advance in clarity in the new Article 9. Compare
U.C.C. §§ 9-301, -306 (1998) with U.C.C. § 9-103 (1995). Here, too, a state filing officer,
usually the Secretary of State, may worry about the resulting shifts in filing patterns and
agitate for nonuniform amendments, most likely consisting of the old rules.
362. See U.C.C. art. 9 pref. note at 29-33 (Annual Meeting Draft July 1998); see also,
e.g., Memorandum from the UCC Article 9 Drafting Committee to Commissioners (Apr.
1998) (outlining changes and rationales) (copy on file with Florida State University Law
Review).
363. See, e.g., Kenneth N. Klee, Barbarians at the Trough: Riposte in Defense of the
Warren Carve-Out Proposal, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1466 (1997); David W. Leebron, Limited
Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1565 (1991); LoPucki, supra note
271; Robert K. Rasmussen, An Essay on Optimal Bankruptcy Rules and Social Justice,
1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 1. Cf. Alan Schwartz, A Theory of Loan Priorities, 18 J. LEGAL STUD.
209 (1989) (granting many tort claimants some priority, but not complete). The coreporters
of Article 9, not surprisingly, hold quite different views. See Steven L. Harris & Charles W.
Mooney, Jr., Measuring the Social Costs and Benefits and Identifying the Victims of Subor-
dinating Security Interests in Bankruptcy, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1349 (1997).
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proposed change in Article 2, which would have improved the status
of a reclaiming seller; the Article 2 committee acceded.364
All this is to say that most financers of goods are quite likely to
work hard for the enactment of revised Article 9. Though there are
more debtors in the world than there are creditors, and though we
are all potential tort claimants, the very diffuseness of these classes,
coupled with the unlikelihood that any individual will care much
about the result, makes it improbable that there will be much sus-
tained opposition.365 Perhaps more importantly, the statute, though,
like all works of mortals, imperfect,366 clarifies a good many areas left
uncertain either by current Article 9 or by capricious judicial glosses.
There are some risks of nonuniform amendments, particularly in the
place of filing and remedies sections, but the statute will probably be
adopted universally and all but uniformly.367
C.   Articles 2 and 2B
Article 2, governing sales of goods, has not been revised since the
initial wave of enactments, a few conforming amendments aside.
Llewellyn’s loose framework gave Article 2 a good deal of play in its
joints; nevertheless, a study committee charged with evaluating the
                                                                                                                      
364. See U.C.C. § 2-816 cmt. (Draft May 16, 1997).
365. Consumer advocates did take part in the drafting of new Article 9 and had a role
in the truncation of consumer provisions near the end of the drafting process. More to the
point, consumer groups could choose to lobby for nonuniform amendments, or, if suffi-
ciently peeved, for nonadoption. This is unlikely to happen. Despite the late rollbacks,
there remain some advances for consumers in new Article 9. Many consumer advocates
may well take their half-loaf. In addition, as part of the late compromise, consumer advo-
cates agreed not to oppose new Article 9 in the legislatures. See U.C.C. art. 9 pref. note at
30 (Annual Meeting Draft July 1998). Though not all consumer groups were represented in
the late bargaining, the most active generally were, which will blunt any sustained attack
on that front.
366. Excepting, of course, Gilbert and Sullivan’s Iolanthe.
367. There is one nonuniform enactment that Florida should consider, whatever the
outcome of these other issues. The Florida version of section 9-312(4), which gives the
holder of a purchase money security interest a superpriority if it perfects its security inter-
est within a limited time after the debtor takes possession, contains an extra sentence:
“Failure to so perfect shall cause the priority of the purchase money security interest to be
determined under subsection (5).” FLA. STAT. § 679.312(4) (1997). This added sentence is
surplusage if one reads the following section: “In all cases not governed by other rules
stated in this section (including cases of purchase money security interests which do not
qualify for the special priorities set forth in subsections (3) and (4) of this section) . . .”
U.C.C. § 9-312(5) (1995). Florida enacted this to reverse International Harvester Credit
Corp. v. American National Bank, 296 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 1974), which did violence to Article 9
by giving the holder of the purchase money security interest its superpriority even though
it did not comply with section 9-312(4). The leading treatise on Article 9 has termed this
“The World’s Worst UCC Decision” and “probably the low point in judicial construction of
Article 9.” CLARK, supra note 233, ¶ 3.09[4][d]. Florida’s nonuniform amendment was de-
signed to overturn International Harvester Credit, restoring the statute to its otherwise
universal meaning. As International Harvester Credit remains in the Southern Reporter, it
may be prudent to carry forward the nonuniform language in order to remind future gen-
erations of that decision’s fatuity.
346 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:285
state of sales law concluded that there were enough difficulties to
warrant review.368 A drafting committee was thus empanelled in
1991 and, with occasional intervals for rest and refreshment, has
been at work ever since.
In the course of the revisions, it was proposed that software and
other licensing transactions be brought within Article 2. The law
here had not been codified; some courts applied Article 2 by analogy,
others applied Article 2 directly, and still others used the common
law.369 Article 2, however, fits licensing imperfectly. After an attempt
to use a hub-and-spoke method to bring together the laws of sales,
leases, and licensing, it was decided to split licensing off on its own.370
A new drafting committee was thus put in place, and Article 2B be-
gan to take life.
Both Articles are still works in progress. At present, it is antici-
pated that Article Two will go to the states in early 2000, while Arti-
cle 2B should be ready a year later. Commenting on either in any de-
tail would thus court instant obsolescence. One can, however, predict
safely that both will prove controversial; it is even possible that one
or both will be interred in a uniform graveyard. Interestingly, the na-
ture of the opposition to each is quite different. The present opposi-
tion to Article 2 is led by various industry groups, most of which de-
cry the slightly expanded warranty coverage in draft Article 2. They
also worry about other consumer provisions, most notably the shift-
ing provisions about assent and contract formation generally.371 This
is not, however, to say that consumer advocates are delighted with
the progress of Article 2. In fact, most of the changes are fairly mod-
                                                                                                                      
368. See generally PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE, PEB STUDY GROUP, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 2: PRELIMINARY REPORT
(1990).
369. See PETER A. ALCES & HAROLD F. SEE, THE COMMERCIAL LAW OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ch. 9 (1994).
370. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE REVISED ARTICLE 2B—PREFACE 3-4 (Draft Dec.
1, 1995), available at <http://www.law.uh.edu/ucc2b/1201/pref1201.html> (visited Dec. 22,
1998).
371. See, e.g., Letter from R. Bruce Josten, Executive Vice President, Government Af-
fairs, Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, to Members of the Uniform
Commercial Code Article 2 Drafting Committee (Mar. 6, 1998) [hereinafter Josten Letter]
(complaining about formation and warranties sections); Memorandum from Jeffrey S.
Edelstein & Debra Freeman, Attorneys, Hall Dickler Kent Friedman & Wood, to Members
of the Uniform Commercial Code Article 2 Drafting Committee (Mar. 2, 1998) [hereinafter
Edelstein & Freeman Letter] (letter from advertising trade associations, complaining
about treatment of warranties created by advertising); Letter from Andrew D. Koblenz,
Senior Attorney, American Automobile Manufacturers Association, to Members of the Uni-
form Commercial Code Article 2 Drafting Committee (Jan. 26, 1998) (complaining mainly
about formation and warranties sections) (copies on file with Florida State University Law
Review).
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est, and a good many, if they favor any side, favor industry.372 An
outsider might have trouble understanding the fuss; none of the
changes proposed in the present draft of Article 2 could be called
revolutionary, and most simply recognize existing cases or extend
slightly principles that have long been present in contract and com-
mercial law. Furthermore, as is often entirely justifiable, the Article
2 drafting committee has often revised the draft to take account of
industry objections, whether on substantive grounds or out of real
concerns about the prospects for enactment. On the merits, then, in-
dustry has little cause for complaint and should have still less by the
end of the process.373
Two illustrations may be in order, one on contract formation and
the other on warranties. A number of critics of draft Article 2 have
pointed to what they term “significant changes“ to the parol evidence
rule. 374 When one actually compares the parol evidence rule in draft
Article 2 with that in the current version, though, one finds precious
little change. The main changes in the draft are (1) elevating lan-
guage about whether terms “would certainly have been included” in
the record from comment to blackletter375 and (2) clarifying that
terms in a record may be explained from the surrounding circum-
stances.376 The latter may appear to expand the parol evidence rule;
in fact, though, it merely brings it more formally in line with the
more modern approach espoused by Arthur Corbin and found, among
other places, in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. 377 Indeed, as a
number of courts and commentators have observed, the Article 2 pa-
rol evidence rule was itself substantially a rejection of the old four-
corners approach to parol evidence. 378 The change in the draft=s pa-
                                                                                                                      
372. See, e.g., Letter from Gail Hillebrand, Senior Attorney, Consumers Union of U.S.,
Inc., to Uniform Law Commissioners (July 1997) (applauding balance in draft and noting
the provisions that favor sellers and that favor buyers).
373. Enactability is an obvious and important issue for any uniform statute because
there is always the concern that nonuniform amendments may degrade the uniformity of a
statute, or that incomplete enactment will lead to divergent rules. See, e.g., Fred H. Miller,
Consumers and the Code: The Search for the Proper Formula, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 187, 214-
15 (1997).
374. Letter From Charles R. Keeton, Counsel, General Electric Company, to Members
of the Uniform Commercial Code Article 2 Drafting Committee 2 (Feb. 5, 1998); see also,
e.g. Letter From American Gas Association to Members of the Article 2 Drafting Commit-
tee, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 3 (Mar. 6-8, 1998);
Josten Letter, supra note 371, at 2.
375. Compare U.C.C. '  2-202(a)(1)(B) (Draft Mar. 1, 1999) with U.C.C. '  2-202 cmt. 3
(1995).
376. See U.C.C. '  2-202(b) (Draft Mar. 1, 1999).
377. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS '  212 & cmt. b (1979); Arthur L.
Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parol Evidence Rule, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 161,
189-90 (1965).
378. See, e.g., Barbara Oil Co. v. Kansas Gas Supply Corp., 827 P.2d 24, 35 (Kan.
1992); Herman Oil, Inc. v. Peterman, 518 N.W.2d 184, 188 (N.D. 1994); Sundlun v. Shoe-
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rol evidence rule is thus quite modest, and perfectly consistent with
modern legal doctrine. 379
The other illustration is the draft=s treatment of advertising war-
ranties. Article 2 has hitherto been silent about whether a manufac-
turer could, through its mass-market advertising, create an express
warranty enforceable by remote buyers. The draft expressly states
that a manufacturer may, in essentially the same way that it creates
any other express warranty.380 This move has been attacked by many
in industry. 381 One wonders why. Though it is true that current Arti-
cle 2 does not specifically validate this sort of express warranty, in
comments it clearly holds open the possibility that courts may wish
to recognize that such a warranty exists.382 Almost without exception,
courts that have reached this issue have done so.383 In fact, only one
part of the draft treatment of advertising warranties diverges from
the path of current law B its elimination of consequential damages
for lost profits, even for those who make it past the usual foresee-
ability test.384 Manufacturers may resist this codification of current
case law, but the real long-term effect of this draft provision is in
their favor. Again, the objections from industry seem ill-founded.
Article 2 has drawn some fire, but its life has been placid when
compared with that of Article 2B. Almost from the start, Article 2B
has drawn formidable opposition from a wide range of entities. Con-
sumer groups have consistently opposed it, often calling of late for
the abandonment of the project.385 So, too, have many groups of soft-
                                                                                                                      
maker, 617 A.2d 1330, 1334 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); II E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH
ON CONTRACTS '  7.3, at 216 (2d ed. 1998).
379. Though it should be noted that some jurisdictions still use something like the
four-corners approach to parol evidence under the common law.  See, e.g., Ralph James
Mooney, The New Conceptualism in Contract Law, 74 OR. L. REV. 1131, 1148-59 (1995).
380. See U.C.C. '  2-408(c) (Draft Mar. 1, 1999).
381. See, e.g., Edelstein & Freeman Letter, supra note 371, at 2; Josten Letter, supra
note 371, at 4.
382. See U.C.C. ''  2-313 cmt. 2, -318 cmt. 3 (1995).
383. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 524 F. Supp. 1042, 1046-47 (D. Conn.
1981); Prairie Prod., Inc. v. Agchem Div.-Pennwalt Corp., 514 N.E.2d 1299, 1302-04 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1987); Spring Motors Distribs., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 489 A.2d 660, 674-77 (N.J.
1985); Inglis v. American Motors Corp., 209 N.E.2d 583, 586-88 (Ohio 1965).
384. See U.C.C. '  2-408(f)(3) (Draft Mar. 1, 1999).
385. See, e.g., Letter from Steve Brobeck et al., Consumer Federation of America, to
Charles Alan Wright & Gene N. Lebrun, Presidents, ALI (Nov. 10, 1998) (letter from Con-
sumer Federation of America, Consumer Project on Technology, National Consumers
League, and U.S. Public Interest Research Group); Letter from Gail Hillebrand to Uniform
Law Commissioners (June 24, 1998) (letter from Consumers Union). The letters and other
items referred to in this note and those that follow may be found on The 2BGuide, the pre-
eminent website on proposed Article 2B, at <http://www.2Bguide.com> (visited Nov. 18,
1998).
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ware customers, including a good many industry groups.386 Many
groups of computing professionals have also opposed the statute,387 as
have certain industries affected at its edges.388 Libraries and other
custodians and providers of information have expressed dismay.389
Finally, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) recently wrote com-
ments that call into question many important provisions in Article
2B.390
With all these opponents, they must be doing something right.
Certainly that has been the view of the software industry, which has
consistently supported Article 2B.391 This, again, is understandable.
The law governing licenses of computer software is far from deter-
mined, and major splits exist among courts on a great many impor-
tant issues.392 At some point, uniformity is highly desirable. One
might ask whether it would be better to let common law courts build
                                                                                                                      
386. See, e.g., Letter from Gordon Pence to UCC Article 2B Drafting Committee (Oct.
12, 1998) (letter from Caterpillar, Inc.); Letter from John Stevenson to Carlyle C. Ring, Jr.,
Chair, NCCUSL Article 2B Drafting Committee (Oct. 8, 1998) (letter from SIM).
387. See, e.g., Letter from John R. Reinert, President, IEEE-USA, to Carlyle C. Ring,
Jr., Chair, & Raymond T. Nimmer, Reporter, NCCUSL Article 2B Drafting Committee
(Oct. 9, 1998).
388. See, e.g., Letter from Jack Valenti, Director, Motion Picture Association of Amer-
ica, et al., to Carlyle C. Ring, Jr. Chair, NCCUSL Article 2B Drafting Committee & Geof-
frey Hazard, Jr., Director, ALI (Sept. 10, 1998) (letter from Motion Picture Association of
America, Recording Industry Association of America, Newspaper Association of America,
National Association of Broadcasters, National Cable Television Association, and Maga-
zine Publishers of America).
389. See, e.g., Letter from National Writers Union (UAW Local 1981) to Carlyle C.
Ring, Jr., Chair, NCCUSL Article 2B Drafting Committee, et al. (Oct. 9, 1998); Letter from
Robert Oakley, Washington Affairs Representative, American Association of Law Librar-
ies, et al. to Charles Alan Wright, President, ALI (Oct. 8, 1998) (letter from American As-
sociation of Law Libraries, American Library Association, Association of Research Librar-
ies, and Special Libraries Association).
390. See Letter from Joan Z. Bernstein, Director, Division of Financial Practices, Bu-
reau of Consumer Protection, et al. to Carlyle C. Ring, Jr., Chair, NCCUSL Article 2B
Drafting Committee, & Geoffrey Hazard, Jr., Director, ALI (Oct. 30, 1998) (letter from Bu-
reau of Consumer Protection, Bureau of Competition, and Federal Trade Commission).
391. See, e.g., Memorandum from Business Software Alliance to Article 2B Drafting
Committee (Oct. 10, 1998); Memorandum from Information Industry Association to Article
2B Drafting Committee (Oct. 8, 1998).
392. One illustration comes in contract formation. Many software manufacturers use
shrink-wrap licenses—licenses, the terms of which are located within the packages and
that provide that assent occurs on the use of the software. If the buyer does not learn the
terms of the license until she has paid for the software, are the license terms part of the
sales contract? Federal circuit courts have split on the issue. Compare Step-Saver Data
Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 102 (3d Cir. 1991) (not enforceable), with ProCD, Inc.
v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996) (Easterbrook, J.) (enforceable). Paren-
thetically, draft Article 2B generally validates shrink-wrap licenses even though they ap-
pear somewhat inconsistent with traditional rules of contract formation and, for that mat-
ter, the principles of federal warranty law. See U.C.C. §§ 2B-207, -208 (Draft Feb. 1, 1999);
see also, e.g., Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act § 102(b)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(1)(A) (1994)
(presale availability of warranty terms); Zachary M. Harrison, Note, Just Click Here: Arti-
cle 2B’s Failure to Guarantee Adequate Manifestation of Assent in Click-Wrap Contracts, 8
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 907 (1998).
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up a body of case law before presuming to codify, but the need is pre-
sent. Where there is need, though, there is danger; if the law is fro-
zen incorrectly, it may alter greatly the continued development of an
important industry.393
Article 2B continues to shift in order to address objections. At the
November 1998 meeting of the drafting committee, for example, the
scope of Article 2B was limited to computer information transactions,
thus addressing in part the objections of many in print and other
media who do not want to fall under Article 2B.394 The drafting com-
mittee also endorsed a provision allowing public policy to override
contractual terms. Thus, for example, it would be possible for con-
tractual restrictions on fair use, reverse engineering, and the like to
be rendered unenforceable.395 More changes may be in store.396
It remains too early to tell whether Article 2B will even be pro-
posed by NCCUSL and ALI, much less whether it will be enacted
anywhere. Three comments can safely be made, though. First, if the
                                                                                                                      
393. This cuts both ways. A statute that placed excessive restrictions on software licen-
sors might well stunt the growth of that industry. On the other hand, a statute that tilts
too far in their favor might dissuade customers from licensing software from American
firms, thus providing an obstacle to growth.
394. See Carlyle C. Ring, Jr., Summary of Actions at Article 2B Meeting, Nov. 13-15,
1998 at 1 (n.d.), available at <http://www. 2Bguide.com/docs/cr1198sum.html> (visited Jan.
9, 1999); cf. Letter from Jack Valenti et al., supra note 388. This change has not mollified
those groups. Though they have escaped coverage as licensors, they are still covered as li-
censees. Furthermore, just as happened with Article 2, courts might apply Article 2B by
analogy to other licensing transactions. They have thus renewed their objections. See Let-
ter from Jack Valenti, President and CEO, Motion Picture Association of America et al. to
Gene N. LeBrun, President, NCCUSL et al. (Dec. 7, 1998)).
395. See Ring, supra note 394, at 1; see also, e.g., Charles R. McManis, The Privatiza-
tion (or “Shrink-Wrapping”) of American Copyright Law, 87 CAL. L. REV. 173 (1999) (as-
sailing the use of such terms).
396. One may, however, doubt that enough changes will occur to palliate the objectors,
or that the remainder of the process will be at all smooth. Even before the ALI decided to
delay considering Article 2B, acrimony plagued the drafting. A random selection of the
comments in The 2B Guide illustrates this. More disturbingly, the acrimony appears in of-
ficial statements made by the drafters. See, e.g., U.C.C. art. 2B pref. 20 (Draft Aug. 1,
1998) (“In the political process that surrounds any new law, many public statements have
been made about the effect of Article 2B on consumer protection. Most are political efforts
to mislead.”). There have even been more or less polite intimations that some on the
drafting committee have improperly communicated the views of others. See Letter from
Gail Hillebrand, Senior Attorney, Consumers Union, to Gene Lebrun, President, NCCUSL,
& Carlyle C. Ring, Jr., Chair, NCCUSL Article 2B Drafting Committee (May 11, 1998)
(protesting use of Consumers Union’s name with an implicit endorsement of Article 2B),
available at <http://forums.infoworld.com/threads/get.cgi?56678> (visited Jan. 28, 1999).
The amount of criticism itself would make bridging the gaps difficult; the tone suggests
that it may be impossible. Moreover, it is hard to explain NCCUSL’s decision not to change
its schedule, even in light of the ALI’s decision to delay consideration of Article 2B by a
year. See Press Release from National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws (Jan. 9, 1999), available at <http://www.2bguide.com/docs/199prel.html> (visited Jan.
28, 1999). Possibly NCCUSL thinks the remaining problems can be dealt with by with a bit
of polish on the current draft. See id. It may also be that NCCUSL has in mind proceeding
ahead, even if ALI ultimately tables the draft or gives firm objections after NCCUSL has
approved it. In any event, the prospects are uninviting.
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FTC is not satisfied with the progress of Article 2B, it may render
large parts of the project moot. As it has in other contexts, the FTC
can issue regulations that preempt state law. The drafting commit-
tee, ALI, and NCCUSL would thus do well to ensure that the FTC’s
comments are heeded, at least in substantial part, if they want a real
statute to emerge. Second, if Article 2B is proposed, then it may well
become the law that governs a great many of our licensing transac-
tions. It is not unlikely that 2B would be enacted in a few states with
a heavy concentration of software licensors—Washington comes to
mind. Article 2B’s choice of law provision is quite broad, allowing the
parties—really, the licensor—to designate the law of any jurisdiction,
though the choice is limited somewhat in consumer transactions.397
Accordingly, subject only to the limits imposed by the Full Faith and
Credit Clause or similar policies regarding the recognition of one
state’s laws by another (in particular, looking to the enforceability of
choice-of-law rules), it would then be possible for software manufac-
turers to operate under Article 2B, or some nonuniform variant,
much as certain states of incorporation have become popular be-
cause, in part, of their relaxed corporation laws. What Florida, or any
other state, does might thus largely be moot.398 Third, if Article 2B is
killed off, its spectre may haunt the killers. Now that a complete text
is at hand, the software industry could seek its enactment state by
state (perhaps first removing some of the consumer provisions).399 In
any event, the issue is not yet ripe, though the next several months
should be critical.
V.   A FEW WORDS ON UNIFORM LAW-MAKING
As one surveys the somewhat leisurely maelstrom that is com-
mercial law today, and surveys as well the problems that attend en-
actment, one may sympathize with the politico who, responding to
                                                                                                                      
397. See U.C.C. § 2B-107 (Draft Feb. 1, 1999).
398. Furthermore, should one state in a region adopt Article 2B, other states will be
under pressure to do so, lest they lose software publishers to the neighboring state.  Thus,
if Washington adopts 2B, California may follow. This, in turn, might lead competitive
states to act similarly. If Article 2B is approved, then, its opponents may need to fight hard
in the states in which it is first proposed, and its friends may want to pick early states with
care and concentrate on them.
399. Something along these lines has already started. Though NCCUSL has not yet
finished with Article 2B, and though the drafts have undergone, and are likely to undergo,
significant changes, legislators in Connecticut and Virginia filed bills to put in place the
then-current version of Article 2B. Interview with Gail Hillebrand, Senior Attorney, Con-
sumers Union, in Los Angeles, Cal. (Feb. 6, 1999). Remarkably, when NCCUSL was in-
formed of these premature attempts to enact Article 2B, it did not attempt to stop, or at
least slow, legislative action. Id. Though it appears that these attempts have been abortive,
they do presage similar attempts, especially if NCCUSL, as expected, approves a draft in
July 1999 (though before ALI has reviewed it in May 2000). Should this happen, and
should NCCUSL not act vigorously to hold back the legislatures, one may ask about the fu-
ture of ALI-NCCUSL collaboration.
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the advent of the Erie doctrine and the growth of the commerce pow-
ers, filed a bill to put sales law under the federal wing—and thus in-
spired NCCUSL to take steps toward a Uniform Commercial Code.400
Life might well be easier, if not necessarily better, had commercial
law become a federal creature. Still, here we are, with a uniform law
that must be made uniform by the actions of some fifty jurisdictions.
The survey above may suggest that not everything runs smoothly.
Sometimes, as with Article 2A, a statute is launched, only to be re-
called quickly as problems are pointed out. Sometimes, as with Arti-
cle 8, a statute, though carefully devised, mispredicts the future and
thus leaves ungoverned many of the transactions it was designed to
govern. Sometimes, as with Article 2B, a well-intentioned project
draws a barrage of criticism that may imperil the result. And the
U.C.C. is a success story; many uniform statutes issued by NCCUSL
are adopted by few states, and some by none.401
Furthermore, even if a good product is offered to the states, they
may well put in place nonuniform amendments, whether to placate
this or that interest group or to deal with some cherished idiosyn-
crasy in local law.402 Nor is the process of enactment always a model
of legislative deliberation, unless one’s model is drawn from Bis-
marck’s famous dictum. Busy legislatures generally give little atten-
tion to routine uniform statutes, save when an affected group takes
an interest, and may have to rely heavily on advocacy, rather than
dispassionate counsel, when deciding what to do. In closing, then, I
offer a few diffident suggestions on the law reform process, from
drafting through enactment.
1.   Use New Forms of Communication to Improve Deliberation
This requires a bit of background for those unfamiliar with the
drafting process. At present, drafting committees meet infre-
quently—say, no more than four or five times a year for somewhere
between three and . . . well, however many years Article 2 ultimately
takes. Attending these meetings can be costly, which limits the abil-
ity of some potentially interested parties to take an active role.
Though interested parties can submit proposals to the reporters or
committee between meetings, proposals are discussed and voted on
only at meetings. As a result, a good deal of a typical meeting is
spent hearing people recite relatively familiar arguments and devise
ways to formulate proposals for voting. Even when proposals are
                                                                                                                      
400. See Garvin, supra note 62, at 264-66.
401. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of Uni-
form State Laws, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 131 (1996).
402. See supra note 151. For that matter, these amendments may prove ineffective,
thus doing nothing more than sowing confusion in the minds of future readers. See supra
note 4 (nonuniform amendment to deposit account definition).
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made in principle, to avoid drafting on the floor, the ultimate product
will be voted on only later, after the reporters have framed the stat-
ute.
At least in my experience, the result is not always satisfactory.
Written submissions unaccompanied by the physical presence of
their authors are frequently left aside, and a good deal of wheel rein-
vention goes on. These meetings are held when the people involved
are away from their files and offices and thus cannot easily check
whether statements made are perfectly accurate or whether one per-
son’s rendition of an earlier compromise is entirely correct. The press
of time often prevents one from tabling matters until the full truth
can come out. In principle, one can go back to correct errors, but iner-
tia and other business sometimes preclude this.
One can only speculate, but it is likely that some past problems
have come about because of this method of drafting. Potentially af-
fected parties are often silent or at least muted; on the other hand,
parties that can afford to be present throughout may have undue
sway. Much time is also lost in devising language on the spot, or in
debating recollections, time that could better be spent on the merits.
The present drafting method may have made sense in earlier
days, when gathering around a table was the only way to hash out
statutory language. Nowadays, though, one could use computer bul-
letin boards and e-mail lists to carry out much of the work between
meetings. Members of the drafting committee and other interested
parties could post and debate proposals at leisure, with full reference
materials at hand and no limits, save one’s own endurance, on craft-
ing one’s views. Ideally, proposals could thus be framed and, to a
large extent, completed between meetings, leaving actual meetings to
settle on policy issues and pass on work completed between meet-
ings.
How might this avoid past difficulties? First, it would open up the
process to more participants, especially the relatively impecunious.
This might head off some nonuniform amendments inserted when
those unable to take an active role in drafting nationally take an ac-
tive role locally. Second, it could shorten the drafting process by
leaving less to do at meetings (and thus requiring fewer of them).
Though errors are found and corrected over time, complex statutes
may also become Byzantine with endless layers of redrafting and
patching. It is hard to remember why one took a decision three or
five years ago, so one may reverse it without regard to the sound
principles it had captured. Third, it should improve the quality of the
participation. This is not to say that drafting committee meetings are
intellectual slums. To the contrary: those I have attended have been
marvelously educative and have featured discussion at as high a
level as one can contemplate. But a good deal of what is said is frank
354 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:285
advocacy and thus may not present the truth fully or, at times, fairly.
A less concentrated process of deliberation makes it harder to slide
dubious assertions past a committee, many, if not most, members of
which are generalists. Others can more plausibly rebut assertions or
do the research rebuttal may require. Fourth, it should save money;
if fewer meetings are required, then NCCUSL has lower costs. It
thus could take on more drafting projects, or devote more resources
to those it has.403
NCCUSL has already taken steps in this direction by placing
drafts of its works in progress at a website.404 It might be worth try-
ing this with a new project to see whether the cost and bother would
be worth it.405
2.    Make Complete Drafts Available Before the Blackletter Is
Approved
Ordinarily, draft articles of the U.C.C. are approved before the
comments are complete, or even before they are written. The version
passed on by ALI/NCCUSL contains the proposed statutory text,
perhaps with introductory comments and some reporter’s notes
tucked within. This contrasts with the usual ALI process for ap-
proving Restatements of the Law, in which both the blackletter and
the comments are made available in draft form when the members of
the ALI review the Restatement.
One can see why the U.C.C. drafts over the last decade or more
have proceeded in this way. It is time-consuming to prepare com-
ments, and reporters have plenty on their hands without the need to
write and rewrite comments as the statute changes. Furthermore,
the drafting process tends to run on longer than expected. By the
time the statutory text is more or less final, no one wants to wait un-
til the comments can also be made ready. As ALI and NCCUSL meet
only once a year (in May and July, respectively), delay caused by
drafting comments can put back a statute by up to nine months.
Still, the experiment might be tried. First, it is common to resolve
disputes among drafting committee members by assuring one side or
                                                                                                                      
403. Most importantly, by commissioning empirical work or by hiring outside experts
to prepare background papers in unfamiliar or relatively unstudied areas. Others have
pointed to the lack of empirical work in so fact-driven an area as a deficiency in the draft-
ing process. See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Thinking Like a Lawyer, Acting Like a Lobbyist:
Some Notes on the Process of Revising UCC Articles 3 and 4, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 743, 770-
73 (1993).
404. The URL is <http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc> (visited Jan. 9, 1999).
405. A modest reform along these lines would be to hold drafting committee meetings
in law schools. The committee members and observers would then have ready access to law
libraries, and thus could check the accuracy of statements made during meetings and do
research on matters otherwise unanticipated. Law students might also be available to as-
sist.  I am indebted to David Frisch for this observation.
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the other, or perhaps both, that the problem will be dealt with in the
comments. This is also a way to handle principles which are difficult
to draft precisely and briefly, but that should go somewhere. It is
thus difficult to assess the success with which the reporters have
handled this delegation until the comments are out. Leaving aside
the potential fallibility of reporters who are asked to put things into
comments over many years, it is possible that problems with con-
flicting comments, or conflicting memories of what the comments
should have said, may emerge only after the draft has been approved
and the comments written—and then it is too late to open up the
process.406 This may lead to nonuniform amendments in the states as
frustrated commissioners and observers seek to get their ideas rec-
ognized somewhere.
Second, it is hard for those not active in the drafting of a statute
to get a clear sense of what is behind shifts in statutory language
without comments. True, the drafts typically contain redlined text,
and often the reporters will note why a change was made. If, how-
ever, something was dropped from the statute because it would be
dealt with in the comments, an outside observer will not realize why.
Making the comments available earlier might thus lead to more in-
formed submissions to ALI and NCCUSL in the later stages of ap-
proving a draft.
Third, preparing the comments before, rather than after, the stat-
ute is approved should help reduce the sort of problem that plagued
Article 2A. When objections came in after the blackletter was ap-
proved, the reporter responded by rewriting the comments. This at
times left the text and comments at odds, as others have observed.407
Better to have the two fit together, and have both text and comments
approved at once.
Fourth, having a more complete version available may forestall
some of the late interventions found, for instance, in Article 2A. It
has been pointed out that state law revision commissions tend not to
get involved with a draft statute until very late in the process. If a
full version were available for a reasonable time before approval,
state law revision commissions and bar committees might be more
inclined to review the product and make suggestions before the stat-
ute is approved. This would probably cut down the number of non-
uniform enactments, and perhaps remove the need to recall an arti-
cle (as happened recently with Article 2A, and happened with the
whole U.C.C. in the 1950s).408
                                                                                                                      
406. The comments are made available for inspection before they are made final, but
there is no opportunity for discussion.
407. See, e.g., Rapson, supra note 65.
408. After Pennsylvania enacted the U.C.C., the New York Law Revision Commission
issued a report that, though generally favorable, found a good many spots where the
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Fifth, and perhaps most important, the comments are quite im-
portant. They do not control the text, though there are plenty of spots
in the Code where the text is ambiguous or at least very difficult to
understand without the comments. Still, they are at least the second
resort, and often (alas?) the first, when one is faced with difficult or
unfamiliar statutory language. And, as has been noted, they are of-
ten used to fill in the gaps, where the drafting committee either felt
that the statute could not efficiently deal with the welter of cases
that could arise or where what is called for is either a general princi-
ple or a series of illustrations. The comments can also be used to sug-
gest answers to interstitial problems or to problems deliberately left
outside the scope of the statute.
Given this, why are the comments not passed upon by the people
who approve the statute proper? The lack of approval, beyond the re-
porters and the chair of the drafting committee, has been pointed to
as a reason against the overuse of comments.409 It does seem odd to
allow a very small and perhaps unrepresentative group the chance to
shift significantly the meaning of a statute. For purely instrumental
reasons, this may not be a bad thing if one likes the reporter’s views
more than the views of the drafting committee.410 But these instru-
mental reasons lack a certain legitimacy and may ultimately lower
the value of the comments to potential users.411
It is hard to see why NCCUSL and ALI should promulgate the
U.C.C.’s comments in a method so different from that used for the
Restatements. Were the text and comments put together for delib-
eration and passage, the comments would carry even greater weight
and might also benefit from more give-and-take. In any event, the
process might be considered for one or another of the projects up-
                                                                                                                      
U.C.C. needed improvement. See WALTER P. ARMSTRONG, JR. A CENTURY OF SERVICE: A
CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS 77 (1991). To avoid having nonuniform versions throughout the states,
NCCUSL revised the U.C.C. significantly, bringing it closer to the New York approach. See
JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1, at 4 (3d student
ed. 1988).
It is true that the whole Code was available by then, which would seem to undercut the
point made above. Having the whole Code, text and comments alike, does not guarantee
that the states will pass on it in advance. It makes early comment more likely, though,
which would be a help.
409. See Peter A. Alces & David Frisch, Commenting on “Purpose” in the Uniform
Commercial Code, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 419, 447-58 (1997).
410. Mistrust of the reporter, on the other hand, may lead those worried about the
comments either to fight harder for changes in the text, or to oppose the statute altogether.
Some of those involved in the drafting of Article 2B have said as much to me, and one sus-
pects that Article 2B, though extreme, is not unique.
411. See Alces & Frisch, supra note 409, at 447-58; see also, e.g., Laurens Walker, Writ-
ings on the Margin of American Law: Committee Notes, Comments, and Commentary, 29
GA. L. REV. 993 (1995).
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coming—perhaps revised Article 1, which should be finished in 2000
or so.412
3.   Use Law Revision Commissions to Study and Propose Legislation
Most states have law revision commissions that evaluate and re-
port on proposed uniform statutes, survey the state’s statutes for
anomalies and excrescencies, and propose new statutes to supersede
those now obsolete or address new problems. Their work often im-
proves the state’s own laws and can guide legislators as they make
sense of newly proposed enactments. Because these are nonpartisan,
they can also help sift through the comments of the interest groups
that praise or denounce proposed legislation. Finally, state law revi-
sion commissions have figured prominently in reshaping uniform
statutes. The U.C.C. itself was overhauled as a result of the New
York Law Revision Commission’s thorough report on the first ver-
sion; not until the new version was it enacted generally.413 More re-
cently, Article 2A’s hasty recall was occasioned by reports from the
California Bar and the Massachusetts Law Revision Commission.
State bars can do much in this vein, as Florida’s has. Still, they
can do only so much, given that bar study committees work with vol-
unteer staffs. In addition, it is possible that the bar committees could
become dominated by one or another faction, thus providing less than
dispassionate analysis of a proposed statute.414 There is much to be
said for the relative independence of a freestanding group.
                                                                                                                      
412. It should be noted that the argument for may also be an argument against. The
drafting process is already prone to manipulation by groups of those affected by the stat-
utes. Threats of opposition are common currency and can yield some great changes in the
draft statutes. In contrast, the comments are not always run by members of these groups
and thus may be more nearly pristine. Because they generally are not voted on by the leg-
islatures, they also are not amended by them and so will remain impervious to attack.
One may thus prefer the comments to be drafted after approval so that they may moder-
ate some of the influences brought to bear on the statute. The potential opponents will still
be watching, though, and the comments will be out before virtually every legislature
passes on the proposed statute. If the comments move greatly away from the understand-
ing of an affected group, it may push for a nonuniform amendment to the statute or seek to
bring the statute down.
Furthermore, the notion that the comments might be better, or at least more neutral, if
drafted after approval requires that one have great faith in the reporter and committee
chair. While I can think of no reporter or chair who is less than superbly able, it is fair to
say that some may tilt one way or another on issues and that all, though able, are mortal.
From time to time, there have been disputes over whether a reporter has faithfully cap-
tured the sense of NCCUSL or ALI in revising the statute after a request, or order, to do
so. Leaving aside the details of these disputes, the fact that they arise suggests that a good
many affected parties might be uneasy about approving a commentless statute.
413. See, e.g., supra note 412.
414. I should add that I know of no such domination in any such committee with which
I have worked. I raise the issue as at least a theoretical problem (and perhaps an actual
problem, if anecdotal evidence from outside of Florida is to be believed).
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For whatever reason, Florida lacks a law revision commission.
This may well have led to the present problems with Article 2A as to
which Florida, despite its recent actions, still lacks uniformity for no
apparent reason.415 These commissions need not be costly. For exam-
ple, New Jersey’s, with a relatively small staff and budget, has done
impressive work over the last decade or so.416 Putting one in place
would be well worth the cost, given the increased clarity and moder-
nity that Florida’s law would have.
VI.   CONCLUSION
Commercial law in the United States has had waves of develop-
ment. The first may have been early in the nineteenth century, when
Joseph Story, among others, sought to provide a degree of consis-
tency and logic to an often-confused field.417 Much the same may be
said of the latter part of the nineteenth century, during which
American law adapted to some degree to the requirements of an in-
dustrial economy. The third wave was the advance of statutes prom-
ulgated by NCCUSL, most of which appeared in the early twentieth
century.418 After this came the drafting and adoption of the U.C.C.,
which occupied the 1940s through the mid-1960s. And now we have
the last decade, in which almost every Article of the U.C.C. has been
revised, and a new one written. A golden age for commercial law?
Perhaps not. It is easy to idealize the works of our seniors, espe-
cially because we have not been around to see the messy compro-
mises that they made. Certainly the U.C.C. was no exception; indeed,
it was attacked at its outset partly because it was thought to be a
craven capitulation to the banking lobby.419 More recently, a promis-
ing attempt to render payments law coherent was scuttled after a
mass of objections, primarily from the banking industry.420 Commer-
cial law’s history is rife with these difficulties.
Still, there is some reason for doubt. All of the periods above
brought forth an efflorescence of secondary literature—all save our
own, in which commercial law occupies an ever-decreasing part of the
law reviews and the curriculum, to look at but one part of our profes-
sion. This may in part stem from the tendency of modern statutes to
draft for all contingencies, rather than rely on the statement of gen-
eral principles as guides to courts. The latter, not the former, was
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Llewellyn’s idea of a proper commercial code, and one leaves Llewel-
lyn’s framework at some peril.
This move may in part have arisen because of those most vigorous
in pushing for change in commercial law—the relevant groups regu-
lated. As noted earlier, large firms, and trade associations that give
large firms great weight, tend to favor legal certainty, even in light of
greater transition costs and, perhaps, some lack of flexibility.421 The
latter is a legitimate worry for all, but the use of form contracts and
default, rather than mandatory, rules allows large firms to contract
around rules they find inconvenient. Smaller groups affected may not
share these views, but they will likely have less of a voice when criti-
cal decisions are made. Nor do consumers always share them; though
often consumers would prefer clear, simple rules, they also want
some measure of protection against over-reaching and market imper-
fections. In general, though, we have seen something of a move from
standards to rules—or, to a point, from what Llewellyn called in an-
other context the Grand Style to the Formal Style.422
All this is to say that this generation of commercial statutes does
a great deal to clarify current problems in the cases and give effect to
good modern business practice, but does rather less to mold general
principles of law in a completely balanced way. This difficulty may be
the latest iteration of what Professor Cooper has called the “struggle
for control of the UCC” between, as she puts it, the madonnas and
the whores—advocates for clarity, consistency, and elegance and in-
terest-group representatives, respectively.423 The problem is all the
more acute because of the relatively great resources available to
those who represent larger industry groups.424 However conscientious
and competent the members of the drafting committees are—and
their standards are very high indeed—there is some effect to a steady
barrage of criticism from one side or another on any significant issue.
Moreover, a good deal of any drafting process is made with enacta-
bility in mind. Neither ALI nor NCCUSL wants to draft a pristine
and unenacted statute. This is all the more dangerous for the U.C.C.,
which is already on the books; uniformity would be imperiled were
some states to adopt a revised article and others not. Furthermore,
there is very little innate pressure for the adoption of revised uni-
form laws. Bar associations and commissioners may push a bit, but
determined opposition by an important group will often overcome
their force. This leads to a strong desire to avoid annoying any group
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that can credibly threaten to oppose a statute energetically and effec-
tively. While neither ALI nor NCCUSL would sell their good names
to this or that piece of special-interest legislation, there are often ar-
eas for good-faith debate over important principles, and in those ar-
eas the pressure, and usually the result, is for the larger, more tena-
cious groups to prevail.425
One should not yield too readily to despair. The recent revisions
that have been made have been useful, though, at times, somewhat
inclined to favor the large groups that press their cases persistently,
vigorously, and, it must be said, not implausibly. Elegance and con-
sistency are by no means out the window; indeed, the recent revi-
sions often show clean, lucid, and sensible resolutions of important
problems. Perhaps some process reforms of the sort noted above will
help rectify some of the imbalance that from time to time affects codi-
fication. In any case, we near the end of this generation of commer-
cial law reform. Whether it is a model or a warning for the future
remains to be seen.
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